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Abstract 
The techniques currently used to model risk and manage the safety of the UK railway 
network are not aligned to the mechanism by which catastrophic accidents occur in this 
industry. In this thesis, a new risk modelling method is proposed to resolve this 
problem. 
Catastrophic accidents can occur as the result of multiple failures occurring to all of the 
various defences put in place to prevent them. The UK railway industry is prone to this 
mechanism of accident occurrence, as many different technical, operational and 
organizational defences are used to prevent accidents. 
The railway network exists over a wide geographic area, with similar accidents possible 
at many different locations. The risk from these accidents is extremely variable and 
depends on the underlying conditions at each particular location, such as the state of 
assets or the speed of trains. When unfavourable conditions coincide the probability of 
multiple failures of planned defences increases and a 'risk hotspot' arises. 
Ideal requirements for modelling risk are proposed, taking account of the need to 
manage multiple defences of conceptually different type and the existence of risk 
hotspots. The requirements are not met by current risk modelling techniques although 
some of the requirements have been addressed experimentally, and in other industries 
and countries. 
It is proposed to meet these requirements using Bayesian Networks to supplement and 
extend fault and event tree analysis, the traditional techniques used for risk modelling 
in the UK railway industry. Application of the method is demonstrated using a case 
study: the building of a model of derailment risk on the UK railway network. 
The proposed method provides a means of better integrating industry wide analysis 
and risk modelling with the safety management tasks and safety related decisions that 
are undertaken by safety managers in the industry. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Safety of complex systems 
In the modern world, our safety depends on complex systems. We travel by aeroplane 
to go on holiday and commute to work using the railway; we use energy that is derived 
from nuclear power stations; and we use products which are developed using chemical 
processing. Each of these systems comprises different elements. There is a 
technological core, generally consisting of engineered hardware and software systems; 
there are people who maintain and operate the technological parts of the system; and 
there is the management organisation which sets the context and culture in which the 
whole system functions. 
These systems have the potential for catastrophe, but society demands high levels of 
safety from them. In order to meet society's needs, they must be designed, operated, 
maintained and managed to ensure that the occurrence of accidents is reduced as 
much as possible. Potential accidents must be predicted and the whole system made 
to operate in such a way as to prevent them from occurring. 
In most industries, a clear understanding of which accidents are possible has arisen 
over many years through experience. This understanding of accidents, including their 
causes, relative severities and likelihoods, is consolidated and captured in risk models. 
These models are widely used and accepted. They are used to support decisions 
about how to design, operate and manage the system and support the management 
systems that companies have in place for ensuring safety. Both the accuracy of risk 
models, and the way in which they influence decision making and safety management, 
are critical to the safe operation of complex systems. 
1.2 The UK railway system 
The railway industry in the United Kingdom 1 (UK) is one such complex system. It is 
huge in scope, consisting of many thousands of miles of rail and many stations and 
depots. It also comprises of a variety of different hardware and software systems, 
including those for signalling, electrification and rolling stock. These elements must be 
1 The railway network in Northern Ireland is undertaken under a separate managerial and 
legislative framework from that of the remainder of the United Kingdom; however, this is not 
relevant to the work described here so for the sake of familiarity the UK is referred to in this 
thesis rather than Great Britain. 
1 1 
integrated and the system must be operated, maintained and managed effectively to 
deliver a safe transport service to the railway's many users. 
Safety is assured through the use of various control measures. The system is designed 
so that no single failure or error in control measures can lead to an accident. The 
technical, operational and managerial elements of the system all play their part in 
preventing accidents and must work together to ensure that accidents do not occur. 
This makes the system prone to major accidents when all controls fail COincidentally in 
the same location. Safety is a property of the system as a whole. However the safety 
controls are often implemented by conceptually different, and separately managed, 
engineering and operational disciplines. Because of the complexity that this creates 
management of safety is difficult. Local conditions may mean that the risk in a 
particular location is disproportionately high, because of the increased likelihood of 
failure of a number of safety controls. However detailed knowledge of the potential 
accidents and the effectiveness of each safety control in each location is needed to 
identify such conditions before an accident occurs. 
The UK Railway Industry was privati sed in 1994. Since privatisation the industry has 
increasingly moved away from a prescriptive, standards-based approach to safety 
management. The modern railway industry relies increasingly on risk models and risk 
assessment practices. Safety has improved in recent years but serious train accidents 
have continued to occur. The industry must therefore seek to improve safety by 
developing better techniques for estimating accident risk, and by using these estimates 
to support decision making more effectively. 
1.3 Risk modelling in the UK railway industry 
If a company understands what the various diffuse causes of an accident are, and 
where they are likely to occur, it can seek to ensure that safety controls prevent their 
occurrence. 
The railway industry's understanding of accident causation is captured in risk models. 
However, the approaches used are not well aligned to the nature of risk on the railway. 
Models do not include the myriad causes that might be implicated in the occurrence of 
a major accident. Risk models are also often representative of large sections of the 
network, or use data derived in this way. Therefore they do not capture the specific 
circumstances that often result in substantially increased risk in a particular situation. 
For example, at Ladbroke Grove an accident occurred when an inexperienced train 
driver drove a train past a red signal on a section of the network where experienced 
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drivers had noted the difficulty of reading and interpreting the meaning of lineside 
signals (Cullen 2000; Cullen 2001). The increased risk at this location was not 
estimated prior to the accident as there were no risk models which explicitly included 
both driver inexperience and poorly positioned infrastructure as potential accident 
causes. Even if these conditions had been included as causes in a model, it is unlikely 
that the high level of risk would have been identified as it occurred in this particular 
situation only, and any risk assessment undertaken would be likely to model the 
average risk across a particular area of infrastructure and an average set of 
circumstances. The Ladbroke Grove accident is described and investigated further in 
section 3.3. 
According to the theory of organizational accidents (Reason 2002), in the aftermath of 
an accident there is increased awareness and vigilance throughout an organisation and 
safety performance improves as a result. Catastrophic accidents are rare. In the 
absence of accidents, risk levels will gradually rise as an organisation becomes 
complacent. 
In this thesis I argue that the UK railway industry is prone to the occurrence of 
organizational accidents. However, the nature of risk on a rail network means that the 
industry faces particular problems in managing such risk, and preventing the 
occurrence of major accidents. The railway network exists over a wide geographic 
area. Similar accidents are thus possible at many different locations. However, the risk 
from these accidents is extremely variable and depends on the underlying conditions at 
each particular location. The implication of this large system scope and variation, and 
organizational accident theory is that, at any given time, there are locations on the 
railway network where risk is disproportionately high. This huge scope and variation 
complicates risk modelling, and the review presented finds that current approaches do 
not easily support systematic estimation of risk across a range of locations. 
Risk models which include all significant accident causes, and which are rapidly 
updatable with different situation specific information, could be used to identify when 
and where risk levels are dangerously high to pre-empt the occurrence of accidents. 
This would lead to a more intelligent and targeted approach to the management of 
safety, and models which better support decision making. 
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1.4 Hypotheses 
Four linked hypotheses are argued in this thesis. 
Hypothesis 1: 
Organizational accident theory provides an explanation for the mechanisms by which 
major accidents occur within the UK railway industry. 
Hypothesis 2: 
Given that the industry is prone to the occurrence of organizational accidents a risk 
modelling approach with particular characteristics is needed in order to ideally support 
the effective management of safety (these particular characteristics are defined as 
requirements RMR1-3, SMS1 and SDM1 in section 3.7) 
Hypothesis 3: 
Current risk modelling approaches in use in the UK railway industry do not have these 
characteristics. 
Hypothesis 4: 
The development of a risk modelling approach that has these characteristics IS 
possible. 
1.5 Outline 
The thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 provides essential context required to understand the remainder of the 
thesis. Concepts relating to risk analysis, risk modelling, safety management and their 
general application in the UK railway industry are first described. Because many terms 
are subjective and their use is flexible, the terms that are used in the remainder of this 
thesis are selected and definitions provided for them. In particular the term 'cause' is 
defined and a number of different categorisations of causal type are proposed. The 
modelling and analysis techniques that are commonly used in the railway industry are 
also described. 
In Chapter 3 organizational accident theory is described. This is the theory that 
complex systems are prone to the occurrence of major accidents. By looking at the 
recent history of safety incidents in the UK railway industry, it is concluded that the 
mechanism by which accidents occur in the industry is consistent with organizational 
accident theory (arguing hypothesis 1). 
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I then investigate what the theory says about the prevention of accidents, and find that 
there are three fundamental problems with the application of organizational accident 
theory to the management of risk in the UK railway industry: 
• Lack of safety indicator data. 
• Problems with data collection. 
• The size and variability of the railway network. 
Given these problems, a set of requirements for an ideal risk model are developed to 
support the management of organizational accidents. These requirements elaborate 
upon hypothesis 2. 
Chapter 4 presents the argument in support of hypothesis 3, that current approaches 
substantially fail to meet the ideal requirements outlined. The risk modelling 
approaches used in the UK railway industry are described and then reviewed against 
the ideal requirements proposed in section 3.7. 
In Chapter 5, risk modelling approaches and research which indicate how models that 
meet the ideal requirements of hypothesis 2 might be developed are reviewed. None of 
the approaches reviewed fully meet these ideal requirements, however each provides 
some insight into what a new approach might look like. 
In Chapter 6 Bayesian Networks (BNs), and the underlying theory that supports them, 
are introduced. I then go on to review how BNs have been applied to safety problems 
and risk analysis, in particular in the aviation industry. This allows ideas for how BN 
models could be used to build risk models that meet the requirements set out in 
Chapter 3 to be developed. 
The ideas explored in Chapters 5 and 6 are applied in Chapters 7 and 8, where a case 
study is described which illustrates a new approach to modelling risk in the UK railway 
industry, based on the development of a parameterised risk model using a BN. 
In Chapter 7, the first part of the case study is outlined: the development of a 
parameterised BN based on the structure of a set of event trees. The case study 
describes how event trees from an existing railway industry risk analysis can be used 
to develop a BN model. The model incorporates all logic from the original event tree 
models and also makes the condition states that form the underlying assumptions of 
the initial analysis both explicit and variable. 
In Chapter 8, Part 2 of the case study, which builds on the work described in Chapter 7, 
is outlined. A parameterised BN model which incorporates both fault tree and event 
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tree logic is described. Like the event tree model described in the previous chapter, the 
model is parameterised by making condition states explicit and variable. The 
parameterised risk model is quantified using available data and expert judgement. The 
key features of models of this type are described, and I argue that these features 
substantially meet three of the five ideal requirements for risk modelling that were 
previously set out. Therefore this argument partially supports hypothesis 4, that models 
which meet the ideal requirements set out are possible 
In Chapter 9 the argument in support of hypothesis 4 is completed. I argue that the 
parameterised risk model meets the remaining two ideal requirements that were initially 
set out in this thesis, namely that it: effectively supports the various stages of a safety 
management system and; is usable and understandable by those who actually manage 
safety on the network. 
In order to argue that the model meets these requirements, I first describe how such a 
model would be developed (see section 9.1) and used in practice (see sections 9.2 and 
9,3). 
In Chapter 10 the argument is summarised and the contribution of this thesis is stated. 
Further work made possible by the work described here is discussed. Finally, a vision 
for the future of parmeterised risk models of the type described here is presented. 
A glossary of terms is presented in Chapter 11, and the reference list is provided in 
Chapter 12. 
1.6 Published papers 
This thesis draws on its author's contributions to seven different published papers. 
Section 2.1.3: provides a description of safety decision making principles in the UK 
railway industry, and their relationship to legal duties that first appeared in (Bearfield 
2007b). 
The characteristics of ideal risk models presented in section 3.7 and subsequently 
used to assess various risk modelling approaches were initially proposed in (Bearfield, 
Dray et al. 2007). This paper also provided some of the review material in sections 
4.2.1 and 5.2 and presented the concept of a parameterised risk model that is 
expanded upon in section 10.4. 
Various aspects of the case study described in Chapter 7 have previously been 
published. The translation from an event tree to a BN described in section 7.1 formed 
the basis of (Bearfield and Marsh 2005). The development of a BN based on multiple 
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related event trees described in section 7.4 was first presented in (Marsh and Bearfield 
2007a). The case study described in Chapter 7 was published in its entirety in (Marsh 
and Bearfield 2008). 
The use of BNs to parameterise fault trees to allow location specific risk estimates in 
the railway industry, as described for derailment accidents in sections 8.3 to 8.5, was 
first explored using an example relating to SPAD accidents in (Marsh and Bearfield 
2007b). Section 10.3.1 outlines a proposed approach to the inclusion of organizational 
indicators in risk models that was initially presented in (Marsh and Bearfield 2004) 
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2 Risk analysis and modelling principles, definitions and 
techniques 
This chapter presents the essential context required to understand the rest of the 
thesis. First, concepts relating to risk analysis, risk modelling and safety management 
and their general application in the UK railway industry are described. A common 
theme which emerges is a general lack of clarity and consistency in the use of 
terminology in, and the application of, many of the concepts surrounding risk and 
safety. Therefore, I state and define the terms that I intend to use in the remainder of 
this thesis. In particular, the term 'cause' is defined and a number of different 
categorisations of causal type are proposed. 
The modelling and analysis techniques that are commonly used in the railway industry 
are also described. 
2.1 Fundamental principles and requirements 
In this subsection, fundamental risk and safety principles and concepts are described 
and the application of these principles in the UK railway industry is considered, at a 
high level. 
2.1.1 Definition of risk 
In a safety context, the term 'risk' is widely understood, in technical and academic fields 
as well as in general usage, to relate jointly to both the estimated losses which can be 
caused by a future event and the probability of occurrence of that event. This definition 
is particularly appropriate for risk in a safety context, as accidents are highly 
undesirable and (ideally) highly unlikely events. 
In the early part of the twentieth century, contrasting views were expressed about the 
nature of probability, which forms one of the components of risk. Subjectivists like 
DeFinetli saw probability as purely a product of human belief. Objectivists, like Frank 
Knight, believed that intrinsically true probabilities did exist and the difficulty lay only in 
accurately estimating what those probabilities were (Holton 2004). In this thesis, 
judgement derived probabilities are used. The approach is a subjective one. It accepts 
that probability estimates can be formed by people's beliefs however it also accepts 
that objective data might influence people's judgements about probability. Bedford and 
Cooke point out one consequence of accepting subjective probability in systems 
engineering: 
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'Since every rational individual has his own subjective probability it is necessary to find 
a way of building consensus.' (Bedford and Cooke 2001) p199. 
In the fields of safety engineering and safety management, the philosophical issues 
concerning risk are less important than whether or not it is a useful concept to 
practically apply to improve safety. The commonly understood definition is therefore 
considered sufficient. In the UK railway industry's Engineering Safety Management 
guidelines (RSSB 2007b)2 risk is defined as 'the likelihood that an accident will happen 
and the harm that could arise'. Similar definitions may be found in other technical 
standards used in the railway and other industries (for example (BSI 1999)). These 
suggest the following equation, which is accepted for risk assessment generally 
including in the UK railway industry: 
Equation 1: risk = likelihood x severity 
where 'likelihood' refers to the probability of occurrence of some event in a given period 
of time, and 'severity' refers to the death or injury that would be caused by this event. 
Risks levels are therefore generally expressed in 'fatalities per year' or in similar units 
incorporating components of time and injury or death. Risk is estimated using expert 
judgement, available data on the frequency and severity of past events or a 
combination of the two. Risk can be estimated qualitatively, for example using matrices 
(BSI 1999; RSSB 2001), or calculated using quantitative techniques like fault and event 
tree analysis. However, regardless of the technique applied an element of judgement is 
always required. These techniques are described in section 2.4. 
Some have also expressed concerns about the nature of risk. Wilde (Wilde 2001) and 
Adams (Adams 1995) argue that people, by their very nature, accept certain levels of 
risk in their lives and that attempts to measure and reduce risk will always be 
undermined by this mechanism. For example, the driver wearing a seat belt has a 
tendency to drive faster than the driver who is not wearing one ((Adams 1995), p125). 
2.1.2 Legal duty to manage risk 
Legal requirements placed on organisations operating in the railway industry mandate 
some degree of risk assessment. Sections 2, 3 and 4 of Health and Safety at Work Act 
1974 (HSWA) (HMSO 1974) require all employers, including railway companies, to 
manage safety 'so far as is reasonably practicable'. The duty is not just to identify the 
2 Commonly known as and hereafter referred to as the 'Yellow Book'. 
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risks inherent to the company's work activity, but also to effectively minimise them. 
Companies must minimise all risks that are foreseeable. A company manages risk 
through the application of its Safety Management System (see section 2.1.4). 
2.1.3 Safety decision making 
The legal duties that rail companies must discharge in the UK when taking decisions 
that affect safety are based on a complex mixture of case and statute law. There are, 
however, few court rulings that help to clarify how the railways can determine what 
measures are reasonably practicable; thus there is the potential for conflicting views to 
exist about how to interpret the law. Ultimately, each decision taker is responsible for 
deciding if the proposed course of action is reasonable, and if necessary, defending 
that decision in court. 
Determination of whether an action is reasonably practicable involves balancing its 
risks, costs and benefits. The principle was set out in a Court of Appeal judgment in the 
case of Edwards (Asquith 1949): 
I ••• a computation must be made .. .in which the quantum of risk is placed on one scale 
and the sacrifice involved in the measures necessary for averting the risk (whether in 
money, time or trouble) is placed in the other, and that, if it be shown that there is a 
gross disproportion between them - the risk being insignificant to the sacrifice - the 
defendants discharge the onus on them. ' 
Comparison of the risk associated with an action and its cost, as implied by the 
Edwards judgement, is not simple as risk and cost are not measured in the same units. 
In the UK railway industry, risk is generally estimated in Fatalities and Weighted 
Injuries (FWI) per year. 3 In order to make a comparison of risks with costs, the risk 
needs to be translated into a financial value. This is done using the industry 'Value of 
Preventing a Fatality' (VPF), a figure endorsed for use by the Department for 
Transport, which is currently £1.6 million per statistical fatality averted. This figure was 
originally developed from studies of what a selection of members of the public said that 
they would be willing to pay for reduction in risk levels. As the VPF is a measure of 
what society says they are willing to pay for risk reduction, a sensible and proportionate 
approach would be to mandate expenditure of resources for the reduction of one FWI 
only up to the VPF. This would appear logical and reasonable, but it does not sit 
3 1 FWI is equivalent to: 1 fatality; 10 major injuries; 200 reportable minor injuries or; 1000 non 
reportable minor injuries. (RSSB 2008b), page 27. 
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comfortably with the judgment in the Edwards case, which requires expenditure to be 
incurred unless it is 'grossly disproportionate' to the safety benefit. If that judgment is 
considered to be a true statement of the legal requirements, which is questionable, it 
offers no guidance to help determine under what circumstances and to what degree 
additional expenditure might be necessary. 
Prior to 2006, when they handed over of their railway responsibilities to the ORR, the 
HSE and HMRI produced various documents which sought to clarify how they believed 
the law relating to safety decisions should be interpreted. However, these documents 
were written from the perspective of the regulator and primarily addressed regulatory 
concerns. The central purpose of the HSE's document 'Reducing Risks Protecting 
People' (R2P2) (HSE 2001 b) was stated to be: 
'opening up [the HSE's] decision making process rather then providing guidance to 
duty-holders'. 
Nevertheless, this document implied that the industry should adopt the principles stated 
as a means of ensuring that they were taking decisions correctly. In particular it implied 
that railway companies should take account of loosely defined terms like 'societal 
concern' in their determination of what is reasonably practicable. Industry found that 
this guidance was not helpful and only added further confusion. Consultation to 
address this confusion led to many comments from the industry, typical amongst them 
being the comment from the Association of Train Operating Companies (A TOC) that it 
was important that the industry approach to decision taking: 
'deliberately excludes any factor relating to subjective perception of risk ... ATOC 
Members do not believe that this concept has any part in a formulation of legal duty' 
(Bearfield 2007a), page 13. 
Following consultation, and in response to the regulatory guidance documents, the 
industry published 'Taking Safe Decisions' (RSSB 2008b) to clarify its interpretation of 
its legal duties under HSWA. The industry position is that the determination of 
reasonable practicability should be taken by a professional person based on the 
balance between the risk reduction a measure achieves and its cost. The term 'gross 
disproportion' used in the Edwards judgement is taken to relate to the fact that risk is 
often very difficult to estimate with accuracy, and the decision taker might tend to err on 
the side of caution given uncertainty in the risk estimates. 
However, both 'Taking Safe Decisions' and ORR guidance (ORR 2008) agree that 
CBA, and the risk analysis that supports it, do not provide a definitive answer when it 
comes to the taking of safety related decisions. 'Taking Safe Decisions' states that 
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'CBA is only an input into the overall decision taking process and is used to inform a 
judgement.' (RSSB 2008b), page 34. 
ORR guidance similarly stresses that: 
'CBA cannot form the sole argument in showing that risks are reduced SFAIRP. CBA is 
not an end in itself, but rather an aid to decision making.' (ORR 2008), page 1. 
Because of the uncertainty inherent in the estimation of risk, any decision about 
reasonable practicability ultimately must be made by an informed professional 
judgement. In this context, the primary purpose of a risk assessment exercise is to 
educate and inform decision makers, so that they have a better awareness of the key 
issues and can make a well-informed judgement. The risk assessment is therefore not 
seen to be an accurate analysis which gives a definitive answer or option to take 
forward. There is agreement that there is no substitute for informed professional 
judgement, although some research has been undertaken to develop models to 
support the decision taking process itself (Bedford and Quigley 2004). 
2.1.4 Management of Safety on the UK railway network 
The formerly state owned railway company, British Rail (BR), was privatised in 1994. 
Prior to this BR's Safety and Standards Directorate (S&SD) undertook safety 
management tasks for the network as a whole, including accident investigation and 
audit of all of its five regions4 . Over the years since privatisation, S&SD evolved into the 
Rail Safety and Standards Board, which no longer undertakes audit, but which does 
fulfil a range of other roles in the facilitation and organisation of industry wide safety 
management activity. For example, RSSB: 
• facilitates discussion and agreement between railway companies about how to 
proceed with industry safety policy decisions. 
• maintains a comprehensive model of the risk at the network level to assist with 
industry policy making and planning (RSSB 2006). 
• produces the Strategic Safety Plan (RSSB 2008a), which consolidates the 
plans of all railway companies operating on the network 
• assists industry planning by maintaining Railway Group Standards (RGS) on 
behalf of the railway industry. 
4 The Western, Southern, Scottish, Eastern and London Midland. 
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• retains a role in facilitating industry monitoring by maintaining the Safety 
Management Information System (SMIS), which is a database that is used to 
record monitoring data from the various railway companies. Accident 
investigation was previously undertaken by RSSB, but is now undertaken by the 
Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB). 
In the UK railway industry, SMSs were previously mandated for railway organisations 
as part of the Railways (Safety Case) Regulations (HMSO 1994). In April 2006, these 
regulations were superseded by the Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems 
(Safety) Regulations 2006 (ROGS) (HMSO 2006), which implement requirements in 
the Railway Safety Directive (RSD) (EC 2004). These regulations require train 
operating companies and infrastructure managers to implement a safety management 
system which must be certified by the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR). 
Accident event sequences may cross organizational boundaries. Using the Ladbroke 
Grove accident (which is reviewed in detail in section 3.3.1) as an example, a SPAD 
could be partially caused by driver inexperience and partially caused by poor signal 
sighting. Each of these factors is managed by a separate organisation; therefore a 
degree of cooperation is required between organisations in order to manage safety 
effectively. This cooperation might extend to the sharing of risk models, the agreement 
of common ways of working, or the free flow of safety related information. ROGS 
places a duty of cooperation on railway companies to work together to manage such 
risks. 
A Safety Management System (SMS) is the name given to the organisation and 
arrangements put in place by a company to ensure that it operates as safely as is 
possible. The system must ensure that risks are identified, assessed and effectively 
controlled. The concept of a SMS is applied throughout all safety critical industries. 
Different formalisations of this concept exist (for example (CAA 2002; MOD 2004)), 
however all are based on the same underlying principles. The Health and Safety 
Executive's safety management guidelines (HSE 1997) provide a clear overview of 
these principles and the basic contents of a SMS. The guidelines stress that the SMS 
must consist of the following elements, whose initial letters spell out the acronym 
POPMAR. 
• Policy: a policy stating the general intentions and objectives of the organisation 
and the criteria and principles upon which it bases its action. 
• Organisation: an effective management structure that puts In place the 





Planning: clear plans and procedures for the organisation to follow in order to 
ensure that risks are managed. 
Monitoring: mechanisms for measuring safety performance through the 
collection of data (active monitoring) and the investigation of incidents and 
accidents (reactive monitoring). 
Audit: Regular auditing of the organisation to determine how effectively plans 
and procedures are being implemented. 
• Review: Arrangements for the review of the management system itself to 
ensure that it adapts and evolves with the organisation. 
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The relationships between the key elements of a SMS according to the POPMAR 
guidelines are outlined in the diagram of Figure 1. The diagram shows how information 
flows between the various SMS elements. A good safety management system is 
subjected to constant review and update. Work by Kirwan stresses that this is 
particularly necessary in the modern business environment which is subject to rapid 
and continual change (Kirwan 2001). 
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2.2 Risk assessment and modelling terms and concepts 
In this section some of the key terms and concepts used for the assessment and 
modelling of risk are described and the intended use of these terms and concepts 
within this thesis is clearly outlined. 
2.2.1 Accidents 
Like many terms in the safety field, 'accident' is regularly used in everyday 
conversation. The common usage of the term 'accident' and its safety engineering 
usage are for all practical purpose identical. The Yellow Book offers the definition: 
'An unintended event or series of events that results in harm. ' 
A more precise definition is offered by Leveson, who describes an accident as: 
'An undesired and unplanned event that results in a loss (including loss of human life or 
injury, property damage, environmental pollution, etc).' ((Leveson 2002b), p 265) 
This is similar to the definition provided by the Federal Aviation Authority in its system 
safety handbook (FAA 2000). These definitions do not restrict accidents to events 
resulting in death or injury. Financial losses and environmental losses are also 
included. However, as safety management activities are undertaken to reduce health 
and safety risk, and this is a function of harm to people, these activities therefore focus 
on a subset of accidents. 
Some have taken the definition of an accident further by describing specific types of 
accident. As already discussed in the last chapter, Reason focuses his concern on 
organizational accidents, a concept that is fundamental to the arguments presented in 
this thesis: 
'These are the comparatively rare, but often catastrophic, events that occur within 
complex modern technologies ... Organizational accidents have multiple causes, 
involving many different people operating at different levels of their respective 
companies .. . organizational accidents ... can have devastating effects on uninvolved 
populations, assets and the environment ((Reason 2002), page 1). 
The concept of Organizational Accidents is an evolution of Perrow's concept of Normal 
Accidents (Perrow 1999). Perrow postulated that there are some major accidents that 
are inevitable. This is because of the high levels of energy managed by some systems 
and the complexity of their design. He theorised that it is impossible for human 
intervention to prevent accidents from occurring in such systems in certain 
circumstances. Normal accident theory has not influenced safety practice as strongly 
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as organizational accident theory perhaps because it is much less focussed on the 
prevention of accidents. Hopkins (Hopkins 1999) provides a critique of normal accident 
theory that makes this point. In this thesis the concept of a 'normal accident' is not 
considered helpful. The term accident as defined by Leveson is used. Where 
organizational accidents are referred to this alternative term is used explicitly. 
2.2.2 Causes 
It is self-evident that to prevent accidents from occurring, the various possible accident 
causes must be known so that they can be prevented from happening. The notion of 
causality is key to everyday life and in a general sense is universally understood. For 
example, when we get in our car in the morning and the windscreen is frosted over, we 
start the car heater to clear it in the knowledge that the frost is caused by the cold, and 
heat will remove it. However rigorous definition and analysis of the concept of causality 
is much more difficult. There is rarely a single cause of an event. The frost on the car 
window could equally be considered to have been caused by the moisture in the air. 
Mathematicians and philosophers, such as John Stuart Mill and Ernest Nagel, have 
considered issues such as whether a certain set of causes are jointly sufficient to 
cause an event, and whether all such causes are necessary in order for an event to 
occur (Ladkin 2002). In recent years, Pearl has sought to provide a rigorous 
mathematical framework for understanding and interpreting causality (Pearl 2000). 
In the railway industry, the term 'cause' is used to encompass a wide variety of different 
phenomena. Because of this causes are often categorised. The term 'direct cause' (or 
'immediate cause') is commonly used to refer to the final event that occurred in the 
accident event sequence, which should have been prevented by the organisation. 
Identification of a 'direct cause' is therefore a sequential distinction, and the 'direct 
cause' mayor may not be the focus of subsequent accident prevention activities. This 
categorisation implies that earlier events, which preceded the direct cause, and which 
increased the chance that the direct cause would happen, are also causes of the 
accident. In their report into the Potters Bar accident the Health and Safety Executive 
describe the 'catastrophic failure in points 2182A' ((HSE 2002c), page 35) as, 
variously, the initiating, immediate and direct cause of the derailment. 
The term 'underlying cause' or 'root cause' is used to refer to the cause that is seen as 
fundamental to the occurrence of the accident, and without the occurrence of which it is 
perceived that the accident would not have occurred. Although there are no clear rules 
to help in the selection of a root cause, this is often done without controversy. As Pearl 
states: 
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'Human intuition is extremely keen in detecting and ascertaining [the actual cause].' 
((Pearl 2000), page 309). 
The 'underlying cause' of the Potters Bar derailment was identified by the HSE as 
being: 
'the poor condition of points 2182A at the time of the incident, and that this resulted 
from inappropriate adjustment and from insufficient maintenance compared to what 
was necessary for their operating environment and safety functions.' ((HSE 2002c) 
page 37). 
Note that according to this interpretation causes are not always events. The root cause 
of the Potters Bar derailment was 'the poor condition of points 2182A'. Accident reports 
often list many 'conditions' as contributory to the occurrence of an accident. These 
conditions are sometimes referred to as influences, influencing factors or just factors. In 
this thesis, the terms 'root cause' and 'direct cause' (or their variants) are not used. 
Both events and conditions are considered to be 'causes', provided that their 
occurrence or state respectively result in an increase in the likelihood of occurrence of 
an accident. In section 2.3, types of event and condition are categorised, and therefore 
by extension so are types of accident cause. 
2.2.3 Hazard 
The Railway Safety Standards 50126-50129 (BSI 1999; BSI 2001; BSI 2003) and the 
international standard IEC61508 (BSI 2002) define a hazard as 'a physical situation 
with a potential for human injury.' In order to understand and apply the concept of a 
hazard usefully in the safety field systems engineering concepts are applied. 
A hazard is expressed at the boundary of a system. For example if we are introducing 
a new type of colour light signal onto the railway network, we are concerned with its 
interfaces to the wider railway system. Hazards would therefore relate to: possible 
misinterpretation of the signal by train drivers; the interfacing of the signal to the signal 
interlocking computer; the interfacing of the signal to the lines ide railway power supply 
and so on. 
Figure 2 (taken from the Yellow Book (RSSB 2007b), page 152) illustrates the concept 
of the system boundary and shows how the hazard should be specified at that 
boundary. A hazard is useful in safety engineering as it provides a focal point for any 
analysis. Causes of hazards are potentially under the control of the organisation 
responsible for the system. In the case of our colour light system these causes would 
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include component failures that result in the operating parameters of the signal falling 
outside of its specification. 
Causal analysis, such as fault tree analysis (see section 2.4.2) , is used to understand 
these effects. For those who interface externally with the system, the hazard also 
provides a focal point, as they need to be aware of the nature of the potential hazard 
and how they could prevent the hazard escalating into an accident. The diagram 
highlights that once a hazard exists then it is possible that an accident will occur. 
Causal Factors 
Figure 2: Safety analysis system boundary 
The Yellow Book states that: 
System 
Boundary 
'Any change to the rai/way can be regarded as introducing a new system, or changing 
an existing one. Understanding the boundary between a system and its environment is 
a prerequisite to understanding how the system might contribute to an accident (that is 
understanding what its hazards are).' ((RSSB 2007b), page 27). 
The yellow book is concerned with engineering change, and hence its focus is on the 
introduction of new systems to the railway. However the operational railway network as 
a whole is also a system and the same concepts apply. This system incorporates both 
the train and the track and all other elements of the operational railway. The presence 
of an undetected track fault could be considered to be a hazard expressed at the 
boundary of this larger system. Once this hazard has occurred it is a matter of 
circumstance whether or not a derailment occurs. If a train is permitted to traverse that 
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section of track, a derailment accident might occur, and there are no further measures 
under the control of the railway industry that could prevent it. 
The identification of hazards is the first stage in any analysis of modelling of risks. To 
identify hazards, a safety engineer generally gathers together a group of domain 
experts and takes them through a structured process such as the use of checklists of 
the types of hazards and accidents that might occur. The concept of a hazard IS 
fundamental to the risk modelling work subsequently described in this thesis. 
2.2.4 Consequence 
The Yellow Book ((RSSB 2007b). Page 229) defines consequence as: 
'the results arising from the addition of energy or exposure to a hazard. These may 
range from benign results to accidents. Several consequences may be associated with 
a hazard' 
As ,in the safety field the term 'consequence' is often closely related to the concept of 
a hazard. As was described in section 2.2.3, the presence of a hazard mayor may not 
result in the occurrence of an accident. A derailment hazard could result in a minor 
train derailment with no resulting injury or loss of life, or alternatively a derailed train 
could collide with a train travelling in the opposite direction resulting in many injuries 
and fatalities. Analysis of these events is referred to as consequence analysis and 
generally makes use of Event Tree Analysis (see section 2.4.3). Each hazard has a 
range of possible consequences. To understand risk and manage safety we are 
concerned with a subset of these consequences, the ones resulting in injuries and 
fatalities to people. 
2.3 Types of cause 
In section 2.2.2, the concept of a cause was described and it was concluded that 
causes could be either events or conditions. In this section, events and conditions are 
further distinguished by considering sub-categories of each. Categorisation of events 
into failures, human errors and external events is proposed, along with categorisation 
of conditions into technical, operational, organizational and performance conditions. 




Understanding and rigorous definition of the conceptual meaning of the term 'event' is 
closely related to understanding and definition of 'cause'. The definition of the term is 
similarly an unresolved and complex philosophical question which has been the subject 
of debate by philosophers like Kim (Kim 1973; Kim 1977) for many years. For our 
purposes it is sufficient to define an event as an occurrence that happens 
instantaneously or over a short period of time. An event can be reasonably 
approximated as having only two states: 'event has occurred' and 'event has not 
occurred'. The two-state approximation simplifies the modelling of events, for example 
by making them suitable for modelling in a fault tree (see 2.4.1). 
Cause 1 
Event I Condition 
f External event Failure Technical Organizational 
condition condition 
r Human Error ~ Operational Performance condition condition 
Figure 3: Hierarchy of causal types 
2.3.1.1 Failures 
Smith defines a failure as: 
'Non-performance to some defined performance criteria'. ((Smith 1997), page 11) 
The concept has found use widely in the field of reliability engineering which developed 
in the aftermath of the Second World War, and was initially developed to support the 
analysis of the Minuteman launch control system (Watson 1961). To design high 
reliability systems, designers need to be aware of how the individual components of 
these systems could fail. Using this information, they can determine how the system 
itself might fail and hence improve on its design, often by building redundancy into the 
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system. The concept developed for application to electrical/electronic systems, 
mechanical systems and their hybrids. Failure rates for electrical/electronic and 
mechanical components can be derived from manufacturer's data. Components are 
tested by manufacturers over a period of time, and the average failure rates under a 
range of operating conditions are taken to be indicative of the failure rate of 
components of the same type. US military specifications are also available which 
provide guidance on calculating the failure rate of electronic components using their 
operating parameters (000 1991). It has been argued that the prediction of failure 
rates is complex and often inaccurate (Blanks 1998). However, there are some 
characteristics of failure rates that make them easier to quantify than human error rates 
(see section 2.3.1.2). The performance of hardware is less susceptible to external 
influences than people are and it is possible to control the environment to limit the 
effect of these influences. For example, solid state electronic components are specified 
given certain power dissipations, and certain operational temperature ranges. These 
conditions can be controlled, and therefore the failure rates of these components made 
more predictable. 
Failure of electrical, electronic and mechanical components is often practically 
instantaneous, and these failures, for example the open circuit failure of a resistor 
inside a colour light signal or the fracturing of a rail as a train passes over it, can 
therefore be considered to be events. 
2.3.1.2 Human error 
As the reliability of man-made systems has improved, the relative importance of the 
human contribution to safety performance has risen. Research into human error, and 
how to prevent it, has a long history and in the latter years of the twentieth century 
coherent frameworks for understanding and managing human error emerged, such as 
Reason's Generic Error Modelling System (GEMS) (Reason 1990) and the skill-rule-
knowledge framework (Rasmussen and Jensen 1974) from which it is derived. 
A good example of a human error in the railway industry is the occurrence of a Signal 
Passed at Danger (SPAD). A SPAD is an unintentional violation of a safety procedure 
by a driver. Edkins and Pollock concluded that SPADs are skill based errors which 
occur because of the repetitive nature of train driving tasks, and loss of attention that 
inevitably occurs as a result (Edkins and Pollock 1997). Significant work has been 
undertaken into the mechanisms by which SPADs occur over many years, for example: 
(Buck 1963; Williams 1977; Van-der-Flier and Schoonman 1988; Wright 2000; Wright 
and Embrey 2000; Wright, Embrey et al. 2000). Much of the work in this area is 
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concerned with classifying and understanding different error types and the 
circumstances in which they can occur. 
The rates of occurrence of human errors in different circumstances can be estimated. 
One of the most popular techniques for estimating human error rates is the Human 
Error Assessment & Reduction Technique (HEART) (Williams 1986). The technique 
provides a set of generic task types with associated error probabilities. Activities to be 
undertaken are matched to the list of generic tasks, and hence to their associated 
probabilities. A further list of error producing conditions is provided and these are used 
to scale the generic probabilities in accordance with the specific sets of conditions. The 
failure rates and factors are derived from an in depth survey of literature and incident 
reports. 
Estimating human failure rates in this way depends to a great extent on the application 
knowledge of the analyst and their skill at applying the particular technique. A validation 
exercise of three human reliability quantification techniques, including HEART (Kiwan 
1996; Kirwan, Kennedy et al. 1997) found that only 38% of the 30 human error 
probabilities analysed were within a factor of three of values obtained experimentally. It 
is harder to control the influences that may affect human failure rates. The HEART 
technique asserts that these rates are influenced by a wide range of 'error producing 
conditions'. It is not always possible to manage the environment that people operate in 
to constrain all of these conditions or completely control the environment that people 
operate in and this complicates the estimation of human error rates. Nevertheless 
these techniques are widely used for safety analysis. 
2.3.1.3 External event 
The occurrence of some events increases risk, although the events could not in 
themselves be considered failures or errors. For example, if two trains pass each other 
on adjacent tracks, this is for the most part an unremarkable event. However, if one 
derails this event has much more significance and indicates the presence of much 
increased levels of risk. In this thesis these types of events are defined as 'external 
events'. They are a matter of circumstance and are generally events occurring outside 
the system boundary shown in Figure 2. 
2.3.2 Conditions 
In this thesis a condition is defined as the particular state of a person or thing at a given 
point in time. The condition may be in a stable state, it may change gradually over time, 
or it may be in a constant state of change. As with the definition of an event, this is not 
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a rigorous definition, and therefore we must use our judgement and intuition when 
applying either concept. Unlike events, conditions are often not well approximated as 
Boolean variables as their states are often best measured or conceptualised as 
continuous values. 
The condition of the rail that fractured under the train at Hatfield (see section 3.2.3) 
evolved. When initially installed, its condition was good. However, over time, due to the 
effects of trains passing over it, it began to exhibit symptoms of gauge corner cracking. 
Just prior to its fracture, its condition could be considered to be poor. Conditions can 
affect the likelihood of occurrence of events in an accident sequence, but they do not 
definitely determine whether or not events, and ultimately accidents, occur. All 
conditions could be unfavourable, and yet an accident might not have occurred. The 
poor condition of the rail made the event 'rail fracture occurs' much more likely. Yet 
there were other locations on the network with worn rail, at which accidents did not 
occur. In organizational accident theory, Reason talks about 'latent conditions' 
((Reason 2002) page 10) and gives a diverse set of examples such as: 
'poor design, gaps in supervision, undetected manufacturing defects or maintenance 
failures, unworkable procedures, clumsy automation, shortfalls in training, less than 
adequate tools and equipment'. 
The categorisation of conditions proposed is similar to Reason's categorisation of 'local 
workplace factors' and 'organizational factors' although according to the definition used 
here the former describes both technical and operational conditions. 'Performance 
conditions' are considered as an additional condition type. 
2.3.2.1 Technical condition 
The state of the railway's various items of physical infrastructure are categorised as 
'technical conditions'. Technical conditions have featured as causes in all of the major 
UK railway accidents that were highlighted in section 3.2. According to the 
categorisation of causes used in this thesis categorisation the condition of the rail prior 
to the Hatfield accident was a 'technical condition' which was considered to be the 'root 
cause' of the accident. Prior to the Ladbroke Grove accident the condition of the 
Signalling infrastructure, in particular the difficulty in sighting the signal that was passed 
at danger, was an identified cause of the accident. Evidence taken at the inquiry stated: 
'The general signal viewing conditions in the Paddington area present the drivers with 
an exceptionally difficult signal reading task. The complexity of the layout and signal 
gantries, the range of approaches, and the obscuration of signal aspects by overhead 
33 
line equipment presents most difficult visual and interpretative challenges to drivers'. 
((Cullen 2000) page 55). 
In the Potters Bar accident, the HSE concluded that they were: 
'satisfied that an explanation can be given for the failure of points 21 B2A based on 
evidence of the poor condition of these points to an extent that they were not "fit for 
purpose" for the operating environment and safety related functions expected of them. ' 
((HSE 2002c) page iv). 
2.3.2.2 Operational condition 
The factors that affect the performance of front line staff undertaking safety related 
duties are categorised here as 'operational conditions'. In section 2.3.1.2 it was 
described how error producing conditions are used to determine human error rates. 
According to the categorisation used in this thesis these conditions are all 'operational 
conditions'. In the rail specific technique they include 'time availability', 'high workload' 
and 'fatigue'. 
Section 3.3.1 will go on to describe operational conditions that were known to be 
relevant to the occurrence of the train accident at Ladbroke Grove, such as the 
signaller responsible for the track on which the accident occurred was found to be 
operating under demanding time constraints. 
2.3.2.3 Organizational condition 
Where organisations fail in their duty to prevent accidents, it is usually in the structuring 
of the organisation, the effectiveness with which it works, and the culture of the 
organisation. The term Safety Culture was developed by INSAG in the wake of the 
Chernobyl nuclear accident to capture some of these concepts (INSAG 1991). INSAG 
defined safety culture as: 
'that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which 
establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the 
attention warranted by their significance. ' 
INSAG argues that safety culture is dependent on personal attitudes, habits and other 
intangibles. However, such qualities lead to tangible manifestations that can be used to 
test and monitor the safety culture of an organisation. In this thesis, failings or 
inefficiencies in an organisation, which have an effect on the likelihood or severity of 
accidents are categorised as 'organizational conditions'. 'Organizational' conditions 
relate to the performance of an organisation or its components and the setting of these 
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condition states for a particular analysis is qualitative and a matter of judgement. These 
conditions are not set, but emerge from the organisation. 'Organizational' conditions 
cannot be directly measured, but their state can be correlated to other indicators. For 
example, the priority that a senior manager of a company gives to safety cannot be 
directly measured, but the time that this manager spends on company walkabouts and 
direct discussion with his employees about safety matters could be. 
The report into the Ladbroke Grove accident acknowledged that such conditions were 
implicated in the occurrence of the accident. One example given was the inability of the 
discussions of a group convened to investigate the risk of SPADs at Ladbroke Grove, 
prior to the accident, to agree on any significant actions to improve signal sighting. 
Railtrack admitted that: 
(There were probably too many groups and their functions overlapped. While a number 
of good ideas were formulated and debated there was a lack of a single person or body 
to ensure that prompt and appropriate action was taken. The organisation, in this 
respect, was diffuse.' ((Cullen 2000) page 135). 
The Cullen report goes on to conclude that this ineffectiveness was a symptom of poor 
safety culture. Another example of poor organizational performance was in the 
approach to driver recruitment applied by the train operator, Thames trains. Lord Cullen 
states: 
(It is not suggested that Mr Hodder was in any way unsatisfactory as an applicant. 
However the fact that Thames Trains were prepared to bypass their own procedures, 
due to the need to recruit drivers quickly because of an increase in traffic, suggests that 
they had set a production requirement ahead of following procedures appropriately. , 
The organization appears to have performed its recruitment role poorly. This 
organizational condition is something that might have been able to be identified by an 
auditor or through safety culture assessment. 
2.3.2.4 Performance conditions 
Performance conditions are conceptually different from the three other types of 
condition outlined. They do not relate to any particular weakness of the system. A good 
example of a performance condition is train speed. A train might be travelling at a 
speed of 10mph or it might be travelling at 100mph. In neither case would train speed 
be considered to be 'poor'. However, the speed of the train is a fundamental 
consideration when estimating risk. It is the movement of the train that creates the risk 
and train speed is one of the key determinants of the severity of the accident. Another 
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example of a performance condition is traffic density. Sometimes the track is busy, 
sometimes it is not. However, when it is busy the probability of trains colliding with each 
other is increased. To estimate risk in any given situation a clear understanding of the 
state of performance conditions is needed. 'Performance conditions' is also considered 
to include elements of organizational planning such as the intervals between technical 
inspections. 
2.4 Commonly used modelling and analysis techniques 
The key terms and concepts that must be understood in order to assess and analyse 
risk and use this information to manage it have now been defined. Next the techniques 
that are most commonly used in the UK railway industry to model and estimate risk are 
described, namely: 
• Risk Matrices 
• Fault Tree Analysis 
• Event Tree Analysis 
• Bow-tie models 
2.4.1 Risk Matrices 
Risk matrices are used as a quick and relatively simple way of assessing the risks to 
which a project or company is exposed. The approach is strongly supported by the use 
of expert judgement. First, the boundary of the system under analysis is defined and all 
of the hazards identified. Each hazard is then assigned an estimated likelihood of 
occurrence and severity rating according to a set of predefined categories. These 
categories are then combined to form an overall risk ranking, as indicated by a risk 
ranking table that crudely apples the risk equation shown in 2.1.1. The risk matrix 
approach is commonly used in a range of industries and is embedded in standards like 
BS EN51026 (BSI 1999) or the military standard 00-56 (MOD 2004). In the UK railway 
industry, the railway group guidance note GE/GN8561 (RSSB 2001) suggests a 
particular approach for train operators to use to analyse all of the risks that they need 
to manage through the application of their safety management system. Table 1 and 
Table 2 show the ranking approach proposed. Note that both tables use the terms 
'frequency' and 'consequence' rather than the terms 'likelihood' and 'severity' which are 
used in BS EN50126. In this context the equivalent terms should be taken to mean the 
same thing. 
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The advantage of the risk ranking approach is that it allows an analyst to assess the 
risk from a large number of hazards quickly. However, the methodology does not 
enforce or rely upon any analysis of the causes of hazards and accidents and no model 
of cause and effect is produced. Therefore, no detailed record of the assumptions 
under which risk is estimated is required, although a diligent analyst would record key 
assumptions. 
Frequency Consequence 
A Rare - e.g. 1 in 50 years A Negligible - e.g. slight injury, no 
absence from work 
B Infrequent - e.g. 1 in 10 years B Low - e.g. requiring first aid 
treatment 
C Occasional- e.g. 1 per year C Moderate - e.g. injury leading to 
lost time accident 
D Frequent - e.g. 1 per month D High - e.g. single fatality 
E Regular - e.g. 1 per day E Severe - e.g. multiple fatalities 
Table 1 Example qualitative ranking scheme 
Consequence 
Frequency A B C D E 
E M M H H H 
D L M M H H 
C L L M M H 
B L L L M M 
A L L L L M 
fable 2 Qualitative Risk eategories (L = low, M = medium, H = High) 
Essentially the ranking relies on the shared mental model of the gathered experts. This 
mental model may be flawed, and cannot subsequently be reviewed or audited. 
Because of these weaknesses, ranking approaches are often used to filter out the 
hazards with the highest estimated risk rather than as the primary means of risk 
analysis. Further analysis of these hazards would then be undertaken in more depth, 
using techniques such as fault and event tree analysis, which are described in the 
following sub-sections. 
2.4.2 Fault tree analysis 
Smith describes a fault tree as: 
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'A graphical method of describing the combinations of events leading to a defined 
system failure'. ((Smith 1997), page103). 
The system failure being analysed is called the 'top-event', and the individual events 
are called 'base events'. The basic fault tree uses AND and OR gates to link the base 
events to the top event. Other types of gate can be used to model more complex 
logical conditions, for example exclusive OR gates, or NOR gates. The symbols for 
AND gates, OR gates and base events are shown in Figure 4. The event conditions 
that input to the gates can be considered to be either logically true or false only. Base 
events represent the limit of resolution of the fault tree. 
6 
OR gate AND gate 
Base event 
Figure 4: Fault tree Or gate, AND gate and base event 
A cut set is a group of base events whose simultaneous occurrence causes the top-
event to occur, and a minimal cut set is the cut set group comprising the least number 
of base events. AND and OR gates in fault trees each equate to a single Boolean 
algebraic expression. A fault tree can therefore be described as a list of logical 
statements and these logical statements can be simplified using Boolean reduction 
techniques. The resulting simplification describes the top-event in terms of a finite 
number of minimal cut-sets. Calculation of top event probabilities is automated using 
computer programmes such as (Isograph 2007). 
Fault Trees are used across a variety of industries and there is extensive guidance 
available in how to construct and use them (for example (IEC 1990) and (Vesely, 
Goldberg et al. 1981)). They were developed, and have found substantial use, as a tool 
to support analysis of the reliability of hardware systems, a use for which they are well 
suited. The diagram of Figure 5 (from (Smith 1997), page 104) shows a classic fault 
tree analysis undertaken to determine the reliability of a fire protection water deluge 
system. All of the base events are failures of technical components or systems. As was 
discussed in section 2.3.1.1 these failures are usually approximated well by the 
bivalent two-state conceptualisation enforced by the use of fault trees. There are also 
established methods of calculating the failure rates of electrical and mechanical 
components. 
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The fault tree shows where different combinations of base events ultimately have the 
same system effect. The top event describes this system effect, and the fault tree 



















Figure 5: Fault tree for a fire protection water deluge system 
Fire pump 
failure 
Separately modelled fault tree base events are considered to be independent events. 
Any common cause between base events must be explicitly modelled. There are 
various techniques for doing this. For example the same base event might be repeated 
in different parts of the model thereby assuming that both events always have the 
same Boolean state. Correlations between base events can be modelled in fault trees 
using a beta factor to represent a percentage of base event failures that lead to the 
common cause failure of one or more other base events. 
Fault trees are used in safety analysis as well as in reliability analysis. When used in 
safety analysis the top event of the fault tree is a hazard. Whereas analysis of the 
reliability of systems focuses on the failure of hardware components, safety analysis 
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will tend to involve human errors in addition to failures as safety assurance usually has 
a human element. The diagram of Figure 6 shows a fault tree developed for safety 
analysis in the UK railway industry (Campbell and Kennedy 2003). The top-event is the 
occurrence of uncontrolled 'gauge spread'. Gauge spreading occurs when railway lines 
separate such that the distance between them is no longer within acceptable 
tolerances, given the distance between the wheels of trains passing over that section. 




















fails to detect 
gauge spread 






The fact that safety analysis using fault trees often involves human error rate 
quantification creates different problems for the analyst when compared with their use 
for reliability analysis. In the fault tree of Figure 6, although the base event descriptions 
are not clear, on close inspection it can be seen that all base events involve some 
degree of human error. For example 'Visual inspection fails to detect gauge spread' 
might be more clearly described as the human error 'inspector fails to notice gauge 
spread'. The probability of occurrence of this event would tend to depend on a range of 
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factors such as the competence of the inspector, their fitness for duty, and whether or 
not there were any distractions present at the time the event occurred 'Visual 
inspection/reporting procedures fail' represents a failure of the system of work rather 
than a specific human error, however the causes of this event are likely to be 
procedural failures caused by a human error. 
Often when analysts define human errors in fault trees they do not rigorously describe 
them as events, and this undermines the use of the method, as the conceptual clarity 
provided by the method is lost. Another difficulty is that the estimation of human error 
rates is less well established than the estimation of component failure rates, and can 
be a more difficult process (see section 2.3.1.2). Many error-producing conditions are 
needed to provide human reliability estimates, and the state of these conditions can 
vary widely from situation to situation. The conditions relating to a particular analysis 
therefore form the underlying assumptions of the analysis however they are often not 
documented. For example, the error producing conditions relevant to the estimation of 
a probability of occurrence of the human errors modelled were not described in the 
report from which the fault tree of Figure 6 is taken. 
2.4.3 Event Tree Analysis 
Event trees model the possible sequences of events between an initiating event and its 
consequences. When used in safety analysis the initiating event is generally a hazard. 
Figure 7 shows a simple event tree for the initiating event of a signal passed at danger 
(SPAD) occurring on the railway network. The branches of the tree are determined by 
answers to situational questions posed at the top of the diagram. Responses to these 
questions do not have to be simply 'success' or 'failure'. A number of responses can be 
represented at each stage as long as: 
• each of the responses to a given question in a particular branch represents a 
discrete system state i.e. the states are mutually exclusive, and 
• the probability of all such states sums to one i.e. the states at each branch are 
exhaustive. 
However in practice a Boolean, two-state approach (true, false) is most often used. The 
probabilities of occurrence of each of the consequences shown on the right-hand side 
of the diagram can be calculated simply by multiplying the probabilities of each of the 
event outcomes on the branch leading to that consequence. 
For example the probability (P) of a 'high speed collision', given that a SPAD has 
occurred is: 
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P = 0.1 * 0.1 * 0.5 
= 0.005 
-
SPAD occurs Driver overspeed? 
True = 0.1 
False = 0.9 
TPWS functions? 
True = 0.9 
False = 0.1 
True = 0.9 
False=0.1 
ITrain path is 
obstructed? 
I Consequences 
True - 0.5 Low speed coll ision 
I 
IFalse = 0.5 No coll ision 
True = 0.5 High speed collision 
I 
IFalse = 0.5 No collis ion 
True = 0.5 No collision 
I 
IFalse = 0.5 No collision 
True = 0.5 Medium speed collision 
I 
IFalse = 0.5 No collision 
Figure 7: Indicative event tree modelling the consequences of a SPAD 
In order to calculate the estimated likelihood of occurrence of the high-speed collision 
this value should be multiplied by the likelihood of occurrence of the initiating event, the 
SPAD. This probability could be obtained using fault tree analysis or a similar 
technique. As was stated in section 2.1.1: 
Risk = likelihood * severity 
Using the information in the event tree, if the probability of occurrence of the initiating 
event is known, it is possible to estimate the risk associated with this hazard. The event 
tree analysis describes the range of outcomes that are considered possible given the 
occurrence of the initiating event. The severity associated with each of the defined 
event tree consequences is calculated separately using whatever methods may be 
appropriate. For example, from existing data, or an analysis of crashworthiness of 
rolling stock, it might be estimated that a high speed collision would result In 
approximately 10 fatalities. Having estimated the severity of each consequence the 
corresponding risk is calculated simply by multiplying the estimated likelihood of each 
consequence with its severity. The total risk associated with the initiating event is 
calculated by summing the risk associated with each consequence. 
An analyst must be aware of potential conditional probability effects when deriving 
probability estimates for an event tree. For example, with the tree of Figure 7 the 
probabilities assigned for 'TPWS functions' may be affected by consideration of 
whether or not the driver is overspeeding. The TPWS may be less likely to trigger when 
the train passes over it at excessive speed. The question to ask is therefore 'how likely 
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is it that TPWS will function given that the train is overspeeding?' In the example shown 
the implicit assumption is that the speed of the train has no significant effect on the 
functioning of TPWS, as the probabilities in the upper and lower halves of the event 
tree are identical. Event trees can be built using simple spreadsheets to automate the 
calculations described here or with specially developed software packages like Fault 
tree+ (lsograph 2007). 
2.4.4 Bow-tie models 
Fault and event trees are often used together in order to estimate risk. The trees are 
linked using the hazard which is both the 'top-event' of the fault tree and the 'initiating 
event' of the event tree. When linked together in this way the models are often referred 
to as bow-tie models. Bow-tie models have been used for many years to analyse 
hazardous systems, in particular in the oil and gas industry (HSE 2006). 
In a bow-tie model the failures leading to the accident are analysed in the fault tree part 
of the model. The events that occur following the hazard are analysed in the event tree, 
on the right of the model. The bow-tie structure assumes that these events are 
independent. However, since both the occurrence of the failure and the evolution of the 
accident may be influenced by the same conditions in the environment of the system, 
correlations between events in each model can easily occur. 
In the Yellow Book the use of cause-consequence models is suggested for risk 
analysis rather than the use of fault and event trees. The causal part of these diagrams 
consists of fault trees. Consequence analysis is undertaken using a technique identical 
to event tree analysis, with the exception that paths do not always branch at event 
outcome points. Instead where consequences are identical, paths converge. This 
reduces the number of separately modelled consequences associated with some 
hazards. However, this is a minor difference and for all practical purposes cause-
consequence diagrams can be considered identical to bow-tie models. 
2.5 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, the concepts that underpin risk modelling and assessment in the UK 
railway industry were defined. Definitions were provided for key concepts that will be 
used throughout this thesis. In particular, causes of accidents were defined as being of 
two types: events and conditions. A sub-categorisation of each of these types of cause 
was also provided. 
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3 Managing Organizational accidents in the UK railway 
industry 
In this chapter, organizational accident theory, the theory that complex systems are 
prone to the occurrence of major accidents, is described. By looking at the recent 
history of safety incidents in the UK railway industry it is concluded that the mechanism 
by which accidents occur in the industry is consistent with organizational accident 
theory (arguing hypothesis 1). 
What the theory says about the prevention of accidents is then investigated. This 
investigation finds that there are three fundamental problems with the application of 
organizational accident theory to the management of risk in the UK railway industry: 
• Lack of safety indicator data 
• Problems with data collection 
• The size and variability of the railway network 
Given these problems, a set of requirements for an ideal risk model to support the 
management of organizational accidents are proposed. These requirements elaborate 
upon hypothesis 2. 
3.1 Organizational accident theory 
(Reason 2002) explains that, in safety critical industries multiple, sometimes redundant, 
defences are put in place to ensure safety. These can be: 
• implemented in engineered systems. 
• undertaken by people following procedures or 
• provided by the wider management processes of an organisation. 
He refers to these various measures as 'defences in depth'. According to Reason, 
organisations in which accidents are prevented by 'defences in depth' are susceptible 
to 'organizational accidents'. These accidents occur as the result of multiple failures 
occurring to all safety controls. The accident would not be caused by anyone of these 
failures or errors individually but their coincident occurrence leads to catastrophic 
consequences. 'Organizational accidents' occur because of a fundamental 
contradiction: as catastrophic accidents are undesirable many different types of 
defences are put in place to protect against them; however this creates complexity 
which is hard to manage and therefore increases the chances that all defences may be 
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simultaneously breached. Reason uses the 'Swiss-cheese model ' to illustrate the 
mechanism by which 'organizational accidents' occur. 
Some holes due 
to active failures, 




Figure 8: Reason's 'Swiss cheese' model 
DANGER 
o 
Defences in depth 
The defences in depth can be breached by 'active failures' or 'latent conditions'. Active 
failures are events such as component failures or procedural violations by front-line 
operational staff. Failure of a driver to stop a train at a red signal aspect is therefore a 
type of active failure that could lead to a train collision. A driver accelerating his train 
above the speed limit on a curve is an active failure that could lead to a train 
derailment. Latent conditions are generally organizational or procedural weaknesses 
further back in the causal sequence. Organizational accidents are a problem because, 
although in theory the breaching of all defences is highly unlikely, in reality there are 
processes at work that make such an occurrence possible, and in some cases highly 
likely. 
Work activity to generate revenue ('production') and work activity to ensure safety 
(,protection') are dependent upon the same processes within an organisation. There is 
a continual conflict between these two types of activity. The occurrence of an accident 
tends to increase pressure on the company and its workers to maintain safety controls 
and safety performance improves. But this improvement is only temporary. Success 
will inevitably lead to a lack of awareness within the organisation about the occurrence 
of possible accidents. Over time, the organisation becomes complacent and production 
pressures are allowed to erode safety performance. 
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Increasing Resistance Increasing Vulnerability -. --------------------
_~. Currents acting within .~ __ 
-~ .---
• the Safety Space .~-~ __ _ 
Figure 9: Countervailing currents within the safety space 
Reason uses the diagram shown in Figure 9 and the concept of the 'Safety Space' to 
illustrate this. The basic theory here is that there are some organisations for which 
safety is 'bad' and some for which it is 'good'. The 'bad' organisations are more likely to 
have an accident. This accident, being an immediately obvious and undeniable 
measure of safety failure, leads to reactions to improve safety in the short term. The 
best organisations however, are lacking in measures of safety failure and hence over 
time their safety performance suffers. Production goals, because of their immediacy, 
gradually erode safety performance due to a lack of competing safety performance 
measures. He states that: 
'Very few organizations occupy fixed positions within the Safety Space. Most of them 
are in continuous motion, either by being actively driven towards the resistant end of 
the space by energetic implementation of effective safety measures, or by being 
allowed to drift passively towards the unsafe end. ' 
Rasmussen expands on this idea arguing that over a period of time the relationship 
between protection and production in organisations inevitably leads to 'migration of 
activities to the boundary of acceptable performance' ((Rasmussen 1997), page 190). 
This is because in large and complex systems the actions of people who need to work 
together to prevent the occurrence of accidents are functionally disconnected. 
Accidents are prevented by a variety of different people, in different locations, with a 
variety of tasks competing for their attention and priority. Over time they will adapt their 
behaviour according to their perception of the importance of their safety related tasks. If 
they have no visibility or understanding of accident causal sequences their perception 
is likely to be flawed. The pressures can cause safety defences to be eroded such that 
the conditions for an organizational accident substantially exist. All that is required to 
cause the accident in such circumstances is the final active failure that allows all 
defences to be breached. 
Reason stresses that in order to 'navigate the safety space' and resist these pressures 
managers need 'navigational aids' to understand where they are in the safety space. 
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These aids are needed to help them understand how safe their organisation currently 
is, and where to resist production pressures so that performance is not eroded. Reason 
says: 
'We need to learn the right lessons from past events, and then translate that knowledge 
into enhanced resistance. At the same time we must make visible to those who 
manage and operate the system the latent conditions and resident pathogens that are 
an inevitable part of any complex technology' (pages 116-117). 
(Hale, Heming et al. 1997) and (Kirwan 2001) outline related interpretations of 
Organizational accident theory. 
Accident occurrence on the UK railway network is now investigated. This will allow the 
relevance of organizational accident theory to the occurrence of such accidents to be 
gauged. 
3.2 Accidents in the UK railway industry 
The UK railway industry is relatively safe compared with other modes of transport. The 
graph of Figure 10 shows fatality rates across all major transport modes in recent 
years. It shows that in recent years rail is safer than all transport modes except air, 
when measuring safety as fatalities per billion passenger kilometres. 
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Figure 10: Passenger transport fatality rates in Great Britain (Off 2007) 
In particular rail travel is much safer that road travel by car. According to the 
Department for Transports 2007 estimates (OfT 2007) the fatality rate to railway 
passengers in 2006 was 0.1 fatalities per billion passenger kilometres whereas the 
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fatality rate for car drivers and passengers was 2.5 fatalities per billion passenger 
kilometres (a figure which is 25 times higher). However major accidents have always 
occurred on the UK railway network and continue to do so. These accidents are of a 
range of different types. An annual statistical analysis of fatal train accidents on 
Britain's railways is undertaken by the Centre for Transport Studies at Imperial College 
(Evans 2003). The latest report (Evans 2008) found that although performance on the 
railway was worse than in 2006, it was still in line with previous statistical predictions, 
and a general long term trend in the reduction of accident fatality rates. 
3.2.1 Accidents and Incidents 
The Safety Risk Model (SRM) developed by the Rail Safety and Standards Board 
(RSSB), lists 125 separate and distinct accident types that can occur on the UK railway 
infrastructure. These types of accident can occur to passengers, railway staff and 
members of the public, and range from trips and falls to train collisions. 
Figure 11 shows the predicted 10 highest risk accidents in the UK railway industry, as 
estimated by the Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB 2006). The top five types of 
accidents all involve train movement. Accidents involving trains are usually those with 
the most severe consequences. Therefore they cause the most public and media 
concern and tend to be the accidents which drive the actions of the railway industry. 
Major train accidents that have occurred in recent years have generally been of two 
types: accidents caused by signals passed at danger (SPADs) and derailment 
accidents. 
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Pedetrian struCk/crushed by train on level crossing (including footpath 
crossing) 
Passenger train collision with road vehicle on level crossing 
Derailment of passenger trains 
Track worker struck/crushed by train 
~ c Passenger fall from platform and struck by train 
Q) 
'C 
'u :i I\IIember of public falVjump from outisde onto the main line railway 
Passenger slip, trip or fall 
Passenger fall between train and platform 
Collision of train with object on line (not resulting in derailment) 
Workforce electric shock (conductor rail) 
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Figure 11: Top 10 accidents on the UK railway (RSSB 2006) 
3.2.2 Signal Passed at Danger (SPAD) 
I l 
7 8 
Separation between trains is maintained through the use of lineside signalling. The 
location of the train on the track is detected electrically using track circuits which 
determine whether or not a train is present in each 'block section' of the line. A block 
section consists of the area of track preceding a signal. There also a small 'overlap' in 
front of the signal to prevent accidents occurring due to braking misjudgement. Where 
a track circuit shows that a block section is occupied the signal behind it is set to red , 
indicating that no other train should enter the block section. 
The prevention of train accidents relies heavily on the driver being able to 
systematically interpret and react to the signalling indications shown to them. To 
support them in this task a number of items of equipment are used. The Automatic 
Warning System (AWS) sounds a horn, or a buzzer, in the driver's cab to indicate when 
the driver is approaching a restrictive aspect (either amber or red signals). The Train 
Protection and Warning System (TPWS) automatically applies the brakes of a train 
going past a red aspect. 
If a driver goes past a red signal for any reason, the incident is known as a signal 
passed at danger (SPAD). Although most SPADs occur as a result of minor 
misjudgement of braking distances they have occasionally led to serious accidents. For 
example, in recent years major accidents have occurred at Ladbroke Grove (HSE 
2000), Southall (HSC 2002) and Watford Junction (HSE 1998). 
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The accident at Ladbroke Grove was the most severe seen in the UK in recent years. It 
occurred on 5th October 1999 when a Thames turbo train travelling from Paddington 
passed a red signal and collided with a High Speed Train (HST) heading towards 
Paddington from Cheltenham. The closing speed of the accident was 130 mph. Fuel 
tank damage led to the release of six tonnes of diesel. As a result of the collision and 
subsequent fire thirty-one people died and a further 227 were taken to hospital. The 
immediate cause of the collision was that the driver of the Thames turbo did not obey 
the red aspect and in fact accelerated towards the signal. The accident led to a public 
inquiry by Lord Cullen (Cullen 2000; Cullen 2001) which identified many factors as 
contributory causes to the accident. These causes included factors ranging from the 
condition of the signalling infrastructure to the regulatory structure and culture of the 
UK railway industry as a whole. 
3.2.3 Derailment accidents 
A derailment occurs when a train becomes separated from the track guiding its 
direction of movement. Derailments are often minor incidents leading to damage to the 
track and train only. However they have the potential to lead to significant damage and 
injury if the train is going at substantial speed, hits a large object such as a building or 
another train, or if any train involved in the resulting accident is transporting hazardous 
of flammable goods. Derailments have a variety of potential causes such as broken 
rails, misalignment of rails and points, train wheel faults or driving of trains at excessive 
speeds. Three recent high profile derailment accidents in the UK railway industry were 
the derailments at Hatfield (HSE 2002a), Potters Bar (HSE 2002c), and Grayrigg (RAIB 
2007). Derailments can also occur due to train collision with obstacles such as road 
vehicles, as happened at Ufton Nervet (HSE 2004) and Great Heck (HSE 2002b). 
The Potters Bar accident occurred in May 2002 when the rear coach of a four-coach 
commuter train, travelling to Kings Lynn from Kings Cross, derailed on a set of points 
on the approach to Potters Bar station. The rear coach became detached from the rest 
of the train and crashed into the station platform. Seven people died as a result of this 
accident and many were injured. The UK safety regulator at the time, the Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE) determined that the immediate cause of the accident was that 
the points had been incorrectly maintained. 
The Hatfield accident occurred in October 2000. An express train from London to 
Leeds derailed on a curve to the south of Hatfield Station. The left hand rail at this 
location fractured catastrophically. The locomotive and front two coaches remained on 
the track but the rear eight vehicles were derailed and the two rear coaches separated 
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from the remainder of the train. As a result of the derailment four passengers were 
killed and seventy people were injured. The HSE's view was that the 'direct cause' of 
the accident was poor rail condition. The rail had been identified as in poor condition, 
and should have either been replaced or had a temporary speed restriction applied to 
it. 
3.3 Organizational accidents in the UK railway industry 
In section 3.1 organizational accident theory was described, and in section 3.2 the 
occurrence of accidents in the UK railway industry was discussed. In this section the 
extent to which the theory can be used to explain accident occurrence in the industry, 
and the various related behaviours that the industry exhibits are investigated. This is 
done by reviewing the most catastrophic accident in the recent history of the UK 
railway industry, the Ladbroke Grove accident. The industry's response to this accident 
and the prevention of SPADs more generally are also reviewed. The following sections 
therefore provide support to hypothesis 1 that 'organizational accident theory provides 
an explanation for the mechanisms by which major accidents occur within the UK 
railway industry'. 
3.3.1 An organizational accident on the UK railway: Ladbroke Grove 
The accident at Ladbroke Grove was subject to extremely thorough investigation by the 
HSE (HSE 2000) and the Cullen inquiry (Cullen 2000; Cullen 2001). The key active 
failure was that the driver of the Thames turbo train failed to stop at a red signal. The 
AWS system in the turbo train was functioning but did not bring the train to a halt 
implying that the driver falsely acknowledged that he had noted the red aspect. A wide 
number of coincident causes, which in the context of organizational accident theory can 
be considered as latent conditions, were also identified. 




The driver was inexperienced. 
The signal was difficult for drivers to sight. 
The signaller was operating under demanding time constraints: train 
movements in the Paddington area were being controlled automatically. A very 
quick response was required by the signaller to avert the accident. ultimately 
the signaller was unable to react in sufficient time. 
The Cullen Inquiry report stressed that these contributory causes were symptomatic of 
underlying organizational and managerial weaknesses. Unusually the driver had been 
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recruited from outside of the railway industry, when the preferred option was to recruit 
guards or platform staff. Reports acknowledged that driver recruitment was difficult for 
Thames Trains. Commercial pressure put on train operating companies, would have 
made it very difficult for them to argue for cutting services due to a lack of experienced 
drivers. The Managing Director of another train operating company was sacked 
following a period of driver shortages (Harper 2001). The signal sighting problem 
indicated flaws in the actual signalling system and its ability to meet its design intent. 
The infrastructure had been subject to a number of upgrades since 1990 and it appears 
that these were undertaken without rigorous consideration of their effect on signal 
sighting. Hall ((Hall 2003b), pp86-93) commented that experienced drivers regarded 
the track layout and the signalling in the area, as it was by 1999, as very complex and 
requiring great care when driving. As well as causing signal sighting problems it was 
this complexity that complicated the signallers routing task. Hall believes that there was 
a lack of will on Railtrack's part to incur large expenditure by adopting the only real 
solution and moving the signal gantry, as this would have been expensive, time 
consuming and would have resulted in significant service loss for a substantial period 
of time on this route. The disincentives would have been considerable, as Paddington 
Station, and the routes out through Reading to the West Country, are a known 
bottleneck with a lack of diversionary routes. Another safety defence, for mitigating the 
risk from train accidents, is the crashworthiness of the train. The Thames turbo train did 
not have a high level of crashworthiness, resulting in high numbers of casualties 
amongst its passengers. 
Ultimately, the Ladbroke Grove accident occurred because a range of different safety 
controls were not working effectively at a particular location, at a particular point in 
time. This happened because the production pressures on the organisations involved 
were gradually allowed to erode these controls until the point where there was a very 
high accident risk. The people responsible for each of these controls were largely 
ignorant of the link between them - the accident sequence that eventually occurred 
and its various causes. In addition there were certain attributes of the network that 
meant that any accident occurring there would be likely to have severe consequences. 
Trains travelled at high speed, passenger loading was high, and some of the rolling 
stock in the area was known to perform badly in collisions. 
Useful knowledge about the potential 'active failures' and latent conditions' existed prior 
to the occurrence of the accident. Many of the various causes of the Ladbroke Grove 
accident were known at some level in the industry prior to the accident happening. A 
signal engineer believed the signalling layout was dangerous and reported this to 
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management at least four years before the accident (Webster 2000). Possible 
mitigation measures were also suggested but discounted for a number of reasons 
(Harper 2000). The signal that was passed at danger was one of the twenty two signals 
on the Railtrack network that had been passed at danger the most number of times 
(Hall and Wiltshire 2002). The driver's lack of experience was also known. However, 
despite the existence of all of this potential indicator data, sufficient action to manage 
the risk was not initiated or considered a priority at this particular location. 
Organizational accident theory accurately describes the processes that led to the 
occurrence of the Ladbroke Grove accident. A number of defences against SPAD 
accidents existed, but in this location at this particular time they were all penetrated. In 
some instances it seems highly likely that production pressures were at the root of 
these failures. 
3.3.2 SPAD incidents 
As predicted by Reason's 'safety space' model, the Ladbroke Grove accident, and 
previous SPAD accidents such as the Southall accident, resulted in the rail industry 
investing huge efforts in the reduction of SPADs. Various-network wide initiatives were 
set up, such as the National SPAD Focus Group, the circulation of publications and 
videos to spread good practice and awareness of SPAD risk across the industry 
(Metcalfe 2006) and the adoption of 'defensive driving' practices by train operating 
companies (TOGs) (ATOG 2003). Industry cost benefit analysis found that, according 
to the decision making principles applied by the industry there was no requirement to 
install TPWS, or the more advanced system Automatic Train Protection (ATP). The 
2002/2003 Railway Group Safety Plan (RSSB 2003b) estimated the cost of TPWS to 
be £10 million per statistical life saved. The industry benchmark for determining safety 
expenditure at that time was approximately £1.5 million, nevertheless the government 
decided that the additional expense was necessary and passed legislation mandating 
the fitment of TPWS at all junction signals and other signals deemed to be of high risk. 
This installation was substantially completed in December 2003. A further programme 
of fitment of TPWS+, an advanced form of TPWS for signals that are approached at 
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Following the efforts of industry and government the incidence of SPADs decreased in 
the years following the Ladbroke Grove Rail accident. Figure 12 shows the reduction in 
estimated SPAD risks over this period. The effectiveness of industry measures can be 
clearly seen. Estimated SPAD risk was reduced sharply until early 2002, whereupon it 
began to rise again briefly, before falling to historically low levels in late 2005. 
From October 2005 to June 2007, the estimated SPAD risk was maintained below 10% 
of the initial baseline figure. According to organizational accident theory this time would 
have been one of vulnerability for the industry. As the rate of SPADs had been reduced 
there was much less incident data to use to help estimate and manage risk. Also the 
impressive reduction seen in SPAD risk had been achieved through a huge investment 
of resources. A number of industry wide initiatives were needed to achieve the 
reductions seen in SPAD risk. It is known that some of this investment was not 
considered cost effective by the usual standards of the industry. This investment 
occurred in a post-accident climate, where media interest in railway safety and in 
SPAD prevention in particular was high, and railway safety had been high on the 
political agenda as evidenced by the government intervention to install TPWS. 
S The SPAD risk figure has been estimated by Network Rail using the SPAD risk ranking tool. 
This tool provides a metric based on certain conditions which are known to have the potential to 
increase SPAD risk, such as the speed of trains. The model itself is not in the public domain. 
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According to the organizational accident theory, with the level of risk reduced the 
'production' impetus is lessened, leading to the potential for production pressures to 
erode performance. As some of the safety gains had been achieved by the imposition 
of TPWS, a technical system, it might be concluded that a significant amount of risk 
reduction achieved was permanent. However, many initiatives that contributed to this 
safety performance, such as defensive driving techniques, raised awareness about 
SPADs, and improved reporting were more susceptible to erosion over time to the 
'boundary of acceptable performance' described by Rasmussen ((Rasmussen 1997), 
page 190). After achieving these substantial improvements it would be expected that 
SPAD risk would eventually begin to rise due to a gradual reduction in concern about 
these particular accidents, and a lack of information to use to inform management 
decisions to prevent them. Figure 12 shows that the risk did rise again after a period to 
a figure of 21.3% in October 2007. 
The discussion in sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 provide evidence that the mechanisms by 
which the Ladbroke Grove accident occurred, and the subsequent industry response to 
SPAD risk, are consistent with organizational accident theory. This supports hypothesis 
1 that: 'Organizational accident theory provides an explanation for the mechanisms by 
which major accidents occur within the UK railway industry'. 
3.4 Managing organizational accident risk 
In this section, I consider what organizational accident theory tells us about how to 
manage the risk from organizational accidents. The potential problems or difficulties 
that might arise when applying the suggested concepts and principles in the UK railway 
industry are also considered. 
3.4.1 Applying the theory 
If it is accepted that organizational accident theory is applicable to the UK railway 
industry, how then could the risk from these types of accident be managed? As was 
discussed in section 3.1, the theory says that to protect against the occurrence of such 
accidents navigational aids are needed. 
Risk models, and the causal data that supports them, are possible examples of the 
'navigational aids' to which Reason refers. 
In section 2.3, the various categories of accident cause that are used in this thesis 
when discussing risk analysis, assessment and modelling were outlined. These causes 
were categorised as events and conditions. These causal types can be related to the 
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various elements of the 'Swiss cheese model'. The accident trajectory is the sequence 
of events (or active failures) that lead to the occurrence of an accident, whether a 
human error, a technical failure or an external event. The conditions can be thought of 
as the 'latent conditions' whose existence increases the likelihood of occurrence of one 
or more 'active events' in the accident sequence. 
Organizational accident theory therefore implies that up to date knowledge of the 
existence of conditions, and whether or not some events in the accident sequence 
have occurred is needed in order to understand whether an accident is likely in a 
particular situation. Such information (hereafter referred to as 'safety indicators' or 
safety indicator data') can be used to monitor safety performance to help understand 
where and when the potential for organizational accidents has arisen. 
3.5 Accident risk management in the UK railway industry 
In this section, I review how the risk from major accidents has been managed in the 
industry over recent years. This review highlights the difficulties and potential benefits 
of applying the management principles of organizational accident theory in the UK 
railway industry. This discussion further illustrates how organizational accident theory 
can be used to describe and interpret real phenomena in the industry (this further 
supports Hypothesis 1). The review also informs the development of the ideal risk 
modelling requirements that are proposed later in the chapter (see section 3.7). 
3.5.1 Managing train derailment risk 
The biggest single identified cause of derailments is track faults and since the Hatfield 
accident there has been considerable expenditure on improving track quality. The 
National Audit Office reported that total expenditure on Britain's railways was predicted 
to be 30% higher due to track renewal work in the years following the Hatfield accident 
((NAO 2004), p2). 
Following the major derailment accidents at Hatfield and Potters Bar, and the additional 
expenditure that followed it, the incidence of derailments of all types fell (see Figure 
13). 
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Figure 13: Total derailments (or all types) between 2001 and 2005 (source RSSB) 
However, it is unclear whether this reduction actually resulted in the reduction of 
derailment risk across the network. A downward trend in the occurrence of derailments 
does not necessarily translate to an equivalent reduction in risk. It can be seen from 
Figure 14 that, during the period in which derailments of all types were reduced, 
reportable passenger train derailments remained fairly constant. A significant 
proportion of the reduction in the occurrence of derailments was achieved by a 
reduction in freight train derailments. 
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Figure 14: Passenger train derailments occurring 2001-2005 (source RSSB) 
Certain types of freight train which have two-axle, as opposed to bogied, wagons are 
highly susceptible to derailment on poorly maintained track. Freight trains do not carry 
passengers, and tend to travel at lower speeds than passenger trains. This means that 
freight train derailments generally have less severe consequences than passenger 
train derailments. Therefore, it is unlikely that the reduction in freight train derailment 
will have resulted in an equivalent reduction in risk. 
The industry response has tended to focus on poor track quality, the most obvious and 
easily identifiable cause of derailment incidents. However, derailment accidents have a 
wide variety of causes such as wheel faults, driver behaviour and obstructions on the 
line. Information relating to such causes is not readily available in asset records and 
has to be obtained, often by manual inspection or monitoring. It is also difficult to 
baseline. Faults are constantly evolving, and obstructions may only exist for a short 
period of time. However, as has been discussed, information about all causes is 
essential to the determination of levels of derailment risk and the prevention of 
organizational accidents. The other thing which is key to risk are the operational 
conditions of the network such as the speed of trains, the number of passengers on 
each train, and the number of trains using a section of the network. 
Without all of this relevant information, and a means of interpreting its meaning to risk 
at each location on the network, it is difficult to target resource to effectively reduce 
derailment risk. The difficulties with managing derailment risk, and the problems that 
they caused in the aftermath of the Hatfield accident, were clearly expressed by Rod 
Muttram, the former Chief Executive of Railway Safety, the forerunner to RSSB. 
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'The Railtrack management, battered by media, government and regulatory 
pressure ... reacted with panic. It imposed emergency speed limits as low as 
20mph ... Journey times became extended to a completely unacceptable degree and 
the timetable collapsed.' (Muttram 2003) 
Following the Hatfield derailment accident the industry was under huge political 
pressures to act, but lacked sufficient insight into how to effectively target risk reduction 
at derailments. The industry therefore applied control measures indiscriminately across 
the whole network with severe operational consequences. 
In 2007 another derailment occurred at high speed on the network at Grayrigg in 
Cumbria (RAIB 2007). Although the accident potential was high the accident resulted in 
less severe consequences than either Hatfield or Potters Bar resulting in a single 
fatality. However, the accident illustrates that the UK railway network is still prone to the 
occurrence of major derailment accidents. 
The discussion here supports an argument that the inability to systematically collect 
and interpret indicator data relating to the causes of derailments has undermined the 
ability of the industry to manage derailment risk. This is a serious problem which has 
been shown to create huge problems for the industry. 
3.5.2 Managing SPAD risk 
I now consider how the industry has managed SPAD risk. As with the review of 
derailments, this review indicates the problems of managing the risk from 
organizational accidents in the UK railway industry. Following the Ladbroke Grove 
accident huge effort was invested in SPAD prevention by the industry, with some 
success. Therefore, the industry's response to SPAD risk provides some insights into 
how risk might be managed more effectively. 
Figure 15 shows the rolling yearly total for SPADs occurring on UK railway 
infrastructure. The graph shows a gradual, but not dramatic, decrease in the number of 
SPADs occurring over this period. 
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Figure 15: Rolling yearly SPAD total and Rolling yearly average SPAD risk 
The graph of Figure 15 shows that the trend in estimated risk from SPADs is entirely 
different from the trend in SPAD occurrence over the same time period. In general, the 
reduction in risk has been much greater than the reduction in SPADs. The graph 
implies that the industry has been able to target its activity to reduce the occurrence of 
SPADs with the most risk potential. 
It is possible to differentiate between SPAD occurrence and SPAD risk reduction, as 
shown in Figure 12, because the railway industry has some knowledge of the 
conditions on the network that are strongly correlated to underlying levels of SPAD risk. 
SPAD risk can be quite closely correlated to particular track layouts, and the speed of 
trains. This information can be collated from planning information and asset records. 
However such information is only of use if a model exists, to use the information to 
estimate and monitor risk. The SPAD risk ranking tool was developed to do just this 
and is available to those taking decisions about how to invest in SPAD risk reduction. 
Therefore measures can be targeted at locations and situations with the highest 
estimated risk. As has already been mentioned, TPWS was first installed at signals 
protecting junctions, as SPADs at these locations might lead to train collisions, and 
therefore create the potential for catastrophic accidents. Next TPWS+ was installed at 
signals where trains often passed at high speed. Train speed obviously provides a 
good indication of risk as it influences both the likelihood and the severity of an 
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accident. Using this information it was possible to target measures at the prevention of 
SPADs with the highest accident potential. 
However, further information, and improved risk models would still be useful. TPWS 
was initially installed at all junction signals. Where these installations were to signals on 
lightly used lines, with no timetabled conflicts between trains at junctions then they will 
not have contributed significantly to risk reduction. If this information were more readily 
available, and the model were better able to utilise it, perhaps these installations would 
not have been made. In fact the railway industry is seeking the removal of many TPWS 
installations that now seem inappropriate, given new data based on operational 
experience (ORR 2007). 
Ultimately, the more relevant indicator data that is available in advance of taking a 
decision, the more discriminating the industry can be about proactively targeting 
investment at improving safety. 
In summary then, success has been achieved in the reduction of SPAD risk because it 
has been possible to target key measures like TPWS at high risk locations on the 
network. Some key indicators of SPAD risk are known, and happen to be able to be 
monitored. Models are available to interpret these indicators and this knowledge is 
used to support decision making. This lends support to the idea that better indicator 
data, and risk modelling tools can provide the 'navigational aids' to which Reason 
refers. However, even though targeting has been effective for the management of 
SPADs, better indicators would have allowed more effective targeting of control 
measures and hence more effective investment. More generally, organizational 
accident theory says that to improve safety further better indicator data is needed. This 
implies detailed causal analysis and knowledge of the state of infrastructure and the 
performance of people at all locations across the network. 
3.6 Problems applying organizational accident theory in the UK railway 
industry 
The review of derailments and SPAD incidents highlights that safety indicator data 
relating to the potential causes of organizational accidents is often not readily available 
in the industry. When information is available, there are not always models available 
which can use this information to estimate risk and therefore support management 
action. This section investigates why this might be the case and explores some of the 
reasons why it is difficult to apply organizational accident theory in the UK railway 
industry in practice. 
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In the UK railway industry the identification, collection and analysis of safety indicators 
is complicated for a number of reasons. 
• Because the industry operates with high levels of safety there is little readily 
available accident data with which to ascertain the effectiveness of defences 
against accidents, at any given point in time. 
• Major accidents are often the result of a complex set of causes that are 
particular to a location or situation. Data relating to the variety of causes that 
might be implicated in a major accident is not routinely monitored. 
• The sheer size and variability of the railway network means that the amount of 
potentially relevant data is vast. This makes collection and interpretation of 
data very difficult. 
These three issues are investigated further in sections 3.6.1 to 3.6.3. 
3.6.1 Lack of safety indicators 
RSSB maintains the Safety Management Information System (SMIS) database to 
record details of events reported to them by the various railway companies. This 
information is used to support RSSB's risk modelling, and also the development of 
industry reports such as the annual safety performance report (RSSB 2007a). The 
requirements for data reporting are described in a RGS 'Reporting of Safety Related 
Information' (RSSB 2007c). SMIS requires railway companies to report: 
• All accidents resulting in death or injury 
• Dangerous goods incidents 
• The occurrence of a wide range of 'safety events'. These include hazards such 
as derailments but also other events further back in the causal sequence such 
as train overspeeds, track faults and train faults. 
The standard requires that for all 'safety events' the company: 
(shall be responsible for ensuring that details of the immediate cause (s) and where 
appropriate, the under/ying causers) are included in the SMIS record of the event.' 
((RSSB 2007c) page 12) 
The standard defines an immediate cause as 'an unsafe act or condition which causes 
an accident or incident' ((RSSB 2007c) page 6). An incident is separately defined as a 
'near miss'. This definition therefore implies that 'safety events' are incidents or 
accidents (and not the events or conditions preceding them). 
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The definition of an underlying cause also implies that 'safety events' are incidents or 
accidents. An underlying cause is: 
'any factor(s) which led to the immediate causes of accidents or incidents, or resulted 
in such causes not being identified or mitigated (,(RSSB 2007c), page 33). 
According to the definitions of cause outlined in section 2.3 the 'underlying cause' 
might relate to an event preceding the event of interest or a condition whose state 
correlates closely to the event. The standard does not mandate the recording of 
'underlying cause(s)' unless the event being reported has been the subject of a formal 
investigation. Taking all of these definitions into account there is some room for 
interpretation in the application of the standard. However there is only a firm 
requirement to record incidents and accidents. 
Major accidents on the UK railway network are mercifully rare. However, detailed 
analysis of the causes of major accidents is generally only undertaken in such 
circumstances. As a result of this, detailed causal data for potential accidents is scarce. 
This issue has been recognised as a general problem in the safety field for many 
years. Heinrich (Heinrich 1931; Heinrich 1951) describes a model of the typical ratios 
between severe accidents, minor accidents and incidents (called no injury accidents). 
The model is shown in Figure 16 and visually highlights how, for every major accident 
that occurs there are a large number of more minor accidents or incidents. As you go 
down the triangle, from accidents to incidents more data is available. This theory maps 
well to the railway industry. 
There are a wide range of accidents and incidents that occur due to the operation of 
the rail network. At the lower extreme are events like passenger slips, trips and falls at 
stations. These occur very regularly, and therefore there is a lot of occurrence data 
available relating to them. This makes it easier to estimate their future likelihood of 
occurrence. Slips, trips and falls also tend to lead to similar outcomes that are typically 
of low severity. Past data, collected at the network level, concerning the frequency and 
severity of these types of accident is therefore likely to be highly indicative of future 
risk. However at the other extreme, there is the potential for major train accidents to 
occur. Major train accidents are rare and therefore there is little hazard and accident 
data available to support their analysis. The severity of major train accidents can also 
vary widely, introducing further uncertainty. The Southall and Ladbroke Grove rail 
accidents could be considered to be similar in many respects. However, the former 
resulted in seven fatalities whereas the latter resulted in 31. Past data relating to the 
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Figure 16: Heinrich's accident triangle 
3.6.2 Problems with data collection 




As discussed in the previous section, the RGS for reporting of safety related 
information requires only that the 'immediate cause' of any accident or incident should 
be recorded. The various causes of an accident were outlined in section 3.3 and 
consist of both events and conditions. This immediate cause could be an event of any 
type, a technical condition or an operational condition. It is unlikely to be an 
organizational condition as these types of failing are generally followed by an 'active 
failure' which would more clearly be considered the 'immediate cause'. For example 
there were organizational failings in the process by which the driver of the Thames 
turbo was recruited prior to Ladbroke Grove accident. However this would not be 
considered an 'immediate cause' according to the definitions in the RGS as it triggered, 
and was followed by, a number of other failings the last of which was the driver passing 
the red signal. Performance conditions are also unlikely to be reported as the 
'immediate cause' of an incident. Performance conditions which are strongly correlated 
to risk like train speed are not necessarily deviations from the planned operational 
parameters of the railway. Performance conditions (like train speed) would not be 
recorded as causes unless performance limits are being exceeded (e.g. a train 
overs peed) . 
Data is collected for a variety of different reasons in the rail industry. In addition to the 
standard mentioned data is collected for performance monitoring, to support 
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compensation payments and to meet specific reporting legislation. It is also collected 
by various organisations to support prosecutions. Data collection is therefore not 
generally scoped for the development of detailed risk models. Stoop (Hale, Wilpert et 
al. 1997), page 77, points out that in general data used for analysis in safety critical 
industries is vulnerable to underreporting, incomplete recording, and does not 
necessarily provide the researcher with the complete picture of the conditions under 
which the accident took place. 
The latter point is particularly true for the railway industry. Many of the factors that it is 
known risk is sensitive to are not routinely monitored. This results in a loss of context 
for the data. Data is available and may be collected. However the models that exist are 
not able to be used to interpret the type of data that is available. This is a general 
problem. Hale and Koorneef point out that it is difficult for those recording data to 
ensure they record all information that is necessary to improve safety. 
'Any report, by its choice of words simplifies real-life processes and conditions. It is 
impossible to know just on the basis of the data provided in the notification report 
whether or not crucial context data are missing and if so, which data. It is like looking 
into a room through a keyhole: one cannot see what is out of sight, but possibly 
relevant for understanding the visible scenes.' (Koornneef and Hale 2001). 
Reports do not tend to provide all of the information that is needed. 
3.6.3 The spread and variability of the railway network 
The UK railway network exists over a wide geographic area and consists of over 20 
thousand miles of track. A hazard, such as a train passing a signal at danger, may 
occur at many different locations on the railway. Although broadly the same sequence 
of events would need to occur for this to happen at each location, the probability of 
these events occurring will differ widely depending on the effectiveness of the safety 
controls in each location and local conditions. 
In order to understand the risk across the network, safety indicator data for each 
possible location on it is needed. If, as stated in the previous section, the full accident 
causal sequence across all locations on the network is to be considered then 
substantial data collection and monitoring is required. This data would also need to be 
interpreted to identify where risk is highest at any given time. This makes data 
management and analysis much more complex than it would be in a single location, 
like for example a single nuclear power plant, or oil platform, or indeed a single railway 
station. 
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At Ladbroke Grove it was known that the signals were difficult for the driver to sight for 
a variety of different reasons. It was also known that the driver who passed the signal 
at danger was inexperienced. In most other locations neither of these conditions hold 
true and both are true in even fewer. However there was no process or model being 
systematically applied to interpret the relationship between the state of these various 
indicators and the degree of accident risk. The integrity of all of the various defences 
that were needed to prevent it had not been jointly and holistically considered in 
advance of the accident. The focus of the railway should clearly be on identifying such 
situations in advance of the occurrence of a major accident. This principle has been 
advocated by Health and Safety Executive in guidance for its inspectors (HSE 2001 a). 
'Location by location consideration of risks should however be carried out to determine 
whether, even if application of a control measure system-wide would be ruled out on 
the grounds of excessive costs, application is reasonably practicable in certain 
locations, such as those that present a particularly high risk and/or low cost. ' 
However, the HSE does not comment on how onerous a task this would be for the 
consideration of all types of accident risk across the network as a whole. There are a 
huge number of separate locations on the network where accidents are possible. There 
are also a huge number of possible accident sequences to consider. To analyse them 
all, from first principles, would be a major task. And as the integrity of these defences 
may be constantly changing, due to performance pressures for example, it would be an 
ongoing task. 
The concept of the 'safety space' (see section 3.1) and the issue of large geographic 
scope combine to create an additional problem for railway safety management - the 
presence of 'risk hotspots' - locations on the network where risk is disproportionately 
high. 
The UK railway consists of many different locations, organisations, technologies and 
procedures. It would therefore appear to be inevitable that this variability would result in 
a wide variability in accident risk across the network. The graph of Figure 15 provides 
support for the existence of 'risk hotspots' on the UK railway network. It shows that the 
estimated risk has reduced significantly from only a small change in the number of 
SPAD incidents. The rise in SPAD risk seen in late 2007 has occurred fundamentally 
because of the occurrence of two high risk SPAD incidents (from a total number of 
322). It can be seen that recently the risk has risen whilst the number of incidents in 
total has reduced. 
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This variability is predicted by organizational accident theory which argues that safety 
performance varies greatly between organisations because of continual movement in 
the 'safety space' The organizational pressures that drive movement in the safety 
space are significant in the industry and one might expect these forces to result in a 
wide variety of safety performance. As was discussed in section 3.1 Rasmussen 
expands on this theory to say that the production pressures in an organisation 
inevitably drive organisations to the point where accidents are likely. One might 
consider that the accidents at Ladbroke Grove and Hatfield are examples of this. 
Another factor to consider is that when accidents occur resources are heavily diverted 
to particular areas of risk. This mechanism was clearly seen in the aftermath of the 
Hatfield accident. In practice the railway has limited resources to invest in safety. If one 
type of accident receives a disproportionate share of these resources, then it is likely 
that safety will suffer in some other area. If this were the case we might expect to see 
accidents occur due to different causes as a result of money being diverted to manage 
risk related to accident which happen to have occurred in the recent past. 
Risk varies significantly across the network, from location to location. Those locations 
with the highest risk are referred to in this thesis as 'risk hotspots'. It may well be that, 
in a number of locations, at any given time the conditions under which a major accident 
could occur exist. All that is required is the failure of a single line of defence. If this is 
the case then the management problem is how to identify these locations and intervene 
before an accident actually occurs. 
In summary, management of safety on the UK railway is greatly complicated by the 
large geographic spread of the railway and the variability and complexity that occur as 
a result of this. Huge amounts of information are potentially relevant to the 
management of safety and monitoring and analysing all of this information would be a 
major task. The performance of the railway is variable from location to location and in 
some locations - risk hotspots - risk is disproportionately high. 
3.6.4 Summary of problems 
Accident and incident reports are the only indicator data that are definitely collected by 
the industry. However, because major accidents are rare in the UK railway industry (as 
outlined in section 3.6.1) there will not tend to be significant amounts of such data. 
Reporting tends to be done for a variety of reasons and might not provide all of the 
required causal information even where reports are available. The problem of 
monitoring and interpreting the meaning of safety indicators in the UK railway industry 
is compounded by the size, variability and complexity of the network which means that 
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huge amounts of safety indicator data, relating to possible accident causes would need 
to be collected. However there is a need to undertake such monitoring and analysis as 
at any given time there will be a number of locations on the network where risk is 
disproportionately high. It may well be that an organizational accident is imminent at 
such locations. 
3.7 Ideal risk modelling requirements 
In this section a number of ideal requirements for risk models are stated given: 
• 
• 
Hypothesis 1 - that Organizational accident theory provides an explanation for 
the mechanisms by which major accidents occur within the UK railway industry 
- is valid 
the particular problems of applying organizational accident theory in the UK 
railway industry, as identified in section 3.6. 
The derived requirements define the ideal characteristics of risk models referred to in 
Hypothesis 2. 
3.7.1 Requirements for a model to support the management of organizational 
accidents 
have argued that major accidents in the railway industry exhibit the properties of 
organizational accidents. Organizational accident theory provides a conceptual model 
to use as the basis of a risk model, and also with which to identify safety indicator data 
that could usefully be collected. 
Safety indicator data relates to the range of different causes of an accident. An 
accident ultimately occurs because of a particular sequence of events. There are also 
various conditions, which influence the occurrence of the events and the severity of any 
accident. These conditions might indicate latent weaknesses in an organisation's 
defences or they might relate to the operational characteristics of the network that 
indicate high risk, such as train speed. The way to achieve continuing safety 
improvement is to understand all of these underlying causes of accidents by analysing 
the accident event sequence. These causes will, by definition, occur more regularly 
than the accident itself, providing improved opportunity for collecting data and 
developing indicators. 
A conceptual model is needed to interpret the meaning of this information for each 
possible major railway accident scenario, in each possible location on the network and 
to provide greater visibility of the accident sequence. 
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Organizational accident theory therefore implies the following ideal requirements for a 
risk modelling approach, which form the first two requirements elaborating upon 
hypothesis 2: 
RMR1: Risk models should allow as many of the events in an accident sequence to be 
modelled as is practicable. 
RMR2: Risk models should allow as many of the significant and quantifiable technical, 
operational, organizational and performance conditions that cause accidents or 
exacerbate risk to be explicitly modelled as is practicable. 
The UK railway network is very large, conSisting of many locations, organisations 
technologies and procedures. Although broadly the same sequence of events would 
need to occur for an accident to happen at each location, the probability of these 
events occurring will differ widely depending on the local conditions, which might relate 
to the integrity of safety defences or key operational parameters. 
A model is needed which is able to represent the variety of conditions that exist from 
location to location across the network, and relate these to the accident causal 
sequence. Such a model could be used to identify the indicator data from across the 
network that should be monitored. It could also be used to estimate risk from this 
indicator data to identify the particular locations where risk was disproportionately high. 
This leads to the third recommendation elaborating upon Hypothesis 2. 
RMR3: Risk models should be parameterised by conditions so that the risk at different 
locations and in different situations on the railway network can be rapidly recalculated. 
3.7.2 Risk models and safety management 
As was stated in section 2.1.4 safety is managed by railway staff according to a 
management system. A fundamental principle of SMSs is that they should be risk-
based. In aviation SMS guidance, CAP712 (CAA 2002) Safety Management is defined 
as 'the systematic management of the risks [of aviation activities]'. 
The elements that comprise the SMS must be focussed on identifying and managing 
risks. An organisation's risk model can therefore be thought of as the safety 
management system's brain. Organisation and planning are about ensuring that that 
the SMSs limbs are coordinated with what its brain is thinking. The monitoring, auditing 
and review elements of the SMS are its senses which must correctly inform the brain 
about the factors which will affect the level of risk. Therefore, the risk model and the 
various elements of the Safety Management System should be fully integrated 
together. 
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Risk assessment and modelling are critical to the management of safety. It is also 
critical that the risk information is understood and acted upon by those that take safety 
related decisions in the industry. To manage safety, an effective and up to date 
understanding of risk must be built into the management system and the practical 
actions of the company. In particular when the industry decides what procedures, plans 
and actions to put in place to meet its legal duty it must do so with an awareness of 
risk. 
This leads to the next requirement for risk models: 
SMS1: In order to ensure that they effectively support the management of safety, the 
uses of risk models should support the various stages of a safety management system. 
This requirement can be broken down into more specific points by considering each of 
the various stages of a Safety Management System as outlined in section 2.1.4:6. 
• Organisation 
o Able to be used to gauge the impact of organizational changes on risk. 
• Planning 
o Estimates the total network wide risk. 
o Allows ranking of risk by individual location or situation, to allow 
prioritisation and targeting of interventions. 
o Estimates changes in risk level following interventions. 
• Monitoring (active) 
o Monitoring of changing network risk profile. 
o Monitoring of changing risk in each location on the network 
• Monitoring (reactive) 
o Can be used to help learn lessons from accidents. 
o Can be used to diagnose the causes of accidents. 
• Audit 
o Ability to be used to interpret audit results, and their implications for risk. 
6 No credible or specific support for the policy or review elements of a Safety Management 
System have been identified 
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3.7.3 Risk models and safety decision making 
As was discussed in section 2.1.3, the railway industry guidance document 'Taking 
Safe Decisions' (RSSB 2008b) describes how the industry uses risk information within 
the wider decision making process. The guidance stresses that risk modelling and 
analysis is not purely an analytical exercise but also has a more qualitative, judgment 
based element. The process of safety analysis has benefits above and beyond any 
numerical output that it produces, as it ensures that the domain experts think about the 
relevant issues in a systematic and structured way before reaching any judgment about 
what measures to put in place. Ultimately the intention of risk analysis and modelling is 
to assist the decision maker in best understanding the risks, costs and benefits of a 
particular decision so that an informed judgement can be made. 
Risk models do not themselves improve safety. Safety is improved by the actions of 
managers and other railway employees. This leads to the final requirement for an ideal 
risk model. 
SDM1: In order to ensure that they effectively support the taking of safety related 
decisions, risk models should be developed to be accessible to and understandable by 
those who actually manage safety on the network 
3.8 Chapter summary: Restatement of ideal requirements 
In this chapter, the recent accident history of Britain's railways was reviewed. The 
review found that organizational accident theory explains many of the phenomena seen 
in the industry. The theory provides an explanation of the causal mechanisms by which 
the Ladbroke Grove accident occurred, and how the various causes arose. It also 
describes the industry's response to major accidents more generally and provides an 
explanation for trends seen in reported accident levels in the industry. 
The theory also proposes an approach for the management of the risk from 
organizational accidents. Consideration of these approaches again provides useful 
insights into why the industry's responses to previous actions may have (section 3.5.2) 
and may not have (section 3.5.1) been successful. The review led to the conclusion 
that there are three fundamental problems with the application of organizational 
accident theory to the management of risk in the UK railway industry: 
• Lack of safety indicator data 
• Problems with data collection 
• The size and variability of the railway network 
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Data collected in the industry tends to relate to accidents and their immediate causes. 
This may lead to a focus on the most recent serious accident or incident, which may 
not reflect underlying levels of risk. Safety theory says that, in order to reduce the 
likelihood of organizational accidents further better indicators of the events and 
conditions that precede the immediate cause need to be developed and their 
relationship to underlying levels of risk needs to be determined. I have therefore sought 
to define a model of risk that would help to develop such indicators. As the railway 
industry is a large and sprawling system, the conditions that need to be monitored vary 
from location to location. With this in mind, a set of requirements for an ideal risk model 
to improve understanding of all of the various causes of accidents and how they 
combine in a particular situation or location have been developed. In summary, these 
requirements are: 
RMR1: Risk models should allow as many of theevents in an accident sequence to be 
modelled as is practicable. 
RMR2: Risk models should allow as many of the significant and quantifiable technical, 
operational, organizational and performance conditions that cause accidents or 
exacerbate risk to be explicitly modelled as is practicable. 
RMR3: Risk models should be parameterised by conditions so that the risk at different 
locations and in different situations on the railway network can be rapidly recalculated. 
As safety is ultimately achieved by the actions of safety professionals it is crucial that 
the models developed by applying this new technique align with the management 
approaches and actions used in the industry and can be used and understood by 
decision makers in the industry. Two additional requirements have therefore been 
proposed on this basis: 
SMS1: In order to ensure that they effectively support the management of safety, the 
uses of a risk models should support the various stages of a safety management 
system. 
SDM1: In order to ensure that they effectively support the taking of safety related 
decisions risk models should be usable and understandable by those who actually 
manage safety on the network. 
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4 Review of industry safety management and risk modelling 
approaches 
I concluded the last chapter by proposing five ideal requirements for risk models to 
support the management of organizational accidents in the UK railway industry 
(summarised in section 3.8). In this chapter, risk modelling approaches used in the UK 
railway industry are described and then reviewed against these ideal requirements. 
This chapter presents the argument in support of hypothesis 2: 'Current risk modelling 
approaches in use in the UK railway industry do not have these characteristics and 
therefore do not ideally support the effective management of safety.' 
4.1 Assessment of the risk of a railway company's train operations. 
Railway companies in the UK must undertake suitable and sufficient risk assessment 
as part of the requirements to receive certification of their SMS by the industry joint 
economic and safety regulator, the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR). Organisations are 
legally required to assess the risk of their entire operations as part of a process to 
ensure that they are doing all that is reasonably practicable to reduce risk. 
To support this process RSSB, the industry safety body, has published guidance for 
train operators to use to undertake risk analysis and assessment (RSSB 2002). The 
document outlines the principles that should be applied when undertaking risk analysis. 
For example, this guidance describes requirements for risk analysis which reflect the 
ideal requirements set out in this thesis, stating that companies must undertake: 
' ... a detailed [hazard} identification .. . modified to take account of the specific factors 
applicable to the operation such as new or different [hazards}, causes or consequences 
and individual potentially high risk locations.' ((RSSB 2002) page 12). 
In practice, however, given the scope of their operations and the tools and techniques 
for risk analysis available to them, it is difficult for train operators to apply these 
principles in full. In a section describing the choice of assessment methodology the 
guidance asserts that to produce a 'suitable and sufficient' ((RSSB 2002) page11) risk 





The total risk that their operation creates 
The total risk contribution for each hazard 
The total risk contribution of the direct causes of each of these hazards 
The total risk from their train operations to which each type of individual 
(passenger, member of staff, member of the public) is typically exposed 
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The identification of the locations or situations on the network where there is the 
highest risk is not stressed, perhaps because of the inherent difficulties of doing this in 
practice. One way to estimate the totals bulleted above would be to look at the risk in 
each location on the network and aggregate it to calculate each total. However this 
approach is difficult because of the nature of risk on the railway and the practical 
difficulties inherent in its estimation. Train operations take place over a large 
geographic area, and the assessment of the risk of each hazard from first principles in 
each location would be a time-consuming task (as discussed in section 3.6.3). 
Therefore, train operators tend to apply a 'top down' approach to the estimation of the 
risk totals. They are able to make estimates of the risk totals bulleted above from the 
data that they routinely collect for SMIS about incidents and accidents using the risk 
ranking approach outlined in Appendix B of the guidance (see 2.4.1 for a description of 
the ranking categories applied). This approach, and the accident causal model that it 
implies, are summarised in Figure 17. 
As has been discussed, to meet the SMIS requirements (see section 3.6.1), companies 
will tend to record data about accidents and incidents. Incidents like SPAD occurrences 
or broken rails align with the definition of 'hazards' previously outlined. To assess risk 
train operators must assess the risk from each hazard. Experts might assess the 
hazard likelihood by asking: 'how many SPADs occurred on this network in the last five 
years?' The answer would be considered to provide an indicator of the future likelihood 
of SPADs occurring. The occurrence rate can then be normalised to a per year figure 
and used to estimate the likelihood ranking category according to the scheme laid out 
in Table 1 (shown on page 37). This process might result in a revision to the calculated 
figure by applying expert judgement to determine how indicative past frequencies are 
of future likelihood. Similarly the answer to the question: 'What was the average 
severity of SPAD accidents that occurred over this time period?' could be used to 
estimate a severity ranking. The risk ranking of this hazard could then be determined 
from the ranking matrix shown in Table 2. Unlike in the event tree models described in 
section 2.4.3 the consequence side of the model includes a single accident, 
representing an accident of average severity. Figure 17 summarises this process and 
shows how all risk estimates are made on the basis of hazard (incident) data and 
accident data. No such diagrammatic representation of the causal sequence IS 
produced as part of the process, but the implied causal model is as shown. 
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Figure 17: Causal model applied for TOC risk assessment 
Note that it consists of only two events: the hazard and the accident. Precursors are 
not separate events and there is no separate event data to support estimation of their 
likelihood. The term 'precursor' is used to describe a subset of 'hazardous event' 
occurrences according to their attributed cause. For example if the hazard was a 
SPAD, and its attributed cause was a signal failure, one pre-cursor might be 'SPAD 
due to signal failure'. Another might be 'SPAD due to driver error' etc. Therefore the 
total SPAD rate would be the aggregate of the rates of all precursors. As was explained 
in section 3.6.1 there is no requirement in the industry to report data about potential 
causes of hazards and therefore the model is not at this level of detail. The separate 
events 'signal failure ' and 'driver error', which will only cause SPADs in some 
circumstances, are not themselves considered. 
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4.1.1 Review of approach against the risk modelling requirements 
In this section the risk ranking approach is reviewed to see the extent to which it meets 
the ideal risk modelling requirements RMR1-RMR3. 
RMR1: Risk models should allow as many of the events in an accident sequence 
to be modelled as is practicable. 
Figure 17 shows the approach does not allow all events in an accident sequence to be 
modelled. Using the ranking approach there is no model of the accident sequence as 
such; moreover, the implied causal model is a simplistic one. As the precursors are 
sub-types of hazard, rather than separate events, the implied model consists of only 
two events in each accident sequence: the hazard and the accident. Therefore the risk 
ranking approach enforces a simple model of the accident event sequence. 
RMR2: Risk models should allow as many of the significant and quantifiable 
technical, operational, organizational and performance conditions that cause 
accidents or exacerbate risk to be explicitly modelled as is practicable. 
The second requirement for an ideal risk model is that all significant and quantifiable 
technical, operational, organizational and performance causes of accidents should be 
explicitly modelled. The approach does not support this. The method does not require 
any of the conditions or events in the accident causal sequence to be considered other 
than the two events already mentioned. The data that supports the probability 
estimates is aggregated occurrence data from a range of different locations on the 
network. The conditions relevant to the resulting risk estimates are therefore an 
amalgam of the conditions in existence in various locations across the network at the 
time that hazards previously occurred and data was collected. 
RMR3: Risk models should be parameterised by conditions so that the risk at 
different locations and in different situations on the railway network can be 
rapidly recalculated 
Consideration of whether or not risk at different locations and in different situations on 
the railway network can be rapidly recalculated leads immediately to the conclusion 
that this is not supported by the process. The analysis is concerned with the total risk to 
which a train operator is exposed, not the risk in any individual identifiable location. 
SMS1: In order to ensure that they effectively support the management of safety, 
the uses of a risk models should support the various stages of a safety 
management system 
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The risk assessment undertaken is intended to impact upon the train operator's safety 
management system. The guidance document states one purpose of the assessment 
as being: 
'identification of control measures with links to the safety management system ... ' 
The risk estimated relates to the train operator's total scope of operations and the 
potential uses of the model therefore align with this scope. For example, this approach 
might be used to justify a proposal that improved driver training procedures are 
implemented across a TOG's train operations, to reduce SPAD risk. The approach 
outlined cannot easily be used to identify risk controls that effectively target major train 
accident risk in particular locations or situations. This is because the approach relies on 
limited existing data, the weaknesses in the implicit risk model and the lack of 
conditions and parameterisation in the approach. 
However, the approach provides an accessible and easily understandable 
methodology to help safety professionals consider risk. Therefore even if local issues 
are not specifically modelled or analysed, application of the method might trigger 
discussion and local consideration of risk in practice. 
SDM1: In order to ensure that they effectively support the taking of safety related 
decisions risk models should be usable and understandable by those who 
actually manage safety on the network 
Because the approach is relatively simple to apply and understand it is able to be 
applied by safety professionals and managers within railway companies and supports 
discussion and consideration of risk issues within companies. However the simplicity of 
the approach is at the expense of the complexity needed to understand the causal 
mechanisms that can lead organizational accidents, and the model provides little help 
for managing safety related to such issues. 
Summary 
The strength of this approach is its accessibility. To apply the process safety 
professionals do not need to be expert risk modellers. This is an important advantage 
of the approach, as it helps to link understanding of risk to the practical management 
decisions made. The approach therefore partially meets SMS1 and SDM1, in that its 
use has the potentially to improve the way that an understanding of risk is factored into 
safety management and decision making. 
However, the model is based on a simplified model of the accident event sequence. It 
does not involve any attempt to model the underlying conditions which increase the 
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likelihood of events in the accident sequence. Neither does it allow for the particular 
causes that exist in different locations and situations to be modelled. Therefore it does 
not provide an approach that is well aligned with the management of organizational 
accident risk, and does not meet requirements RMR1-3 that were previously proposed. 
4.2 The Safety Risk Model (SRM) approach 
The Safety Risk Model (SRM) is produced by RSSB on behalf of the UK railway 
industry. It consists of a series of fault and event tree models representing 125 different 
hazardous events that have been identified as possible on the UK railway network. It 
therefore comprises of a set of bow-tie models (section 2.4.4). The SRM is regularly 
updated by a large team of analysts; the Risk Profile Bulletin (RSSB 2006), which 
describes the model output, is widely distributed across the industry. The SRM is 
supported by a database which contains all of the frequency and consequence 
estimates used as input to the model. A set of model assumptions is also maintained. 
Figure 18 (taken from (Dennis, Somaiya et al. 2002)) shows a simplified extract from 
the SRM: a fault and event tree to model derailment risk. The fault tree part of the 
model is similar to the equivalent part of the model outlined in Figure 17. In general, 
each hazardous event is disaggregated into the 'precursors' using a number of different 
base events linked with a large OR gate. As discussed in section 4.1 each precursor 
relates to a sub-set of the hazardous event occurrences rather than the causal event 
per se. For example, the model is quantified using data on the occurrence of broken 
rails which subsequently led to a derailment, not using data on the occurrence of 
broken rails (see Figure 18). 
Each event tree includes a range of different events and outcomes. The severity of the 
consequences of each accident outcome modelled by the event tree is calculated 
externally to the model, and then input to the database which provides input data for 
the model. The SRM is used for estimating the total risk to which the railway industry is 
exposed from all accidents. It can therefore be used to track progress in the 
effectiveness of risk and safety management activity in the industry. It has also been 
used to postulate likely changes in risk associated with network wide initiatives or the 
update of UK railway standards, which are put into force across the entire network. For 
example, the model was used to predict the change in risk associated with the 
widespread adoption of the Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS) as a 
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Figure 18: Safety Risk Model (SRM): indicative derailment model 
In the SRM Risk Profile Bulletin, risk is defined as: 
Equation 2: risk = frequency x consequence 
This definition differs from the one presented in section 2.1.1. The SRM estimates the 
risk across the railway network and it utilises data from across a range of locations and 
situations to do this. The use of 'frequency' is required in the risk equation rather than 
'likelihood' because of this. It is possible that the frequency of each hazardous event 
type or precursor type across the network could be greater than 1 per year, and 
therefore this component of the equation is quantified as a frequency not a probability. 
To estimate risk the probability of occurrence of possible events in an accident 
sequence must also be estimated. The past frequency of occurrence of an event is one 
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indicator of its current likelihood. However, if the circumstances in which a past event 
occurred are different to the current circumstances then past frequency of occurrence 
may not be a good indicator of likelihood. Therefore the equation should not be taken 
to mean that the model produces risk estimates purely on the basis of past event 
occurrence rates. The term 'frequency' could instead be taken to mean 'estimated 
future frequency'. The definition shown as Equation 2 should therefore be taken to be a 
definition which is specific to the SRM, and safety management activities and 
techniques that make use of it. 
Equation 2 provides an indication of the philosophy behind the development of the 
SRM, for which the preferred method of determining event likelihoods is to use past 
event occurrence rates. Wherever data is available it is used in the SRM to set the 
future likelihood of occurrence of events. The Safety Management Information System 
(SMIS) includes data describing the past frequency of occurrence of hazardous events 
and hence precursors. Where little data is available, for example when considering low 
frequency events like train collisions, expert judgement is used to support estimates of 
likelihood. Judgement is also used to establish whether past event occurrence rates 
are indicative of the current event likelihood of occurrence. Such judgement might arise 
when changes to the railway are known to have occurred like the imposition of TPWS 
and the removal of Mark 1 rolling stock from the network. 
As the SRM is quantified using data sourced from across the whole network the model 
provides an estimate of the total network wide risk. The model breaks down these risk 
estimates at hazardous event and precursor level. Because of the model's strong 
reliance on reported industry data it is widely trusted, and used within the railway 
industry. Its method of development gives confidence that the risk estimates it provides 
are likely to be reasonable, even for risk allocated at the precursor level. A review of 
the SRM (Bedford, Quigley et al. 2004a; Bedford, Quigley et al. 2004b) found that 80% 
of the precursors were within a factor of 10 of the empirical estimates on the basis of 
judgement. The report suggested that any disagreement was due either to 
miscalibration of the experts responsible for validating the model or unrepresentative 
historical data. It proposed further work to address any inaccuracies and improve the 
model. 
4.2.1 Review against the risk modelling requirements 
I now consider the degree to which the SRM meets the ideal requirements previously 
set out for a UK railway risk model. 
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RMR1: Risk models should allow as many of the events in an accident sequence 
to be modelled as is practicable. 
The Safety Risk Model uses complicated event trees to model the possible sequences 
of events that follow the occurrence of a hazard. In some of the models, well over a 
dozen different events are included in event tree models. This aspect of the event 
sequence is thus well modelled although given its strong reliance on available data, the 
SRM modelling approach presents a limited model of the causes of a hazard. 
A review of the SRM undertaken by the Health and Safety Laboratory (Turner, Keeley 
et al. 2002) pointed out the lack of depth in the causal model represented by the SRM: 
'In general the fault trees within the SRM are expressed at a relatively high level and do 
not, generally, model the root causes of failures. ' 
For each incident or accident recorded in the data, it is assumed that there was a 
single immediate cause, the pre-cursor. For example the data will describe whether a 
derailment event was caused primarily by a rolling stock fault, or another type of fault 
such as a track fault, an obstruction or overspeeding. The SRM model only takes 
account of these immediate causes - the 'active failures' that ultimately triggered the 
occurrence of the accident. As previously discussed, the precursor is therefore actually 
a sub-type of the hazardous event rather than a discrete causal event. The other 
preceding events that organizational accident theory says also lead to its occurrence 
are not generally recorded in the data and are therefore not generally modelled. In 
some cases where more detailed incident data is available, for example in the 
modelling of SPAD risk, the model includes more detailed causal breakdowns. 
RMR2: Risk models should allow all significant and quantifiable technical, 
operational, organizational and performance conditions that cause accidents or 
exacerbate risk to be explicitly modelled. 
The SRM includes a list of assumptions based on knowledge of the states of relevant 
conditions on the network ((RSSB 2006), Page 70). Most of the assumptions made 
relate to the event tree part of the model where more detailed information about events 
and conditions is known and these assumptions are generally made about things like 
train speed, and the particular characteristics of locations, like tunnels or stations. 
These are performance conditions and technical conditions, respectively, within the 
casual taxonomy outlined in section 2.3.1. In general the approach is to assume 
average condition states rather than specific ones. For example the assumptions state 
that 'the average speed at which a train will strike a road vehicle at an open [level] 
crossing (OC) is taken as 10 mph'. Where particular condition states are assumed, this 
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is done by creating additional instances of the fault and event tree models with revised 
structure and/or probabilities. For example the derailment model is split into high and 
low speed models. The SRM assumptions state that the 'the average speed of a fast 
speed derailment is assumed to be 55 mph'. However, the model does not represent 
the risk from derailments occurring at 55mph: it represents the network aggregate risk 
from derailments incidents falling within the set high speed range, the average value of 
which is 55 mph. Incident data from all incidents arising within the range of speeds is 
used to produce a new instance of the model. 
The SRM model includes some condition states within the model. However these only 
represent a subset of the condition states of relevance. 
RMR3: Risk models should be parameterised by conditions so that the risk at 
different locations and in different situations on the railway network can be 
rapidly recalculated 
As discussed in the previous paragraph, some models are replicated and different 
condition states assumed for each part of the SRM. For some parts of the model 
condition states are introduced as events in the event tree, resulting in sets of event 
tree end points that relate to different condition states. In the derailment part of the 
model, for instance, there are separate event tree structures produced for the 
consequences of derailments occurring at night, at 'peak' times of the day or at 'off 
peak' times of the day. This is done by introducing an event called 'time of day' into the 
event tree. The event has three possible states, one for each different time of day 
modelled, and probabilities are assigned to each state to represent the relative 
probability that a derailment occurs at each of these times. Time of day' is actually an 
indicator of the performance conditions, 'traffic density' and 'passenger loading'. Given 
that an accident has occurred, passenger loading is strongly correlated to the severity 
of the accident consequences, and traffic density impacts on the probability of collision 
following a derailment. 
Building separate models in this way allows the risk from different sets of conditions to 
be modelled. However, inclusion of multiple conditions states in this way results in 
rapid growth of model size. By including both high and low speed states the derailment 
model in effect doubles in size. Inclusion of the three different times of day results in 
the event tree model becoming three times larger than would otherwise be the case. It 
is clear to see that it would not take the addition of many more conditions ,or condition 
states, to make the model unmanageably large. The ultimate implication of this 
approach is that, in order to build a complete network wide risk model, a separate 
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model would be needed to represent all different sets of conditions that might occur 
across the rail network. Currently the model does not contain sufficient 
parameterisation for it to be used to derive a risk estimate for particular regions of the 
network. The Health and Safety Laboratory report (Turner, Keeley et al. 2002) 
concluded that: 
'the generic nature of the model makes no allowance for regional differences on the 
infrastructure' 
However, the model is used by train operators to provide an indication of the risk for 
their particular operations. Each hazardous event in the SRM is associated with a 
'normaliser'. For example in Figure 18 the hazardous event is described as 'passenger 
train derailment/train mile travelled'. Train operators can scale up each normalised risk 
estimate according to the characteristics of their own operation. RSSB provides tools to 
support this process? 
Yet train operators must be aware of the potential inaccuracies in this approach. The 
normalised figure is not actually representative of the risk at any known location on the 
network. The model calculates the risk arising in total, divided by the normaliser. This 
division of the network total figure to a normalised figure is necessary to enable to use 
of precursor frequency estimates, which may well be greater than 1, to quantify the 
fault tree model, which is a probabilistic model. A normalised figure (e.g. per train mile) 
would result in frequencies of occurrence of precursors that are much less than 1. This 
allows the assumption to be made that the observed frequencies per train mile per year 
are mathematically equal to probabilities of occurrence per train mile per year. 
As was argued in section 3.6.3, risk is not evenly distributed across the network and 
the total risk on the network is likely to be dominated by the risk in a subset of 
locations. For example, it cannot be assumed that the scaled risk per track mile relates 
to a track mile on the network where 'average' condition states (e.g. average train 
speeds, average track quality, etc) exist. Risk will substantially arise in locations where 
unfavourable condition states exist in combination. In acknowledgement of this issue 
the RSSB tools require safety managers to apply their own data to derive risk 
estimates, wherever possible. The scaled national profile estimates are used only as 
an indicative estimate of risk where no specific data exists. 
7 These tools are not in the public domain, and therefore are not described further in this thesis. 
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SMS1: In order to ensure that they effectively support the management of safety, 
the uses of a risk models should support the various stages of a safety 
management system 
As the SRM has a network-wide scope, it provides strong support for safety 
management at the UK national level. It is used to identify the risk profile of the UK 
railway network and to provide risk forecasts for the UK railway as a whole. This leads 
naturally to its use to drive the policy of the railway industry. It is also used to support 
the development of safety initiatives throughout the industry. 
The SRM has been used to estimate the impact of the network wide application of 
control measures. In 2003, following legislation mandating TPWS fitment, it was used 
to estimate the risk reduction that would be achieved by implementing TPWS at all 
junction signals, permanent speed restrictions and buffer stops. The analysis was used 
to inform a Cost-Benefit Analysis of whether or not installation of TPWS had been 
justified under the principles of reasonable practicability. 
For the reasons already explained use of the model to support local decision making is 
more difficult and requires additional interpretation and analysis. The CBA analysis 
mentioned did not attempt to estimate whether it was necessary to install TPWS at a 
sub-set of locations on the network, perhaps because this would have entailed more 
extensive remodelling work: 
' .. . no attempt has been made to model degrees of partial fitment.' ((RSSB 2003a) 
page 32). 
Industry safety managers are given access to the RPB presenting the models key 
findings every time that the model is updated, and also spreadsheets of the risk 
estimates broken down by hazardous event and pre-cursor. This allows them to extract 
risk estimates from the SRM for the purposes of their own calculation and assessment. 
However their estimates do not relate to their particular scope of operations so it can 
be difficult for them to extract such information. There is a paucity of data at the local 
level and the SRM provides a start point to assess if they think they are above or below 
the network risk level reported in the SRM. 
The model therefore supports policy and planning well at the network level. It is also 
strongly linked to the incident data via SMIS and is clearly well integrated with industry 
monitoring activity. For particular safety managers, use of the SRM to support their own 
safety management activity is more problematic requiring a degree of interpretation, 
and an awareness that in some cases SRM output may not be useful or relevant. 
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SDM1: In order to ensure that they effectively support the taking of safety related 
decisions risk models should be usable and understandable by those who 
actually manage safety on the network 
The Safety Risk Model provides the industry with estimates of the average risk for a 
wide number of hazards, and precursors across the railway network. These estimates 
are strongly driven by data collected, and are developed by a robust and trusted 
process. This gives the industry confidence in their validity, and helps to ensure that 
they are used in practice. The data is most useful for control measures with a wide 
scope of implementation, where the average risk estimates provided are most likely to 
be valid. 
As previously discussed, the risk estimates are less useful for decision making relating 
to specific situations or locations as the SRM scope will not be aligned to such 
situations. In these circumstances the analyst will require a detailed understanding of 
the assumptions of the model, and these are not fully transparent. Work is under way 
to develop detailed definitions of the meaning and scope of hazardous events and 
precursors, to make the underlying assumptions of the model more transparent to its 
users. However, the underlying fault and event trees on which the risk estimates for the 
major accidents in the model are based are not routinely made available to industry 
safety managers so they are unable to examine and review these models to ascertain 
their validity in particular circumstances, and in any case competence in risk modelling 
would be required to do so. Without such understanding the models might be 
misunderstood and misused. 
Summary 
The SRM is a substantial and trusted model in the industry with many uses, particularly 
with regard to national .policy, planning and initiatives. For this reason, when 
considered within its intended scope, the model substantially meets requirements 
SMS1 and SDM1. 
However, the model was not developed specifically to support the management of 
organizational accident risk and does not meet all of the requirements outlined for such 
models. From this perspective it only partially meets requirements SMS1 and SDM1 as 
the models network wide scope means that a detailed understanding of its scope and 
assumptions would be needed to truly understand how the risk estimates it provides 
translate to the local level. This understanding is hindered in particular by the fact that 
the fault and event tree parts of the model are not available to the users of risk 
information. 
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The SRM partially meets RMR1. The event tree side of the model includes detailed 
analysis of the sequences of events that could result in an accident, following the 
occurrence of a 'hazardous event'. However the fault tree side of the model describes 
only a single measurable event. The model does not meet RMR2 as it contains a 
limited degree of parameterisation by condition, and the approach to inclusion of 
conditions - duplication of the model structure - does not provide a viable way of 
extending parameterisation to a significant degree. Because of this limited degree of 
parameterisation the model does not meet RMR3. Scaling the national aggregate risk 
by a normaliser would not support the identification of 'risk hotspots' as by definition the 
estimate represents average risk rather than a possible upper estimate. 
4.3 Quantitative risk assessments - industry study 
Safety approvals or justifications are usually required to allow changes to be made and 
a risk assessment will often form the basis of an argument presented in a technical 
report, or a safety case, to argue that the adoption of a new system or procedure is 
justified. This is implicitly acknowledged in the industry safety management guidance 
the Yellow Book (RSSB 2007b) which is scoped to address 'engineering change'. 
Because of this focus on justification of change, and the considerable effort and 
expertise needed to build risk models, individual organisations in the UK railway 
industry do not maintain their own risk models for all accidents to which they are 
exposed. Instead, they tend to undertake bespoke risk assessment and modelling on a 
case by case basis. Organisations may wish to undertake risk modelling to: 
• Determine whether a new system can be safety installed, and how to do this 
most safely. This could range from the installation of closed circuit television at 
a station to the introduction of a new signalling control centre. 
• Determine whether alterations to procedures can be safely undertaken, and 
how to do this most safely. 
By definition, these bespoke assessments are limited in scope to consider only the 
possible effects of each intervention. 
Next one particular analysis is considered, as an example of how this approach is 
applied. Section 4.3.1 is based on insights into the strengths and weaknesses of the 
modelling approach that were gained by a review of the analysis, and resulting model 
with its original author. Note that the study is subsequently used as the basis for the 
core modelling work of this thesis which is described in Chapters 7 and 8. 
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4.3.1 Urban derailment risk analysis 
A 'derailment study' (Howes 2001) was carried out as part of development studies for a 
proposed upgrade to an urban railway. 
The objective of the original study was to quantify the level of risk to passengers and 
staff arising from derailments on the railway and use this information to undertake the 
upgrade in the optimum way, ensuring that risk was reduced to as Iowa level as was 
reasonably practicable. Fault and event tree models were used to calculate the risk 
from a number of different consequences that could occur following derailment. The 
analyst decided that the risk assessment should comprise of six different fault and 
event tree models, each representing a distinct type of location on the network. The 
models were developed from the structure of an early version of the SRM. Therefore 
the fault tree side of each model consisted of the hazard 'train derailment' and a range 
of precursors. The event tree part of each model was more elaborate, consisting of a 
range of different events that could occur following the occurrence of the hazard. The 
process followed for the development of these models is broadly the same as that 
applied to develop the SRM. The set of event trees produced as part of the model are 
shown in Appendix A 1. The event tree for a twin track tunnel is shown below. 
derailment derailment maintain derails to strike tunnel carriages fall M lines ide collapse secondary Frequency 
occurs containment clearances cess/adjacent portal structure collision 
line 
Yes 1 - no derailment 0 
0 
Yes 2 - minor derailment within 0.29 
0.29 clearances 
No 4- minor derailment ro cess. 0.35145 
0.99 striking lineside structure 
Cesslolatfonm 
0.5 
Yes 7 - major derailment to cess. 0.00355 
0.01 striking lines ide structure 
No 
1 
No 1 I - major derailment to adjacent 0.303525 
I 0.9 line No No 
0.71 0.95 Yes 12- major derailment to adjacent 0.033725 
0.1 line. with secondary collision 
Adiacent 
0.5 No 13 - maJor derailment to 0.015975 
r 0.9 line Yes 
0.05 Yes 14 - maJor dera~ment to 0.001775 
0.1 line with secondary coUision 
Figure 19: Twin track tunnel on a section of urban commuter railway 
Table 3 describes the meaning of each of the events in the set of event trees for the 
study. In order to support the work described in this thesis (some time after the analysis 
had been undertaken), the assumptions under which the event trees were produced 
were reviewed with the risk analyst who had initially developed it (see appendix A2). 
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This provided an opportunity to investigate how effectively the condition states that 
form the underlying assumptions of the models had been documented, managed and 
accounted for in this risk analysis. 
Condition Condition description 
location of derailment the location where the derailment occurs I 
I 
derailment containment whether the derailment containment is fitted. l fitted I 
I 
I 
track curvature the curvature of the track 
number of tracks the number of adjacent tracks: 
track type whether or not the track is predominantly plain line 
or whether it contains switch and crossing 
train speed the speed of the train when derailing (mph) 
lineside object density the density of objects beside the line 
lineside object type the type of equipment beside the line 
Density of traffic the traffic density 
rolling stock type the type of rolling stock 
Table 3: Conditions whose state affects fault and event probabilities 
4.3.2 Review against the risk modelling requirements 
I now consider the extent to which the modelling approach outlined meets the ideal risk 
modelling requirements that were set out in section 3.8. 
RMR1: Risk models should allow as many of the events in an accident sequence 
to be modelled as is practicable. 
The modelling approach undertaken is based on the structure of the SRM. Therefore 
the event sequence is modelled in a similar way. A detailed sequence of events is 
included in the event tree, however the fault tree part of the model is simplistic 
modelling only one event - the hazard itself. 
RMR2: Risk models should allow as many of the significant and quantifiable 
technical, operational, organizational and performance conditions that cause 
accidents or exacerbate risk to be explicitly modelled as is practicable. 
The analyst was asked to identify the conditions which he believed he needed to know 
in order to estimate the probability of occurrence of each of the events in the model. 
Table 4 shows the conditions that the analyst identified, and the events to which they 
relate. 
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Event Event Description Relevant conditions 




derailment A raised containment rail is present, which Derailment 
containment contains the derailment by limiting the containment fitted 
sideways movement of the train. 
Train speed 
maintain Following derailment the train remains clear Track curvature 
clearances of any obstruction. It does not overlap 
adjacent lines or obtrude beyond the edge Train speed 
of the track area. 
derails to The train can derail to either side of the Number of tracks 
cess/adjacent track. Derailing to the 'cess' (the outside 
Train speed line edge of the track area) may lead to a 
collision with a structure beside the railway Location of derailment 
line. Derailing to the adjacent side may lead 
to a collision with another train. 
carriages fall The carriage does not remain upright. Train speed 
Rolling stock type 
hit lineside The train hits a structure beside the line, Location of derailment 
structure such as a station platform or a building. Train speed 
Lineside object density 
structure Collision with a structure causes the rolling Train speed 
collapse stock carriage to collapse or break apart. Rolling stock type 
Lineside object type 
secondary The derailed train collides with a following Density of traffic 
collision or on-coming train. 
Table 4: Events and the conditions whose state influences their likelihood 
The analyst was subsequently asked to identify the set of these condition states that 
formed the underlying assumptions of each of the six models produced during the 
study. The sets of conditions identified are shown in Table 5. 
In some cases, the same assumption was made for all six models. For example, it was 
assumed that all traffic on this section of the network consisted of electric multiple units 
(EMUs) and it was assumed that the track had 'severe' curvature throughout. In other 
cases, specific condition states were assumed for specific types of location. 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 ModelS 
Location Open Bridge Stopping Tunnel Through Tunnel 
track Station station approach 
Containment No 
Curvature Severe 
Tracks 4 2 2 2 2 2 
Track Type Plain line Plain line Plain line Plain line Plain line Plain line 
&S&C &S&C &S&C 
Train Speed 30m ph 30mph <15mph 30mph 30mph 30mph 
Lineside High N/A High High High High 
Object 
Density 
Lineside Anchored N/A Anchored Anchored Anchored Anchored 
Object Type 
Density of High 
Traffic 
Rolling Electric Multiple Unit (EMU) 
Stock Type 
Table 5: Condition states assumed for each of the six fault and event tree models 
For example, the train speed is only less than 15mph in stations where the train is 
scheduled to stop. All of the conditions relate to the event tree part of the model except 
'track type' which relates to the fault tree part of the model. The 'open track', 'stopping 
station' and 'tunnel approach' models include precursors to model both switch and 
crossing (S&C) faults and plain line faults, whereas the other models include only 'plain 
line' faults. 
The analyst found it quite easy to derive the condition states shown in Table 5 despite 
the fact that the analysis had been undertaken nearly four years previously. However 
despite this a review of the assumptions described in the report found that the 
assumptions that the analyst identified in the exercise were not completely and 
consistently described in the report. 
As has previously been discussed, fault and event trees describe failures and events. 
They do not support the explicit modelling of the underlying conditions or their states. 
Therefore these conditions must be documented separately in any report supporting an 
assessment. The report is very thorough in this area, with a section used to describe 
the underlying assumptions in detail. Nevertheless there are some assumptions which 
are not documented in it. For example: 
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1. The report does not state the assumptions made about the number of tracks 
in each location. 
2. The report states that only one train speed would be assumed for the models 
- an average speed of 30mph. It is not stated that the train speed in stopping 
stations will be lower than this. 
In the case of 1 above, the models provide some implicit information that a thorough 
reviewer might be able to use to deduce the assumption. Review of the event 'derails 
to cess/adjacent line' in event trees 2-6 shows a 50% chance of derailing in either 
direction which indicates the presence of a twin track layout. In event tree 1 there is a 
much higher probability of derailing towards an adjacent line which could be assumed 
to imply a larger number of tracks. 
In the case of 2 above, Table 4 shows that there are a number of events that the 
analyst identified as being affected by speed. The probabilities of occurrence of all of 
these events differ in the 'stopping station' model when compared with the probabilities 
of occurrence in other event trees. The analyst had therefore diligently considered the 
impact of this change in speed despite the fact that this difference was not explicitly 
documented in the model or as an assumption. Nevertheless, as this discrepancy had 
not been documented, anyone analysing the results of the report or trying to re-use its 
structure for another application would have to infer this difference in speed. 
Ensuring the correct recording of condition states as assumptions of the analysis, is 
only the first problem to be addressed. Having clarified exactly what the assumptions 
underpinning the analysis were, it is then possible to investigate whether they were 
logical and supportable. In some cases, the assumptions did not appear sound. For 
example, the report states that a speed of 30mph is assumed across the analysis but 
elsewhere in the report it is assumed, on the basis of past experience that derailments 
occur at an average speed of 42mph, so this speed is used to calculate the severity of 
derailments. Speed is therefore modelled inconsistently in different places in the model. 
The past evidence indicates that trains that derail tend to do so at a higher speed than 
the average across the network. This disparity in average train speeds and average 
derailment speeds highlights a key problem with the use of average values as 
assumptions in the analysis. Using an average value as an assumption neglects the 
fact that accidents are most likely to occur in 'risk hotspots' where undesirable 
condition states are coincident. The accident is more likely to occur where there is high 
speed and severe track curvature than where there is 'average' speed and 'average' 
track curvature. The use of an average value therefore underestimates the level of risk 
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in certain locations. In other parts of the model extreme values are used, rather than 
averages. The problem with this approach is that it creates a mismatch between the 
assumptions and reality. Worst case conditions will, by definition, only arise in certain 
locations on the network. The risk will be at its highest in these locations. 
RMR3: Risk models should be parameterised by conditions so that the risk at 
different locations and in different situations on the railway network can be 
rapidly recalculated 
The major assumption made in the analysis is that any location on the network can be 
represented by one of the six models. By extension, this means that only the six sets of 
conditions outlined Table 5 exist on the network analysed. 
Investigation of the condition 'track curvature' shows that this assumption is a gross 
simplification. For this condition, the analyst did not use an average. Instead he made a 
worst case assumption that track curvature is 'severe' across the whole of the 
infrastructure area modelled. The analyst confirmed that only up to 80% of the network 
is either 'severely' or 'moderately' curved, with the remaining 20% being straight track. 
The likelihood of certain types of derailment is strongly correlated to the degree of track 
curvature. If it is assumed that all track curvature is severe then the risk estimated by 
the model for moderately curved or straight track on the network is likely to be an 
overestimate. In turn the risk estimate for track that is actually severely curved is likely 
to be an underestimate. A similar principle applies when making the assumption that 
traffic density is always 'high', when in fact it varies significantly. Most of the risk on the 
network will actually relate to the locations where track curvature is severe and traffic 
density high. In locations where track is straight and traffic density low, the risk will be 
much lower. However, the models do not have sufficient resolution to distinguish 
between locations where these differing condition states exist. 
In the SRM separate event trees were built to take account of the differing states of the 
conditions train speed and traffic density in the estimation of outcome severities. I 
previously argued that, to enable risk estimates to be made under these conditions, 
similar duplication of fault trees would be necessary. Following this approach three 
separate versions of each model would have been needed to take account of the 
variation in track curvature described by the risk analyst: the first assuming 'severe' 
curvature, the second assuming 'moderate' curvature, and the third 'no curvature'. This 
would have resulted in eighteen separate models being produced rather than the six 
that were actually built. If the model was then expanded to include two possible 
condition states for 'traffic density', 36 separate models would be needed. Extending 
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the model to account for a wider variation of conditions states to produce a higher 
resolution of model results in an exponential increase in the size of the model 
produced. It is therefore clear to see why this approach is not followed. The larger the 
model, the more difficult it is to manage and the more time-consuming it is to produce. 
Therefore an analyst must use their judgement to select a representative set of models 
for a particular problem. In this case, the analyst made what appears a sensible 
judgement from the perspective of manageability in restricting the analysis to six 
separate models. However, the fact that gross simplifications were needed in the 
model assumptions to do this illustrates that there are flaws with the current approach 
to the application of fault and event trees to risk analysis in the UK railway industry. 
SMS1: In order to ensure that they effectively support the management of safety, 
the uses of a risk model should support the various stages of a safety 
management system 
In this study, the risk model is used support the planning stage of the Safety 
Management System. The model is not location specific. It looks at risk across the core 
derailment study area. 
Risk assessment is undertaken in order to argue that the risk is reduced to as Iowa 
level as is possible. The report investigates whether particular control measures, like 
the installation of containment rails, will have an impact on derailment risk. 
SDM1: In order to ensure that they effectively support the taking of safety related 
decisions risk models should be usable and understandable by those who 
actually manage safety on the network 
The approach meets SOM more fully than the SRM, as it is a bespoke model produced 
for a particular project. The insights gained by undertaking the modelling approach 
would be made by analysts within the project, and therefore it is possible that these 
insights would inform any risk based decisions made. 
Summary 
The model fails to fully meet RMR 1 as the fault tree part of the model is simplistic 
models only one event. It also fails to substantially meet RMR2. Condition states are 
not modelled in fault and event tree analysiS. The condition states that form the 
assumptions of the model are instead documented in the supporting report. However in 
the particular study that I investigated not all condition states were documented. This 
makes inconsistent assumptions more likely. For example, in this study two different 
and inconsistent assumptions were made about train speed. Conditions can easily be 
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ignored or overlooked. In certain circumstances it may be considered self evident that a 
condition exists, and therefore consciously or by omission it is not documented. But the 
state of such conditions may change. They can differ from location to location or , 
change gradually over time. Failure to thoroughly document conditions can make it 
harder for others to understand and interpret the results of an analysis. It also makes it 
easier for the state of conditions to be set inconsistently in an analysis. In summary, the 
documenting and management of conditions is a complex task. They are generally 
considered as assumptions of any analysis, and the review highlights that there is 
currently little or no methodological support to help analysts consistently record and 
manage them. 
The model also fails to meet RMR3 as it is not parameterised. Six separate models are 
produced, each assuming a different set of condition states. However many more sets 
of conditions than this are likely to exist across the railway network under analysis. 
Unfortunately the inclusion of more conditions states in the model using the fault and 
event tree approach would lead to an exponential increase in the number of models 
required and is not practically possible. 
The approach partially meets requirements SMS1 and SDM1 as it supports planning 
decisions on a project and the application of the modelling process itself would help to 
educate the organisation responsible for taking any related decision. 
4.4 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, the extent to which UK railway approaches to risk assessment and 
modelling meet the ideal requirements that were previously proposed were reviewed. 
By reviewing the ways in which risk is modelled in the UK railway industry, against 
requirements derived in Chapter 3 it was found that none of the approaches has the 
ideal characteristics to support organizational accident risk modelling that were outlined 





No current models allow all of the causes of accidents, both events and 
conditions, to be explicitly modelled (RMR1, RMR2). 
None of the models or techniques identified is parameterised. Therefore none 
could be used to rapidly analyse risk in different locations and identify possible 
risk hotspots (RMR3). 
Each approach has limitations in its use to support safety management 
activities and the taking of safety related decisions (SMS1, SDM1). 
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Although none of the models are parameterised by condition information, both the SRM 
and the industry bespoke risk model included some duplication of fault and event trees. 
This acknowledges the need to model risk under different circumstances and provides 
support for the validity of requirement RMR3. 
The risk assessment and modelling approaches are strongly linked to the availability of 
data and therefore these models are based on truncated models of the event sequence 
and fail to include underlying conditions. None of the approaches reviewed fully met 
any of the modelling requirements RMR1-RMR3. 
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5 Review of related risk modelling approaches and research 
In this chapter I review risk modelling approaches and research which indicate how 
models that meet the ideal requirements of Hypothesis 1 (outlined in section 3.8) might 
be developed. None of approaches fully meets these ideal requirements, although 
each provides some insight into what a new approach might look like. 
5.1 General 
Research has been undertaken to look at modelling of certain types of railway risk. For 
example, Podolfillini et al (Podofillini, Zio et al. 2006) describe a model for optimising 
railway track inspection to improve reliability and maintenance. The research is based 
on the detailed analysis of the results of ultrasonic rail inspection cars, and uses a 
simple barrier model of cause, rather than a more detailed analysis of the possible 
accident event sequence. Neural network have been used to estimate how 
earthquakes might affect train acceleration at a range of stations on the Taiwan high 
speed rail system (Kerh and Ting 2005). Their work identified one station which 
potentially had much higher risk than all others on the line. 
However there is much less work which tries to develop new or improved generic 
approaches or extensions to existing standard risk modelling techniques that could 
potentially meet the ideal modelling requirements outlined in this thesis. In sections 5.2 
to 5.5 the research in the area of risk modelling with the most relevance to this thesis is 
described. 
5.2 The Irish Rail risk model 
Sotera Risk Solutions has developed a risk model for Irish Rail that can estimate the 
variability in risk from location to location across the Irish rail network (Sotera 2007). All 
significant hazards occurring on the Irish railway network were modelled using fault and 
event trees. The logic for each of the hazards was initially developed using standard 
fault and event tree software. In order for the model to quantify the risk in each location, 
each of the failures and events in the model for each of the hazards were 
parameterised, so that the failure rates and event probabilities depended upon the 
details of the asset design and condition in each location and the usage of the system 
by trains and passengers. It was then necessary to obtain all the indicator data to 
populate the model. This was achieved by linking to the operators asset databases 
which hold the relevant information on asset design and condition, and taking 
information from timetables, level crossing use, passenger counts and so on. Despite 
this Sotera encountered problems with the availability of data to quantify their model , 
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and therefore supplemented available data with expert judgement to quantify their 
model. The model focuses on known differences in railway assets and performance. In 
other words, it considers physical differences rather than operational or organizational 
ones. The parameterisation of the model is undertaken in an additional layer of 
software. 
The model has many of the attributes that I have argued are necessary. It incorporates 
a low level of causal analYSis in its fault trees and a long sequence of events in its 
event tree models and therefore substantially meets requirement RMR1. It also 
includes a range of technical and operational conditions. Some time-varying conditions 
are included in the model, such as asset condition, passenger loadings, and rail traffic 
levels. However, the model does not include operational or organizational conditions 
which would also be expected to vary over time. It would be difficult for Sotera to 
expand the model to include operational and organizational conditions using fault and 
event tree techniques for the reasons that were outlined in section 2.4.2. It therefore 
partially meets the requirements that were set out in RMR 2. 
The model is parameterised to include technical conditions and performance 
conditions, in addition to failures and events (substantially meeting RMR3). But, there 
is a limit to the degree of parameterisation that can be applied to the model. The Irish 
railway network is broken down into 227 specific locations, where it is assumed that 
specific sets of conditions exist. In practice, a location is either a station area or a 
section of infrastructure typically 5km long. The model therefore assumes that there is 
no variability in the states of conditions in each of these areas or track sections. In 
effect this is the same approach as was used in the industry study (section 4.3) 
although that used only 6 different sets of trees and so did not select the condition sets 
modelled in such a systematic or considered way. 
Irish Rail has recognised the need to build models which capture specific assumptions 
so that risk form high risk locations on a railway network can be estimated. This work 
therefore provides support for the validity of the risk modelling requirements outlined in 
this thesis. 
The uses of the Sotera model reflect its focus on technical and performance conditions, 
for example the model has been used to look at the benefits of redeploying existing 
assets; a significant reduction in network risk was achieved by deploying rolling stock 
differently across the network since it was found that the least crashworthy trains were 
used on the lines with the highest potential for an accident. Particularly acute high-risk 
locations and assets have also been identified (e.g., lightly used lines which, given their 
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configuration and the condition of assets, present a high level of individual risk). It 
would be difficult for Sotera to expand the model to include operational and 
organizational conditions using fault and event tree techniques for the reasons that 
were outlined in section 2.4.2. The model is able to estimate network wide risk, as the 
additional software is used to aggregate the risk in all locations to a network-wide total. 
However, there is one key drawback to the model, when considering its uses to support 
safety decision making (SDM1). As the parameterisation is handled in a separate layer 
of software the model is a 'black box' and the fault and event tree logic is not visible to 
the user. When local risk figures are calculated, the model also fails to provide updated 
fault and event tree models of the relevant accident causal sequence. This will 
therefore limit the extent to which local decision makers would be able to use and 
interpret the results. 
5.3 RSSB/Risk Solutions derailment risk model 
The UK railway industry has recognised that risk models which include both events and 
conditions, and which can be used to model risk in specific locations are potentially 
useful. RSSB commissioned research to consider: 'the feasibility of developing a risk 
model capable of describing the complex interactions that create and mitigate the 
derailment risk due to track faults.' (Campbell and Kennedy 2003). 
The research suggested that if it were possible to build such models they would help to 
understand the true levels of risk at specific locations or at locations with common 
characteristics. This would then allow the model to be used to help determine the effect 
of asset condition, or different control strategies on risk. 
The researchers investigated a number of different ways of building their model and 
finally settled on an approach using a traditional fault and event tree, supported by an 
additional fault tree which modelled condition states. Condition states were referred to 
as 'environmental factors' and this second set of fault trees was called the 'environment 
module'. The 'environment module' fault trees were used to calculate the probability of 
occurrence of different possible combinations of condition states. A layer of software 
was used to link all the models. A 'fault module' was developed to calculate fault tree 
base event probabilities given different combinations of environmental conditions. 
Similarly the 'consequence module' calculated the probabilities of events in the event 
tree given the different combinations of condition states. 
As was discussed in section 3.6.1, the industry does not have a complete set of data 
and asset records which describe the combinations of condition state in each and 
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every location on the network. Therefore the probability of condition states was 
estimated from their total network incidence. For example, using network data the 
modellers estimated that 2% of the UK railway network consisted of track in tunnels 
((Campbell and Kennedy 2003), p95). Estimation of network wide populations in this 
way provides no model of how different sets of locations combine in particular 
locations. To model this an influence diagram was developed. This modelled the 
strength of conditional probability relationships between environmental factors, and 
hence which condition states were more likely to be coincident in particular locations. 
The model included eleven different environmental factors, each with three to six 
separate states. The influence diagram is shown in Figure 20. Broken arrows are used 
to denote weak influential relationships; solid arrows denote strong relationships. 
Figure 20: Environmental factors influence diagram 
The study identified nine separate track faults that should be modelled with separate 
sets of fault trees and only one, 'gauge spreading', was built in earnest. Not all 
condition states were included in the environment module. Separate fault tree 
structures were used to model high, medium and low severity gauge spreading. Also 
separate trees were built for low and high speed operation 
The conceptual model was built and indicative output results obtained. However the 
model was never developed beyond its initial phase. The research report does not 
provide any explanation of why the work was not taken forward. The most likely 
explanation for this is that the model produced was too large as to be of practical use. 
As conditions and faults were each being modelled using fault tree techniques, the 
same exponential increase in model size that was discussed in 4.2.1 and 4.3.2 was 
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evident. This problem was lessened to an extent by the use of two separate fault trees. 
However even with the selection of a small scope of model focussing on derailment 
due to gauge spread for the purposes of demonstrating the approach, the degree of 
parameterisation modelled resulted in significant repetition of fault tree logical 
structures, and hence a large and unwieldy model. A large section of the research 
report is taken up simply with documenting the fault trees produced. 
Were it possible to develop this model, it may have met requirements RMR1-RMR3 
more fully that the existing techniques were reviewed in Chapter 4. The model includes 
a more complex model of the event sequence than the existing industry approaches 
previously investigated as the fault trees are developed to several levels of abstraction. 
The extract of the fault tree part of the model shown in Figure 6 shows a portion of the 
model with a number of separate base events, and this is a small sub-set of the total 
fault tree model. A number of condition states are explicitly modelled. Some are 
embedded in the fault tree model; others are explicitly modelled in the 'environment 
module'. The model includes detailed and explicit modelling of over a dozen different 
condition states, and could be used to calculate the risk with all possible combinations 
of them. Unfortunately the approach suffers from the practical difficulties associated 
with building and maintaining models with such a high degree of parameterisation. A 
model of this type that included enough of the individual causes of risk to be useful 
would be too large to build, maintain and use. 
Nevertheless this research provides further validation of the hypothesis that these 
types of model are desirable as there is clearly an interest in the UK railway industry in 
their development. The research also provides evidence of the difficulties of developing 
parameterised models using fault and event trees that were previously outlined in 
sections 4.2.1 and 4.3.2. 
5.4 LPSA and risk monitors 
Similar requirements to those that were set out for ideal risk models in the railway 
industry have driven the development of tools and techniques in other industries. 
Following the Three Mile Island nuclear accident in the US, there was recognition that 
the traditional focus of accident prevention on the design of nuclear power stations, and 
the inclusion of a high degree of redundancy in the system functions needed to change 
(Joksimovich 1994). This led to a focus on risk models which were able to be used to 
predict and monitor the variability in conditions that might arise throughout the 
operational life of nuclear power stations such as changes in plant configuration, 
operational procedures, repair and maintenance activities and aging of equipment and 
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components. This approach is called living probabilistic safety assessment (LPSA) and 
is defined by the IAEA as: 
'a PSA of the plant, which is updated as necessary to reflect the current design and 
operational features, and is documented in such a way that each aspect of the model 
can be directly related to existing plant information, plant documentation or the 
analysts' assumptions in the absence of such information. ' (IAEA 1999) p1). 
A living PSA builds on standard risk modelling approaches like fault and event trees. It 
extends these techniques to model underlying assumptions explicitly and link these 
directly to known information and data about the system. This approach reaches its 
logical conclusion with the use of LPSA to supports the use of Risk Monitors which are 
defined by the IAEA as: 
'a plant specific real-time analysis tool used to determine the instantaneous risk based 
on the actual status of the systems and components. At any given time, the safety 
monitor reflects the current plant configuration in terms of the known status of the 
various systems and/or components, e.g. whether there are any components out of 
service for maintenance or tests. The safety monitor model is based on, and is 
consistent with, the LPSA. It is updated with the same frequency as the LPSA. The 
safety monitor is used by the plant staff in support of operational decisions.' ((IAEA 
1999) pp1). 
The relationship between living PSA and risk monitors is clearly described in the 
forward to CSNI technical papers number 7 and 8 ((CSNI 2004) page7): 
'The aim of the risk monitor is to provide an estimate of the point-in-time risk for the 
current plant configuration and environmental factors whereas the LPSA provides an 
estimate of the average risk hence uses average initiating event frequencies and 
maintenance unavailabilities and usually takes account of the exposure time to different 
initiating events as the plant passes through the different plant operational states 
modelled in the PSA. Hence, the LPSA model needs to be reviewed for any average or 
assumed conditions in the model to ensure that an accurate point-in time risk is 
calculated for all configurations. ' 
Tools like RiskVu (Pullen 2002) can be used to develop living PSA models and risk 
monitors. Risk Vu provides a high level interface to fault and event trees built using 
Fault Tree+ (Isograph 2007). The models consist of Master Logic Diagrams and Event 
Sequence Diagrams. A Master LogiC Diagram is essentially a generic fault tree models 
which describes the 'top logic' (i.e. the full set of fault sequences that the system might 
experience given the range of system operating parameters). An Event Sequence 
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Diagram shows a sequence of events and their potential outcomes. These outcomes 
are those events which occur after an initiating event, leading up to end states and 
consequences. It is similar to an Event Tree, but is used in more advanced risk 
assessment methodologies where the modelling of event sequences needs to be more 
flexible. 
The interface consists of a model of the system, for example the particular nuclear 
power plant, in which various parameters can be changed and used to update the 
underlying fault and event trees. 
The philosophy behind the use of living PSA and risk monitors is very similar to the 
philosophy and approach to risk modelling that I have argued should be applied in the 
railway industry. Kafka explains that: 
'If [systems] were managed so that critical high-risk configurations and actions did not 
occur, then risk would be small and practically no severe accidents would occur' 
((Kafka 1997) page 198). 
These 'high-risk configurations and actions' describe the conditions whose existence 
would indicate an increased risk of organizational accidents. The concept of the risk 
monitor in the nuclear industry finds its parallel in our stated requirement for a location 
specific risk model. The risk monitor is used to capture a snapshot of the system in 
time and the risk estimate given the relevant parameters. I argue that in the railway 
industry uncertainty in risk estimates comes primarily from the inability to capture 
variation from location to location across the network. Therefore risk snapshots in the 
UK railway industry should reflect particular locations and performance parameters. 
Despite the similarities in philosophy, the location specific nature of a proposed railway 
model means that it would not be a simple matter to apply this technique to produce 
the ideal model. The proposed railway model would have the potential to model risk in 
a range of locations across a very large geographic scope. Given the scale of the 
model it is not anticipated that causes should be modelled to the level of abstraction 
implied by the use of system models to capture parameter changes. The use of system 
models means that the technique focuses on classical reliability parameters. In this 
thesis the focus is on the key technical, operational and organizational conditions of the 
entire railway system and their causal relationships, rather than on developing a model 
of the railway system function itself, which would be highly complex. 
The existence of LPSA and Risk Monitors in other industries which are prone to 
organizational accidents again provides some support for the argument that similar 
models should be developed for the railway industry. The prime concern of LPSA is 
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temporal change in the parameters that cause risk. In the UK railway industry there 
should be additional concerns relating to the variability from location to location across 
a large rail network. 
5.5 Improving probability estimates from a limited data set 
(Quigley, Bedford et al. 2007) have undertaken research into how to improve the 
probability estimates used within the SRM. They note that many of the SRM precursors 
are rare events. In these instances, estimation of precursor probability (by calculating 
the ratio of the number of events that have occurred to the period of observation), is 
prone to inaccuracy. In particular, there is a high probability of zero estimates, when no 
events are observed; limited observations also result in huge differences in probability 
estimates. They advocate the use of Empirical Bayes techniques, which use pooled 
data rather than subjective estimation, to improve probability estimates. Precursor data 
is pooled to estimate an overall rate of occurrence, and then adjustments are made 
from the pooled rate for each individual event. Essentially certain statistical parameters 
can be inferred from the pooled data set and used to inform the estimation of individual 
pre-cursor probabilities. The work has been taken forward by RSSB and is used to 
improve probability estimates in the SRM. The authors acknowledge some potential 
weaknesses to the approach, in particular in identifying a set of precursors to be pooled 
together with broadly similar occurrence rates. 
This research was undertaken in response to the data problem outlined in section 
3.6.1. It takes as its starting point the assumption that the data set is limited to the 
recorded numbers of occurrence of each pre-cursor in the SRM. The solution 
advocated here is to obtain more detailed understanding of events preceding the 
occurrence of each precursor and conditions which are correlated to its occurrence. 
The two approaches are therefore not mutually exclusive. The approach advocated 
here places an even greater reliance on the availability of data than the SRM. The 
Empirical Bayes approach could also be used to improve estimation of the probabilities 
of occurrence of the additional events and conditions that would be included in any 
model that met the ideal requirements outlined. 
5.6 Chapter summary 
Several research projects have been undertaken with similar objectives to those 
outlined in this thesis. (Campbell and Kennedy 2003; Sotera 2007). However none fully 
meets the risk modelling requirements that were set out in section 3.7. These projects 
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nevertheless support the hypothesis that such models are desirable in the railway 
industry and potentially of use. 
In the next chapter, Bayesian Networks (BNs) are reviewed as a potential technique 
with which to build models which meet the requirements for a model that have 
previously been outlined. 
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6 Bayesian Networks 
In this chapter, Bayesian Networks (BNs) are introduced. I begin by describing the 
basic probability theory behind them, and how BNs are developed from that theory. 
The concepts of conditional probability, Bayes' theorem and marginalisation are then 
described before introducing BNs, as a technique which draws upon all of these 
concepts. 
In the second half of this chapter, a review of how BNs have been applied to safety 
problems and risk analysis, in particular in the aviation industry, is presented. These 
reviews allow ideas to be developed for how BN models could be used to build risk 
models that meet the requirements for risk models that support Hypothesis 2 as set out 
in section 3.B. The work informs the development of the modelling approach that is 
outlined in subsequent chapters. 
6.1 Conditional probability and Bayes Theorem 
A conditional probability is the probability that one event will occur, given that another 
event has occurred. Where the events are a and b respectively this relationship can be 
written as P(alb) (the probability of a given b). When events a and b are independent, 
P(alb) = Pea) and P(bla) = PCb). 
Equation 3 shows the relationship between the probability of the joint event a and b, 
the conditional probability P(alb) and the conditional probability P(bla). 
Equation 3: P(a,b) = pea I b)P(b) = PCb I a)P(a) 
The equation can be re-written as follows: 
PCb I a)P(a) 
Equation 4: pea I b) = PCb) 
Equation 5 is known as Bayes' Theorem, after the Reverend Thomas Bayes who first 
published a special case of it (Bayes 1763). Bayes' theorem is valid for all 
interpretations of probability. The theorem gives a formula for how to revise the 
strengths of evidence-based beliefs in light of new evidence. This is known as inductive 
- or a posteriori - reasoning. 
Equation 4 is sometimes written as shown below: 
PCb I a.k)P(a I k) 
Equation 5: pea I b.k) = PCb I k) 
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In Equation 5, k represents the background context on the basis of which subjective 
probability estimates are made, emphasising that all probabilities are conditional, and 
based on some background knowledge. 
6.2 Use of Bayes Theorem 
Taking a problem outlined by (Jenson 2001), page 7), suppose that a researcher is 
interested in how the sex of a person relates to the length of their hair. There are two 
variables of interest. Let L be the variable 'length of hair' and let S be the variable 'sex 
of person'. 
L = {long, short} 
S = {male, female} 
Bayes Theorem expresses a probability which people find hard to assess in terms of 
probabilities that can often be drawn directly from experimental knowledge or intuition. 
Where conditional probability relationships exist it is often the case that one of these 
probabilities can more intuitively be estimated than the inverse. It is easy enough to 
estimate the probability that someone has long hair given knowledge of their sex. It 
might also be possible to estimate the probability that a person selected at random 
from a certain population is male. Given some background knowledge, k, a person 
might believe that P(male) = 0.5, P(female) = 0.5, and P(long/male) = 0.1. 
'What is the probability that someone with long hair is a man?' is a more difficult 
question to answer. However someone would be able to calculate this from the 
probabilities they are able to estimate by the application of Bayes Theorem. 
Substitution of the estimated probabilities into Equation 5 gives: 
P( I II ) 
- (0.1)*(0.5) - 0 1') 
rna e ong - - . -
(0.5) 
6.2.1 Marginalisation 
The joint event Land S represents the distribution of the two variables described above 
across a population. The probability of this event is written as P(L, S) and is referred to 
as the joint probability distribution of Land S. The probability distribution is the set of 
probabilities of all four possible combinations of the states of Land S: {P(long, male), 
P(long, female), P(short, male), P(short, female)}. 
The probability of one event, without consideration of any other event is called the prior 
or marginal probability. If the joint probability distribution is known then the marginal 
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probability of any particular variable state can be calculated by the process of 
marginalisation (Equation 6). 




The value of the variable a can be determined by summing all of the products in the 
joint probability distribution which are calculated from a. This is because the products 
are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. let us assume that we are able to estimate 
that: 
P(long/male) = 0.1, P (long/female) = 0.7, p(shortlmale) = 0.9, P(shortlfemale) = 0.3, 
P(male) = 0.5 and P(female) = 0.5. 
Using these values Equation 3 can be applied to calculate the joint probability 
distribution to be: 
P (l,S) = {P(long, male), P(long, female), P(short, male), P(short, female)} = {(0.05), 
(0.35), (0.45), (0.15)} 
To calculate the probability that a given person has long hair, Equation 6 can be 
applied to marginalise the variable 'long' out of pel, S): 
P(long) = P(long, male) + P(long, female) = 0.05 + 0.35 = 0.40. 
Therefore there is a 40% chance that a randomly selected person will have long hair. 
6.3 Bayesian Networks 
In this section an example introduced in ((Jenson 2001) page 7) is used to explain the 
concept of a BN. The example is based on the causal relationships between a person's 
sex (x), the length of their hair (h) and their stature (s). 
6.3.1 The joint probability distribution for a number of variables 
A joint probability distribution consisting of any number of variables can be calculated in 
this way by applying Equation 3 extended as appropriate. For example the joint 
probability distribution of the three variables can be calculated simply to the form: 
Equation 7: P(x,h,s) = P(x I h,s)P(h I s)P(s) 
However calculation of the full joint probability distribution becomes more complex as 
the number of variables and the number of states they can take increase. A BN can be 
used to simplify the joint probability calculation and also to provide a diagrammatic 
representation of the causal relationships. 
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6.3.2 What is a Bayesian Network? 
A BN consists of a set of nodes, representing variables, and a set of directed arcs, 
representing influential relationships between the variables. Arcs are directed from 
'parent' node to 'child' node. Each variable has a set of exhaustive, mutually exclusive 
states. The variables and arcs form a directed acyclic graph. The term acyclic means 
that there are no feedback paths through the network. Arcs model correlations between 
variables. The direction of the arc shows the direction of influence between two 
variables. The strength of the correlation is shown in the node probability table (NPT) 
associated with each arc. 
The diagram of Figure 21 shows a BN representing the relationships between sex (x), 
hair length (h) and stature (s). In this example, the arcs are drawn from cause to effect 
creating a causal model. A probability table has been added for each node, providing 
the probabilities of each state of the variable. For variables without parents the table 
contains prior, or marginal, probabilities. Variables with parents have conditional 
probabilities specified for each possible combination of their parent states. The term 
'BN' was coined by (Pearl 1985) because such networks substantially use subjective 
input information and also they rely on Bayes' theorem (as well as Equation 6), to 
provide the formula for calculating updated probabilities in the network. 
The structure of the Bayesian Network must be developed to include all necessary 
conditional dependencies. A common approach is that described by ((Bedford and 
Cooke 2001), section 14.4) and (Smith 1989). First the relevant variables for 
consideration are listed. Then secondary variables, which influence the primary 
variables, are identified. This process is continued until it is judged that all relevant 
variables have been found. Each variable is then described, and assigned its possible 
states. The next stage is the construction of the BN. The variables are ordered a1, ... an• 
The ordering often arises naturally for example as a result of a temporal sequence. For 
each i the smallest collection of variables a1, ... ai-1 is identified such that knowing these 
variables would make the values taken by the other variables in a1, ... ai-1 irrelevant to 
the prediction of ai. The resulting set of variables is the parent set for a1 and 
correspondingly a1 is the child of each of these variables. The BN is produced by 
drawing a node for each variable and drawing an arc from the parent nodes identified 
to each of their child nodes. 
A BN provides a compact representation of the joint probability distribution. In Figure 
21 the states of the hand s can influence each other unless the state of x is known. h 
and s are said to be conditionally independent given x. The BN model therefore shows 
conditional independence relationships between variables. When no conditional 
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independences relationships are known the chain rule of probability states that the joint 
probability distribution of a set of variables can be calculated as follows: 
n 
P(ap a2 ···an ) = IT P(ai I ap ... ,a i _1) 
The joint probability distribution is moresimple to compute when there are conditionally 
independent nodes and can be calculated by applying a modified form of the chain 
rule: 
n 
P(ap a2 ···an ) = IT P(ai I pa(ai )) 
where pa(aj) is the set of parent variables of aj. Hence the joint distribution of the BN 
shown in Figure 21 is: 
Equation 8: P(x,h,s) = P(h I x)P(s I x)P(x) The conditional independencies expressed 




hair length (h) stature (s) 
sex male female sex male female 
long 0.1 0.7 large 0.7 0.2 
short 0.9 0.3 small 0.3 0.8 
Figure 21: BN: how a person's sex influences their stature and hair length 
For larger networks the approach can result in a much simplified calculation when 
compared with the calculations required to apply the standard calculation of Equation 
109 
3. Software packages like AgenaRisk (Agena 2008) and Hugin (Hugin 2008) can be 
used to build BNs and to calculate prior and posterior probabilities from them. 
6.4 Review of the use of BNs in the safety domain 
In this section I review the use of BNs in safety critical and safety related applications. 
A detailed review of their application in three areas of particular relevance to the work 
described in this thesis is undertaken: 
• Identification of risk hotspots 
• Inclusion of operational and organizational conditions in probabilistic risk 
assessments 
• Using BNs to extend and supplement fault and event tree analysis. 
The research reviewed provides insight into how a modelling approach could be 
developed which produces BN models that meet or support the requirements that were 
set out in section 3.8. 
6.4.1 General safety applications 
Although Bayesian probability theory has a long history, it was only when new 
algorithms were developed in the late 1980s (Lauritzen and Spiegel halter 1988) that it 
became possible to execute BNs that were large enough to model significant decision 
problems. Since this time BNs have been used extensively for modelling problems in 
the safety domain. Because of their ability to be used to reason from effect to cause 
they have found significant use as causal models for the purpose of medical diagnosis 
(Heckerman 1990; Nikovski 2000; Sierra, Inza et al. 2000; Lin and Haug 2008). They 
have also found use in systems safety applications in the healthcare industry, for 
example (Maglogiannis, Zafiropoulos et al. 2006). BNs have been used extensively to 
support the development of models of the integrity of safety critical systems 
incorporating software (Oahll 2000; Littlewood, Strigini et al. 2000; Fenton, Krause et 
al. 2001; Gran 2002; Brito and May 2006). BNs are suited to this application as much 
of the information that is available to determine the integrity of software is qualitative 
and the causal relationships that need to be considered are usually not deterministic. 
BNs provide a way of formalising the complicated reasoning process that is applied in 
such areas. 
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6.4.2 Identification of risk hotspots 
Some research has been undertaken into the use of BNs and Bayesian statistical 
approaches for the identification of risk 'hotspots' across a network of installations. 
6.4.2.1 Identifying hotspots on the road infrastructure 
(Heydecker and Wu 2001) describe several different types of analyses that provide 
quantitative information about which sites across a road network would most benefit 
from remedial work to reduce the risk from accidents. They stress that because 
accidents are rare it is difficult to determine which locations have a relatively high 
accident frequency. Four analyses, based upon Bayesian statistical approaches, are 
proposed. The analyses use accident and incident data but analysis is also extended to 
consider a subset of the conditions that were classified in 2.3.2, namely: 
• Performance conditions, for example speed limits, traffic flows. 
• Technical conditions, for example road curvature. 
This research shows that 'hotspot' identification is a problem for transport networks in 
general, not just railway networks. It also highlights that Bayesian analysis is a possible 
way of supplementing limited data sets to identify hotspots by incorporating belief 
based probability estimates rather than relying purely on data. However the approach 
does not draw upon or extend accepted and understood risk assessment 
methodologies used in the railway industry and is therefore not of direct relevance to 
the work described in this thesis. 
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6.4.2.2 PRA in the nuclear industry 
Lee et al (Lee and Lee 2006) describe the application of a BN to the probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRA) of nuclear waste disposal. They note that PRA of a nuclear power 
station is possible because the power station is in a controlled and stable environment. 
They contrast this with nuclear waste disposal, which will occur in a variety of locations, 
and in which risks are dependent on environmental factors that may change 
significantly given the tens and hundreds of years of security that such disposals 
require. Lee et al are concerned with risks which are in some cases genuinely 
uncertain, as they may not have previously occurred at all, and therefore it is clear to 
see why the Bayesian approach, which is not dependent on the existence of data, is 
attractive to them. The approach provides a method for integrating a better 
understanding of variables into risk assessment. However it is tailored specifically at 
the problem of nuclear waste disposal, and is not suitable for use as a tool to guard 
against the occurrence of organizational accidents, because the modelling approach 
makes use of a short model of the accident event sequence. 
6.4.3 Inclusion of operational and organizational conditions in probabilistic risk 
assessments 
Several researchers have developed models which use BNs to factor organizational 
and other factors into probabilistic risk assessments. For example (Mosleh, Goldfeiz et 
al. 1997; Galan, Mosleh et al. 2007) propose a model for assessing the influence of 
'organizational factors' on the reliability of components and on operator performance in 
probabilistic risk assessments in the nuclear industry. An 'w factor' is developed to do 
this. For equipment failures the factor is calculated as the ratio of the 'inherent' failure 
rate to the rate of failure due to organizational conditions. An influence diagram 
(Mosleh, Goldfeiz et al. 1997) or BN (Galan, Mosleh et al. 2007) is used to calculate 
the 'w factor' relating to operator performance by modelling the relationship between 
workers performance and various organizational conditions. The approach extends 
traditional PRA techniques and for this reason is not an approach could easily be 
applied to meet the modelling requirements outlined in this thesis. The objective of the 
research described in this thesis is to develop models which can be customised rapidly 
and transparently to different locations and situations without expert knowledge of 
PRA. Although the BN part of the model might support such an approach, the 
traditional aspects of the model would not for reasons already outlined: the lack of 
explicit modelling of conditions, and the need to replicate the model structure for similar 
event sequences occurring in different locations. (Oien 2001 a; Oien 2001 b) describes a 
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method of linking risk indicators to the risk assessment of an offshore petroleum 
installation. Again, the approach does not address the variability in risk across a range 
of locations that is found in the railway industry, and that the research described in this 
thesis seeks to address. 
Other approaches are more relevant to the work described In this thesis and are 
reviewed in more detail in the remainder of this section. 
6.4.3.1 Sensing changes in Operational Risk Exposure (SCORE) 
The SCORE (Sensing Changes in Operational Risk Exposure) project (Neil, Malcolm et 
al. 2003; Neil 2004) was undertaken in order to determine whether it is possible to 
monitor changes in an organisation's safety culture, and provide a quantified 
assessment of the impact of such changes on risk. The work was therefore concerned 
with integrating operational and organizational conditions effectively into a quantitative 
risk model. One aspect of this work was to look at the operational risk of the air traffic 
control system used by the National Air Traffic Services (NATS). 
The authors chose to develop the model as a BN. However, unlike the previous 
examples reviewed, the authors do not build the model in a single step using only 
expert judgement. Instead they use an existing 'barrier model' of air traffic control 
safety defences as their starting point: 
{the conceptualisation of the processes might begin with an organogram, a pre-existing 
process model, or a backwards analysis of the output properties and the people and 
processes which contribute to those properties. ' 
The 'Barrier Model' (See Figure 31) consists of various events in the aircraft collision 
accident sequence (potential conflict, projected conflicts, loss of separation and 
accident). These events are separated by procedural barriers, which are intended to 










Figure 22: Air Traffic Control 'barrier model' 
A TC Recovery 
Pilot Recovery 
Providence 
The use of a barrier model, which is essentially a representation of the 'defences in 
depth' that are in place to prevent mid-air collision of aircraft, indicates that this 
research, like the research described in this thesis, is concerned with the development 
of models to prevent the occurrence of organizational accidents. The use of the 'barrier 
model' as a conceptual model to inform the building of the BN is sensible for a number 
of reasons. The model used is understood by the experts within NA TS whose advice 
was sought when building the BN. These same people are those that ultimately would 
be best placed to use the BN model. The barrier model provides simple alternative 
representation of the problem that can be used for explanation to the lay person if 
necessary. 
incidents 
Figure 23: BN representation of the air traffic control 'barrier model' 
Figure 23 shows the subset of nodes in the resulting BN that represent the barrier 
model shown in Figure 22. The BN is not an exact translation of the barrier model. For 
example, a distinction has been made in the BN between incidents and accidents in the 
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event sequence to take into account the potential for the Traffic Collision Avoidance 
System (TCAS) to prevent the occurrence of an accident. 
The performance of the barriers is modelled in the nodes at the bottom of the diagram. 
For example 'tactical ATC performance' might be 'good' or it might be 'poor'. These 
categories were assigned on the basis of expert judgement of ATC performance based 
on judgements about levels of performance relative to a perceived normal 
performance. To support this process questionnaires were completed and audits 
undertaken of a number of different ATC teams. The level of performance influences 
the effectiveness of the barrier at preventing an event from escalating to a subsequent 
more serious event. Hence 'probability of conflict despite tactical ATC' takes on values 
representing the probability of occurrence of a breach of the barrier, per demand on the 
barrier, given the performance of tactical air traffic control. The demand on each barrier 
is modelled using the chain of nodes at the top of the diagram. The node 'volume in 
month' models the volume of traffic that is handled in a month and hence the number of 
demands on the first barrier. Depending on the probability of each of the procedural 
barriers failing to contain an event, proportions of this traffic are calculated as 
breaching some or all of the procedural barriers. 
There are many more nodes in the full net besides these nodes shown in Figure 23. 
Other nodes are used to model 'socio-technical functions'. Figure 24 shows the BN 
nodes modelling the socio-technical function for tactical air traffic control. 




There are various influences that affect the performance of socio-technical functions. 
Process models are used to break down the causal relationships between these 
influences and the performance node in a structured way. The authors make use of BN 
idioms (Neil, Fenton et al. 2000). BN idioms are sets of linked BN nodes that represent 
tried and trusted models of causal mechanisms. Ultimately the BN provides causal 
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links between measurable quantities, like safety culture indicators and audit results , 
and the likelihood of occurrence of events in the accident sequence. 
The authors acknowledge difficulty in building such models in particular in ensuring 
clarity and consistency in what the nodes actually represent. They point out that the 
meaning of nodes can shift subtly as the BN is edited and that a clear understanding of 
the entities involved (e.g. people or teams) and the particular tasks they are 
undertaking is essential. 
There are two key aspects of the work that highlight the way forward for the work 
described in this thesis. The first is the use of a conceptual model as the starting point 
for the development of a BN. BNs are attractive for complicated modelling problems 
because of their inherent flexibility and adaptability. However, if an unstructured 
approach is followed this flexibility can result in the building of an over-complicated and 
confused model. The structure of the model needs to be constrained in some way and 
the use of a conceptual model, in this case the barrier model, is a potential way to do 
this. A conceptual model also aids in the ability of others to understand what the model 
represents, whether they are developing it or using it. Yet the translation between the 
barrier model and the BN in this example is only an informal one. There are no clear 
rules to define the translation of one model to another. If it were possible to use a 
conceptual model to define the structure of a BN more formally then one could use the 
model as a specification for part of the net. This might aid in the validation of the final 
model, as well as helping in the understanding and interpretation of the model. The 
SCORE researchers acknowledge the difficulty of validating BN models. 
The barrier model is suitable for use as a conceptual model for the aviation problem 
addressed by SCORE. It can be assumed, with justification, that there is a single 
consequence of mid-air collision: a major accident resulting in the loss of two planes 
and the lives of all aboard them. The event sequence leading to the accident is also 
fairly well defined. The event sequence can therefore be fairly well represented using 
the linear causal structure of the barrier model. 
To adopt this approach for the railway industry a different, less simplistic, conceptual 
model is needed. In the railway a wide range of contributory causes of an accident are 
often relevant with a range of different potential outcomes, the severity of which will be 
variable. Therefore a more complicated, branching structure of events is required. The 
conceptual models in wide use in the railway industry are fault and event trees and 
these would seem to be sensible models on which to base BN models for the railway 
industry. There is also much more numerical and logical information encoded into fault 
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and event trees than there is in barrier models. This information could potentially be 
adopted to help quantify the BN. If fault trees and event trees could be used as 
conceptual models, and the translations between them made more formal, then this 
additional information would also help the model building and validation process. 
Various entities and functions are relevant when determining what the influences on 
particular events are. 
The second key aspect of the work that indicates a way forward for the work described 
in this thesis is the ability to model conditions. The work shows that conditions can be 
effectively modelled in BNs. In the diagram of Figure 24 the capability of the ATe team 
is influenced by 'culture' and 'competence' of the team, conditions whose state affects 
the likelihood of occurrence of an accident. BNs provide a means to develop a model 
which includes the technical, operational and organizational conditions that were 
previously identified as key to the occurrence of accidents. 
6.4.3.2 An aviation BN causal model 
In two supporting papers, Roelen et al (Roelen, Wever et al. 2003a; Roelen, Wever et 
al. 2003b) outline an approach for using BNs to model the technical and managerial 
causes of aviation accidents at airports that has progressed concurrently with the work 
described in this thesis. Their paper describes two cases studies. One considers the 
causes of 'missed approach' incidents, where planes should abort on approach to 
landing because of undesirable landing conditions. The other considers the causes of 
flight crew fatigue, which itself is a potential cause of a number of aviation accidents. 
The authors argue that improvements in causal modelling are needed in the aviation 
industry for much the same reasons as those highlighted in section 1.4. Aviation 
systems (like systems in the railway industry) have a high degree of technical and 
procedural protection and are largely proof against single failures, making them prone 
to 'organizational accidents'. To capture this phenomenon models need to include 
procedural and managerial failures. They argue that this is not possible using a tree 
type structure as the tree would need to be very complex and would become 
unmanageable. Instead they only develop their tree to a level where common mode 
influences manifest themselves. They also argue that fault and event trees are poor for 
modelling human factors and organizational behaviour and in particular they stress the 
binary nature of fault trees, and the inability to model sequence dependencies within 
them. They propose the use of BNs to develop the causal model because this 
technique is inherently flexible, and can be used to model widely differing types of 
causal relationships. A distinction is made in their BN between the 'technical model' 
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and the 'management model'. The paper does not make the reasons for this distinction 
clear, but the technical model is considered to be a model of 'the accident risk' , 
whereas the management model captures the processes that are carried out within the 
aviation system. Both models are considered to be 'holistic' in nature rather than 
'deterministic' a property that the authors believe is exhibited by classic QRA 
techniques like fault and event trees. This distinction appears to be based on the clarity 
and strength of the causal relationships between variables. In fault and event trees 
'events', rather than 'influences', are modelled. Each event usually has only two states 
('occur' and 'not occur') and often the occurrence of one event definitively determines 
the occurrence of another. The causal relationships modelled here, and captured in the 
BN, are less well defined. They depend on the particular state of a number of multi-
state variables and weak causal relationships often exist. 
Figure 25 BN modelling missed approach of a plane to an airport runway 
Figure 25 (Roelen, Wever et al. 2003b) shows the BN causal model for missed 
approach. The variables comprising the technical model are shown using transparent 
BN nodes. The authors acknowledge that assessments must be well documented to 
avoid them becoming slipshod and non-traceable but they do not provide any guidance 
as to how this should be done. 
As with the SCORE research, this project highlights the ability of BNs to be used to 
model conditions as causal factors. Conditions do not definitely cause an accident, but 
increase its probability of occurrence, and BNs can be used to represent such 
relationships. However the model chooses to discard the fault and event tree 
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representation. The authors highlight the difficulty of using fault trees for detailed 
causal analysis that were highlighted in Chapter 4 when reviewing the structure of the 
SRM, and the Risk Solutions derailment model. 
'[Modelling causes at a detailed level of abstraction] leads to a combinatorial explosion 
of the tree, which cannot be handled quantitatively' ((Roelen, Wever et al. 2003b) p 
1322) 
By abandoning the fault and event tree structure and the constraints that it places on 
the model, some rigour in the model development process has been lost. The model 
makes no conceptual distinction between events (such as missed approach execution) 
and conditions (such as weather conditions or alertness). Only the former are capable 
of being explicitly modelled in fault and event trees. There are arguably only two events 
in the BN model 'Missed approach execution' and 'Collision with terrain'. Ideally the 
complete sequence of events leading to an accident, and all of the diffuse conditions 
that affect the probabilities of occurrence of these events would be modelled. The 
truncated sequence of events presents a scope limitation of the model. 
In building the model in this way the authors have also discarded many of the concepts 
that safety engineers apply, and find useful when deciding how to manage safety. In 
other words, the model does not represent the causal structure of events in the way 
that a safety engineer would expect to see them. There is no hazard identified and the 
accident is not clearly distinguished. 
One key finding of this work is the possibility of using BNs to model correlations 
between seemingly independent events and conditions in the model. This is potentially 
very valuable. 
A similar project has been undertaken to produce causal models to help understand 
how the risk from low probability, high consequence accidents changes when new 
technology is introduced into a system (Roelen, Wever et al. 2003a). Again the BN 
developed makes no use of the fault and event tree structure, or standard safety 
engineering concepts. The BN model built includes only variables such as 
'organizational climate' and 'training' which are more difficult to define than events, and 
which are linked with weak influential causal relationships. 
6.4.4 Using BNs to extend and supplement the accepted modelling techniques. 
Several research projects have been undertaken which seek to use BNs to extend the 
use of the accepted method for undertaking risk assessment, fault and event tree 
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analysis. As such approaches build on approaches which are accepted within the UK 
railway industry they are of particular relevance to the work described in this thesis. 
6.4.4.1 Translating Fault Trees into BN format 
Bobbio et al (Bobbio, Portinale et al. 2001) outline how any fault tree can be directly 
translated into an equivalent BN. This translation is investigated to consider the uses of 
BNs within the fields of reliability and dependability analysis, for which fault trees were 
originally developed. Figure 26 shows fault tree AND and OR gates and their BN 
equivalents. The conditional probability tables for the nodes representing the gate 
output variables are also shown. The BN produced, like the fault tree, can be used to 
calculate the top event probability, given the probabilities of occurrence of base events. 
However, the authors' interest is in the additional functionality that the resulting BN 
version of the fault tree model could exhibit. 
A True False 
B True False True False 
C=True 1 0 0 0 
C=False 0 1 1 1 
A True False 
B True False True False 
C=True 1 1 1 0 
C=False 0 0 0 1 
Figure 26: BN equivalents of fault tree AND and OR gates 
The basic underlying assumptions, and therefore constraints, of the fault tree 




events are binary events (working/not working); 
events are statistically independent 
relationships between events and causes are represented by logical AND and 
OR gates 
The paper shows how by converting a fault tree into its equivalent BN, these 
assumptions can be 'relaxed' in the resulting model and therefore it can be applied 
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more flexibly to reliability modelling problems. For example, the authors describe how 
the BN can be adapted to model multi-state variables. Using an example from digital 
electronics, they illustrate how a base event could be modelled that had three states: 
'working correctly', 'stuck at 0 fault', and 'stuck at 1 fault'. They also describe how 
common cause factors can be easily modelled in the BN NPTs. The ability to introduce 
uncertainty into the deterministic logical rules (e.g. AND and OR gates) is also 
discussed '[logic] gates may reflect an imperfect knowledge of the system 
behaviour .... ' ((Bobbio, Portinale et al. 2001), page 254). 
This research illustrates the ease with which fault trees can be translated into BNs, and 
that fixed rules for how to do this can be described. The increased flexibility of use 
demonstrated by Bobbio et al could be used to improve the capability of such models 
to represent technical, operational and organizational conditions, although the authors 
do not acknowledge or investigate this. 
6.4.4.2 An airport safety model 
(Ale, Bellamy et al. 2006; Ale, Bellamy et al. 2007) have used BNs to build hybrid 
models of the cause of accidents at airports. The high level objectives of the work are 
the same as those described in this thesis. They argue that more detailed causal 
models are needed to capture the particular circumstances in which 'organizational 
accidents' occur. 
'causal modelling enables policies and inspection regimes to be tailor made to the 
vulnerabilities in systems and to those activities that pose the most risk .. .for a more 
detailed and airport specific assessment of the risks a correspondingly more detailed 
understanding of the pathways to accidents, their probabilities and consequences is 
needed' 
The approach they describe has evolved concurrently with the work described in this 
thesis. In (Ale, Bellamy et al. 2006) they describe a programme of work to develop 
causal models in the aviation industry. In their most recent paper (Ale, Bellamy et al. 
2007) Ale at al propose the use of event sequence diagrams, BNs and fault trees 
together to model accident causation in and around Schipol airport. Ale et al use fault 
trees as part of the underlying BN specification, as proposed by Bobbio. The approach 
proposed has many similarities to the work that will be described in Chapters 7 and 8. 
In particular a single integrated BN, developed from alternative causal models, is used 
to undertake calculation. They see this as a way to ensure 'consistent handling of 
probabilities and their interdependence' ((Ale, Bellamy et al. 2007), page 1438). 
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The model they describe focuses on variations in situation. This contrasts with the 
primary focus of the model proposed in this thesis on variability associated with 
location. The BN therefore primarily extends their model to include variability in 
operational conditions on the basis that human performance is the potential source of 
most variability in accident likelihood that might be expected at any given airport. 
6.4.4.3 A maritime model 
(Trucco, Cagno et al. 2007) describe a case study in the maritime transportation sector 
which uses Bayeisan Networks to integrate 'human and organizational factors' into a 
probabilistic risk analysis. A BN is developed of the operational and organizational 
conditions. Correlations are then identified between the model and the base events of a 
fault trees that had previously been developed to estimate the risk from collision 
accidents in the open sea. To develop the BN part of the model the authors translate 
functions from another approach, the Structured Analysis and Design Technique 
(SADT) into a BN formalism. 
The authors argue that the model can be used to identify opportunities for risk 
mitigation acting at an organizational or regulatory level. They also argue that it could 
be used to support retrospective analysis, such as the identification of latent 
organizational failures using accident and incident data. 
The approach illustrates the potential for BNs and fault trees to be merged into a 
similar model. However it only considers the causal side of the accident sequence. 
Also, it only makes operational and organizational conditions that underpin the fault 
tree base events explicit as underlying assumptions. The objective of the work 
described in this thesis is to develop models that make all assumptions, including 
performance and technical conditions, both explicit and variable. The omission of such 
causal factors limits the ability of the approach to be used in a range of circumstances 
and locations. 
6.5 Improving risk models using BNs 
The literature review undertaken provides evidence that BNs provide a technique with 
which it may be possible to build a risk model which meets the ideal requirements 
previously set out. 
Our first requirement for a model (RMR 1) is that risk models should allow as many of 
the events in an accident sequence to be modelled as is practicable. Earlier reviews 
demonstrated the possible accident event sequences could be modelled in fault and 
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event trees. The work described in this chapter shows that BN versions of fault trees 
can be developed using BNs. Bobbio describes how to translate fault tree models into 
BNs using clear and repeatable rules (see section 6.4.4.1). A similar translation from 
event trees to BNs would be needed in order to develop a BN version of the standard 
accident event models used in the industry (this is investigated in the next chapter) .. 
The second requirement is that 'Risk models should allow all significant and 
quantifiable technical, operational, organizational and performance causes of accidents 
to be explicitly modelled.' The research reviewed shows that BNs have previously been 
used to make certain types of conditions explicit and variable in a BN. Previous 
research therefore gives confidence that once an underlying BN event model has been 
produced it could be extended, by adding nodes that represent all conditions of 
interest. 
A range of projects have been undertaken that use BNs to incorporate operational and 
organizational conditions into risk models (see section 6.4.3). These conditions are of a 
transient nature and making them explicit in the model as BN nodes allows the impact 
of their change to be modelled and its effect on risk to be calculated. The BN also 
provides a qualitative model of the causal relationships between organizational and 
operational conditions and risk. 
Requirement RMR3 is that 'Risk models should be parameterised by conditions so that 
the risk at different locations and in different situations on the railway network can be 
rapidly recalculated.' BNs provide a candidate technique to use to develop a risk 
modelling approach with this capability. There is evidence that it is possible to identify 
and model the occurrence of risk hotspots using Bayesian approaches (see section 
6.4.2) All relevant work found uses Bayesian statistical approaches to allow belief 
based estimates to be used to supplement location specific data which tends to be 
incomplete. Conditions may be correlated to each other, or they may introduce 
correlations between events. As was discussed in section 2.4.4, when conditions affect 
both the fault and event tree this has the potential to introduce inconsistencies between 
the fault and event tree parts of a risk model. BNs can be used to model correlations 
between any nodes in a model. Therefore, if a model included all events and conditions 
of interest, the correlations between them could be explicitly modelled. This would 
ensure that their impact was appropriately considered when the model was customised 
to model the risk at a particular location 
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Another of the requirements (8DM 1) is that 'In order to ensure that they effectively 
support the taking of safety related decisions, risk models should be usable and 
understandable by those who actually manage safety on the network.' 
In order to develop a complex BN model, it is sensible to start with an existing model. 
Both the SCORE work (Neil, Malcolm et al. 2003; Neil 2004) - see section 6.4.3.1 - and 
the research undertaken by (Ale, Bellamy et al. 2006; Ale, Bellamy et al. 2007) - see 
section 6.4.4.2 - develop BNs from existing, risk models produced using accepted and 
understood approaches. Neil, Malcolm et al use a barrier model, whereas Ale, Bellamy 
et al use fault trees and event sequence diagrams. This approach helps to structure the 
BN and also provides an alternative causal model which can aid interpretation of the 
results of a BN, and can help in its validation. To build a BN, one should start with an 
underlying conceptual model. The risk modelling approach envisaged would begin with 
a model of the accident event sequence at its 'spine'. This part of the model can be 
effectively captured using fault and event trees. Fault and event tree models are not 
just the computational models that safety engineers use in the railway industry. They 
also represent the conceptual model that engineers use to reason about safety and 
risk. It is clear that these models would therefore provide the sensible underlying 
conceptual model for a BN model of risk in the railway industry. 
6.6 Chapter summary 
In this chapter I described BNs (BNs) and the underlying theory that supports them. I 
then investigated how BN models have previously been used in the safety domain and 
in particular for probabilistic risk assessment. This review of the research allowed some 
clarification of ideas for how it might be possible to develop a modelling approach that 
meets the ideal requirements set out in section 3.8. The key clarifications are that: 
• 
• 
BNs provide a potential technology on which to base a modelling approach. 
The methodology should be based on the use of fault and event tree models as 
an underlying specification for the BN. 
• A modelling approach based on the use of BNs has the potential to meet the 
requirements for an ideal UK railway risk model that were set out in section 3.7. 
Previous research has established how to develop BNs from fault trees. In the next 
chapter I investigate how to undertake a translation from event trees to BNs. This 
process is the formalised, as a step towards the development of an ideal UK railway 
risk modelling approach. 
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In the next two chapters, a case study is described which illustrates a new approach to 
modelling risk in the UK railway industry based on the development of a parameterised 
risk model using a BN. 
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7 Case Study Part 1: Parameterising event trees using 
Bayesian Networks 
In the next two chapters, a case study is described which illustrates a new approach to 
modelling risk in the UK railway industry, based on the development of a parameterised 
risk model using a BN. The case study develops, and is based on, the industry risk 
analysis that were introduced in section 4.3.1. 
These chapters provide the argument in support of Hypothesis 3 (that the development 
of a risk modelling approach with characteristics suited to use in the UK railway 
industry is possible). 
In this chapter, the first part of the case study is outlined: the development of a 
parameterised BN based on the structure of the set of event trees from the industry 
derailment analysis. The case study describes how the event trees can be used to 
develop a BN model which incorporates all event tree logic and also makes the 
condition states that form the underlying assumptions of the initial analysis both explicit 
and variable. 
First, in section 7.1, the production of a BN equivalent of an event tree is described. 
Then, in section 7.2, the industry risk analysis introduced in section 4.3.1 is revisited to 
show how an event tree modelling the risk from train derailment at a particular location 
can be translated into a BN by following this approach. Section 7.3 demonstrates how 
to include conditions, whose states form the underlying assumptions of the event tree, 
as BN nodes. The relationships between the states of those conditions and event 
probabilities are elicited, and a more general model produced as a result. This process 
is referred to as parameterisation of the model. 
In section 7.4, a large event tree that includes all of the derailment event sequences 
that exist from the full set of event trees developed for the industry analysis is 
described. This model is again translated to its BN equivalent and parameterised by 
the addition of condition nodes and elicitation of causal relationships. The original study 
consists of a number of different event trees, each representing different locations, 
where particular combinations of condition states are assumed to exist. When the 
condition states that were assumed for each of the initial analyses are selected in the 
resulting BN and the evidence propagated through the net, the model calculates the 
same output as each initial event tree. However, using the model it is also possible to 
analyse the effect of entirely new combinations of condition states on accident 
probability. 
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For each parameterised BN m d I h o e s own the output of the model is investigated to 
~a~ge ~hether the approach produces models that give sensible results and to provide 
insight Into how these types of models might be able to be used in the railway industry. 
7.1 Simple translation from an event tree to a BN 
Events Consequence (C ) 
E1 E2 
yes c1 
0.25 E1 E2 
yes yes 0.5 
0.5 
yes 0. 25 
no 0.5 no 0.75 
no c2 
0.75 -initiatinQ 
event yes c3 
E1 E2 
0.25 




E1 yes no 
E2 yes no yes no 
c1 1 0 0 0 
c2 0 1 0 0 
c3 0 0 1 0 
c4 0 0 0 1 




yes E1 E1 yes no 
0.5 yes 0.5 yes 0.25 0.4 
no c2 no 0.5 no 0.75 0.6 
0.75 - -
initiating yes c3 E1 E2 
event 0.4 
no ~ -• 0.5 (c no c4 
0.6 -
C 
E1 yes no 
E2 yes no yes no 
c1 1 0 0 0 
c2 0 1 0 0 
c3 0 0 1 0 
c4 0 0 0 1 
Figure 27: Fundamental principles for the translation of event trees into BNs 
Figure 27 shows two fully expanded event trees and their BN equivalents. Each event 
tree has two events. The translation to BNs is substantially the same for both event 
trees. In both cases, BN nodes E1 and E2 are needed for each event in the tree. Event 
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nodes have a state for each of their possible outcomes (yes and no). The probabilities 
of occurrence of each event are taken directly from the event tree. BN node C is also 
needed in both cases to represent consequences and this node has a state for each 
possible consequence (c1-c4). The derailment consequence is determined by the 
combination of events that have occurred. Therefore arcs are needed from each event 
node to the consequence node. 
The key difference in the rules for translating the two event trees in Figure 27 is that in 
the first there is no conditional probability relationship between events but in the 
second there is. This information is implicitly shown in the event tree. In the bottom 
event tree we see that the probability of occurrence of E2 differs depending on whether 
or not event E 1 has occurred. However, in the top event tree the probabilities of 
occurrence of E2 is unchanged. This shows that in the bottom event tree E2 is 
conditionally dependent upon the outcome of E 1 and an additional arc is needed in the 
BN to represent this. The diagram shows how all NPTs would be quantified in the 
resulting BNs. Conditional dependencies do not have to be between consecutive 
events in the event tree. Where larger event trees are built, which consist of a greater 
number of events, an event could be conditioned upon the outcome of one or more of 
its preceding events. 
(Kastenberg, Apostolakis et al. 1993) describe a translation between decision trees and 
influence diagrams. Their approach is similar to the one described here, given the 
similarity of those modelling techniques with event trees and Bayesian Networks 
respectively. 
7.2 The core derailment study revisited 
For the purposes of the case study, the 'derailment study' that was reviewed in 4.3.1 is 
now revisited. In that study, six separate derailment risk models were built, one for 
each of the different types of location that were together considered to be 
representative of the infrastructure being analysed. These models were: 
• derailment on open track, where the train is not adjacent to any significant 
infrastructure or enclosed by a tunnel 
• derailment in a station, when stopping at that station 
• derailment inside a tunnel 
• derailment on approach to a tunnel 
• derailment when passing through a station (not stopping) 
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• derailment on bridges or viaducts 
As was discussed in section 4.3.2 this approach introduces an inherent simplification. 
The approach assumes that there are only six possible and distinct sets of conditions 
arising on the section of the network analysed. 
The severity of each possible outcome indicated in the event tree was calculated 
externally to the model using a range of variables, such as train speed, the type of 
rolling stock, passenger loading, and the particular consequence indicated, for example 
whether or not any secondary collisions occurred. 
7.3 Parameterisation of a single event tree 
In this section, a single event tree from the derailment study is used to demonstrate 
how the approach described in Figure 27 would be applied in practice. Then the 
'parameterisation' of the resulting BN version of this event tree is described. This 
process involves making the conditions that form the underlying assumptions of the 
event tree explicit in the model, and eliciting the causal relationships between event 
and condition nodes. 
7.3.1 Translation of an event tree into a BN 
The event tree produced to model derailment consequences in areas of 'Open Track' is 
shown in Figure 28. The event tree shows the probabilities of occurrence of each of 12 
potential consequences, given that an initial derailment has occurred. The model is 
underpinned by a number of assumptions that relate to the core derailment study. 
These assumptions were clarified and summarised previously (Table 5) and the 
meaning of each event at the top of the event tree was also previously described 
(Table 4). 
The event tree shows a range of probabilities associated with each event tree branch 
and the various outcome probabilities that were calculated using this tree. The event 
'contained' is redundant as the assumption is made that no containment rail is fitted 
anywhere on the section of infrastructure modelled for the core derailment study. The 
event 'contained' is included in the model because the event tree branching structure is 
taken directly from the derailment study previously reviewed which included it. 
The SRM is based on a much wider geographical scope, and includes some areas of 
infrastructure where containment rails are fitted. Rather than edit the tree to remove its 
uppermost branch this structure is retained as it impacts upon the BN structure that is 
subsequently built. 
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In order to translate the event tree into a BN, the same approach as is described on 
section 7.1 is applied. One node is created for each of the events in the event tree. A 
single consequence node that is influenced by all possible events is then added. The 
consequence node has 12 possible states, one for each possible derailment 
consequence. For the purposes of this case study it was considered sensible to use 
the events from the SRM derailment event trees as probabilities associated with the 
occurrence of these events, given certain assumed condition states, were readily 
available. The existing models show that quantification of probabilities of occurrence for 
these events is credible. This results in a model of similar complexity to an industry 
standard model, with similar potential uses, whilst minimising the need for additional 
data analysis and expert judgement. Figure 28 shows that there are two separate 
branches of the event tree where it is possible that a derailed train will hit a lines ide 
structure. The probability of a derailed train hitting a lineside structure is different in 
each case. This shows that the probability is conditionally dependent on whether or not 
the train has fallen over. 
derailment derailment maintain derails to strike tunnel carriages fall hit lineside collapse secondary Frequency 
occurs containment clearances cess/adjacent portal structure collision 
line 
Yes 1 - no derailment O.OOE+OO 
0 
Yes 2 - minor derailment within 2.90E-Ol 
0.29 clearances 
No 3- minor derailment to cess 
0.8 6.75E-02 
No 
0.95 No 4- minor derailment ro cess, 
0.95 striking lineside structure 1.60E-02 
Yes 
Cess 0.2 
0.125 Yes 5- minor derailment to cess, 8.43E-04 
Yes 0.05 collapsing rolling stock 
No 8 - major derailment to cess 
0.75 3.33E-03 
Yes 
0.05 No 7 - major derailment to cess, 
0.95 striking lines ide structure 1.05E-03 
Yes 
0.25 
Yes 8- Major derailment to 5.55E-05 
0.05 adjacent fine 
No 
1 
No 9 - minor derailment to 5.31E-Ol 
J 0.9 adjacent fine No No 
5.90E-02 0.95 Yes 10- Minor derailment to adjacent 0.71 
0.1 line, with secondary collision 
Adjacent 
No 11- major derailment to adjacent 2.80E-02 0.875 
I 0.9 line Yes 
0.05 IYes 12- major derailment to adjacent 3.11E-03 
0.1 line. with secondary collision 
Figure 28: Open track on a busy commuter railway 
An additional arc is added between the node 'falls' and the node 'hits structure' to 
model the conditional probability relationship that is implicit in the event tree. The 
difference in probabilities is small, representing a weak correlation between the events. 
The analyst's judgement that this correlation is weak was based on the view that, 
following a derailment, a train will be likely to travel a greater distance if it remains 
upright, and hence is more likely to collide with a structure at the side of the track. Note 
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that this is the only place in the event tree where event probab'I't' d'ff . 
I lies I er according to 
the events that have preceded their occurrence. The BN produced is shown in Figure 
29. 
Comparing the 'open track' derailment event tree with its BN equivalent shows: 
• 
• 
The logical combination of events leading to each accident is most clearly 
shown in the event tree. 
The occurrence of conditional probabilities - arising from dependence between 
the events - is shown more clearly in the BN. 
falls 
yes I 0.05 




falls yes no 
adjacent 0.875 yes 0.25 0.2 
no 0.75 0.8 
clear 
yes 0.29 
no 0.71 0.95 
collision 
yes I 0.1 
no I 0.9 
Figure 29: BN event tree for derailments on a section of open track 
The models provide complementary representations of the event sequences. The fully 
expanded event tree model would have 27 (128) different consequence endpoints. 
These need to be mapped to the 12 different modelled consequences in the 
'consequence' node. Therefore, using the BN structure shown, the 'consequence' NPT 
would contain 1536 different entries, one for each of the 12 consequences under all 
128 different condition combinations. To simplify the quantification of the 'consequence' 
a different BN structure is used in practice (the structure is shown in full in Appendix 
B1.1). The consequence node is broken down into a number of sub-nodes. Each sub-
node models a subset of the consequence states and is dependent on the minimum 
131 
subset of events on which these consequence states depend. With reference to Figure 
28, for example, if we know that 'carriages fall' and 'secondary collision' are both true 
then the only possible outcome is outcome 12, regardless of the occurrence of other 
events. The resulting model is logically identical to one in which the consequence NPT 
is fully quantified, but can be produced much more quickly. 
Appendix B1 shows that the BN calculates the same accident consequence 
probabilities as the original event tree of Figure 28. The consequence NPT is too large 
to show in the diagram. 
7.3.2 Undefined event outcomes 
If the 'open track' event tree was fully expanded, as is the case with the event trees 
shown in Figure 27, it would have 128 different consequences. However in some 
instances, if it is known that a subset of the events has occurred the final consequence 
can be determined. For example in Figure 28, if it has been established that: 
'contained' = No, and 'clear' = Yes then it is certain that the outcome is consequence 
number 2. The event tree model does not define the states of subsequent events in the 
tree. There are two reasons why this might be the case. The first is that the state of the 
event has no effect on the consequence; looking again at the path leading to 
consequence 2, the direction that the train derails in is irrelevant to the consequences 
of the accident, as it is known that the train has maintained its clearances and will not 
hit a structure or other train. In this thesis such events are referred to as 'don't care' 
events. The second reason is that whether or not the event has occurred is inevitable 
given the occurrence of one or more of the preceding events. For example if it has 
been established that the train has maintained its clearances following derailment 
(clear = Yes), then it is certain that the train will not fall onto its side, it will not hit any 
structure, no structure will collapse onto the train and there will be no collision with 
another train. The event tree notation does not distinguish between these different 
reasons for collapsing the event tree structure. Therefore in order to replicate the event 
tree function and calculation in a BN a model would not need to distinguish between 
them either. 
7.3.3 Parameterisation of the BN event tree model 
Next the extension of the BN event tree model to make it more general is described. , 
RMR2 states that the ideal UK railway risk model 'should allow all significant and 
quantifiable technical, operational, organizational and performance conditions that 
cause accidents or exacerbate risk to be explicitly modelled'. It is a simple process to 
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include additional conditions in the BN version of the event tree. The conditions whose 
states form the underlying assumptions of the initial model can be made explicit as BN 
nodes. The relationships between the states of those conditions and event probabilities 
are then elicited. The resulting model is a 'parameterised' one, in which the impact of 
changing conditions can be evaluated. 
Table 3 listed the conditions that the risk analyst who produced the core derailment 
study identified as those that affect event probabilities in the core derailment study, and 
which were considered to be the key assumptions of the model. Therefore these were 
the conditions that were included in the model. Table 4 listed which events in particular 
these conditions influence. This information was used to expand the BN to include 
these conditions as nodes in the BN. Figure 30 shows the BN produced. The event 
nodes, previously shown in Figure 29, are shaded. The consequence node and arcs 
previously shown are omitted for clarity. 
Figure 30: Parameterised 'Open track' BN event tree 
The full BN structure and the set of NPTs necessary to quantify the model are shown in 
Appendix B2. 
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Condition Condition description Condition states i 
Derailment Containment Whether the derailment Yes, No 
Fitted containment is fitted . 
Track Curvature The curvature of the track Severe, Mild, None 
Number of tracks The number of adjacent 2, 4 
tracks: 
Derailment Speed The speed of the >15, <15 
derailment (mph) 
Lineside Object Density The density of objects High, Low 
beside the line 
Lineside Object Type The type of equipment Fixed , Anchored 
beside the line 
Density of Traffic The traffic density High, Low 
Train Crash Worthiness The crashworthiness of High, Low 
the train 
Rolling Stock Type The type of rolling stock High Speed Train, Electric 
Multiple Unit 
Table 6: Derailment operating and infrastructure conditions 
Table 6 shows the conditions that were modelled and their states. Note that only 
technical conditions and performance conditions are modelled, as these were the 
conditions that were identified by the risk analyst. For this case study the number of 
condition states modelled was kept to a minimum to minimise the number of 
probabilities that needed to be quantified in the NPTs of the resulting BN. 
7.3.4 Quantification of the model 
After the BN had been constructed, all NPTs had to be produced or updated. The 
conditional probability relationships in the 'open track' event tree were used in the first 
instance. Table 5, listed the condition states that were previously identified as being 
relevant to the 'open track' event tree. These condition states reflected the fact that the 
core derailment study concerned a high density urban commuter railway (see column 1 
of Table 7) . 
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BN variable Core Derailment study Alternative assumptions 
assumptions (commuter (intercity railway) 
railway) 




Curvature Severe None ! 
I 
Tracks 4 2 
Derailment speed >15mph >15mph 
Lineside density High Low 
Lineside type Anchored Fixed equipment 
Rolling stock EMU High Speed Train 
Density of traffic High Low 
Table 7: Values entered into the BN Event tree model 
The NPTs of the condition nodes were quantified so that, with these condition states 
entered, the event probabilities in the BN were identical to those in the 'open track' 
event tree. This ensured that the BN event tree that was produced by entering the core 
derailment study assumptions calculated exactly the same output as the original event 
tree. It can be seen from Table 7 that, for the core derailment study 'open track' event 
tree the density of traffic is 'high'. In the 'open track' event tree in Figure 28, It can be 
seen that the probability of collision in the event tree is 0.1. Therefore this value is used 
to quantify the BN as shown in Table 8. 
Collision 
Density of Traffic high low 
direction cess adjacent cess adjacent 
False 1 0.9 1 0.99 
True 0 0.1 0 0.01 
Table 8: NPT for the event node 'collision' in the parameterised BN event model 
The additional conditional probabilities necessary for completing the NPTs (shown as 
greyed out text) were elicited with the help of the risk analyst who developed the initial 
study. The presence of the initial probability values in the NPTs simplified elicitation of 
the remaining probabilities needed to complete the NPT by providing a value for 
comparative purposes. Table 8 shows that if the train derails to the cess a collision is 
impossible regardless of the density of traffic. When the train derails to the adjacent 
line the risk analyst considered it 10 times less likely that a collision would occur when 
traffic density was deemed to be 'low'. The BN model was built using the Hugin 
software package. 
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7.3.5 Investigation of the model output 
The parameterised model produced in this section is capable of representing a set of 
different open track event trees. Moreover, it makes the reasons for variability in event 
probabilities explicit. To illustrate this, different evidence was entered into the condition 
nodes so that the model was representative of derailment risk in an entirely different 
infrastructure area: an inter-City traffic area. To do this, the evidence shown in column 2 
of Table 7 was entered. 
When this evidence was entered, the likelihood estimates for each of the possible 
derailment scenarios changed significantly. This can be seen in the diagram of Figure 
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o BN model characterised as a commuter railway (column 1 of Table 12) 
• BN model characterised as Intercity railway (column 2 of table 12) 
Figure 31: Accident probabilities for two scenarios calculated using the BN 
Figure 31 shows that changing the states of variables in the BN has a significant effect 
on the likelihood of each possible consequence following a derailment. Scenario 2 
(Minor derailment within clearances) is much more likely on an inter-city railway than 
on a commuter railway. This is because the track on the inter-city railway is much 
straighter, and therefore following a derailment trains are not likely to veer sharply off 
course and travel outside of their clearances. For the commuter railway the most likely 
outcome is Scenario 9 (minor derailment to adjacent line) as the track curvature is 
assumed to be severe and therefore clearances are not as likely to be maintained 
following a derailment. Also the commuter railway is a four-track railway, and therefore 
it is quite likely that any derailment will be towards an adjacent line. It should be noted 
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that, in this case study, it was assumed that traffic on the intercity infrastructure had the 
same speed profile as that on the commuter railway. Modelling speed changes would 
have entailed a more detailed probability elicitation process. This means that changes 
to the probability of occurrence of derailment consequences occur only because of 
differences in the infrastructure, type of rolling stock and traffic density. 
The probability of occurrence of a derailment was taken from the core derailment study 
and is set at 4.23E-03 derailments per train mile per year. Because the scope of this 
model does not include the causes of derailment, this value is the same for both the 
commuter and intercity scenarios. In other words the consequence probabilities (c1 to 
c12) sum to this value for both modelled cases. In reality however, it is known that the 
states of some of the conditions influence the probability of occurrence of a derailment. 
Table 4 highlighted that both the extent of track curvature and the speed of the train 
influence the probability of a derailment. Therefore, to improve the accuracy of the 
model it would be necessary to expand its scope to look at derailment causes. This 
indicates a need to expand the model into the causal relationships that are traditionally 
modelled in fault trees (how to do this is investigated in the next chapter). Nevertheless 
the case study clearly illustrates the dependence of event tree results on the condition 
states that form their assumptions. 
7.4 Parameterisation of a Multiple Event Tree BN 
RMR3 states that an ideal modelling approach should result in models that are: 
'parameterised by conditions so that the risk at different locations and in different 
situations on the railway network can be rapidly recalculated'. This is partially achieved 
with the model described in the previous subsection. The model is parameterised and 
various condition states can be set within it to model different situations. However its 
application is limited by the fact that it is based on the 'open track' event tree. The BN 
produced cannot model the accident risk arising on any areas of track where additional 
events, that are not possible on open track, might occur. 
I now investigate how to create a model which can be used to model the probability of 
occurrence in a wider range of locations. This is done by combining the information, 
and event branching logic from the full set of event trees produced for the core 
derailment study and hence a large set of possible events. 
7.4.1 Translation of several event trees into a BN 
The first step in the development of the multiple event tree BN is to build a large 
'extended' event tree that includes all of the events in all of the individual trees. Starting 
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with such a tree, it is possible to scope it to represent any of the individual trees on 
which it is based just by altering event probabilities. For the sake of simplicity, and to 
demonstrate the methodology five of the six event trees from the core derailment study 
are merged in this example. The five event trees used are shown in full in Appendix A. 
The event tree modelling derailments on bridges is omitted because it has a 
fundamentally different structure. It could be included using the same method, however 
by restricting the example to the five other locations a clearer illustrative example of the 
approach is achieved. Figure 32 shows the resulting merged event tree which 
describes the logical structure of the BN. 
The event tree is very similar to the open track event tree shown in Figure 28, the only 
difference being that this event tree contains an additional event 'hit tunnel'. The 
presence of this additional event leads to two additional consequences 3 - 'major 
derailment to cess, tunnel portal hit' and 10 - 'major derailment to adjacent line, tunnel 
portal hit'. Insertion of these additional consequences leads to the renumbering of the 
consequences from 1 to 14 as shown on the diagram. The events in the event tree are 
a superset of the events that are present in all five event trees from the initial study. 
The event tree model could be thought of as a model of the 'top logic' of the set of 
event trees used in the core derailment study. 
To transform the event tree of Figure 32 into the event tree of Figure 28, the 
appropriate probabilities of occurrence are added to each branch of the tree. 'Hit 
tunnel' cannot occur in the open track event tree. Therefore the P(strike tunnel portal) 
is set equal to zero in both of the branches in which it occurs. This indicates that 
collision with a tunnel is not possible in areas of open track where there are no tunnels 
and makes consequences 3 and 10 impossible. Hence the resulting tree becomes 
mathematically identical to the event tree of Figure 28. A similar approach could be 
applied to the event trees for each of the five locations. 
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derailment derailment maintain derails to strike tunnel carriages faU hrt lineside strudure secondary 
occurs containment clearances cess/adjacent portal strudure collapse collision 
line 
Yes 1 - no derailment 
Yes 2 - minor derailment WIthin 
clearances 
Yes 3 - malor derailment to cess, 
tunnel portal hrt 
No 4 - minor derailment to cess 
Cess No 
No 5 - minor derailment to cess 
Yes striking lineslde structure 
Yes 
Yes 6 - minor derailment to cess 
No collapSing roUing stock 
No 7 - major derailment to cess 
Yes 
No 8 - major derailment to cess, 
striking lineside structure 
Yes 
No Yes 
9 - major derailment to cess 
collapsing rolling stock 
Yes 10 - major derailment to adjacent 
line, tunnel portal hit 
No 
No 11 - minor derailment to adjacent 
r line Adjacent No 
IYes 12 - minor derailment to adjacent 
line, .,,;th secondary collision 
No 
No 13 - major derailment to adjacent 
I line Yes 
LYes 14 - major derailment to adjacent 
line "';th secondary collision 
Figure 32: 'Extended' event tree showing all branching logic 
To automate this process in the BN an additional node 'location' is created to update 
event probabilities according to the location of the derailment This node has one state 
for each of the event tree locations: 'open track', 'station', 'twin track tunnel', 'through 
station' and tunnel approach' _ The BN model produced is shown in Figure 33_ 
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Figure 33: BN event model representing five related derailment event trees 
The model must be capable of representing all conditional probability relationships 
between events in each of the original event trees. Links between events are added if 
they are implicit in the probabilities assigned to any of the individual event trees. 
Therefore the arc between 'falls' and 'structure' that was shown in Figure 29 is also 
shown here. Note also that there is an arc shown between events 'direction' and 'hit 
tunnel'. This is necessary to capture a conditional probability relationship present in the 
'tunnel approach' event tree which exists to represent the fact that a train is more likely 
to hit the tunnel on the cess side as the tunnel is closer to the train on this side. Some 
nodes have no additional conditional dependency relationships ('contained', 'collapsed' 
and 'collision'). This is because their probabilities of occurrence are identical in all 
event trees and are not dependent on either the location in which the derailment occurs 
or on the occurrence of previous events. 
7.4.2 Additional elicitation: adding variable assumptions 
In order to generalise the model, the same variables as were used previously to 
generalise the 'open track' model were introduced and probability relationships elicited. 
The resulting model is shown in the diagram of Figure 34. Again the consequence 
node and arcs are omitted for clarity. 
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Figure 34 Parameterised BN event tree model of five merged scenarios 
The full BN structure and the set of NPTs necessary to quantify the model are shown in 
Appendix B3; 
Note that the conditional probability arc between 'location' and 'clear' that was shown in 
Figure 33 is not present in the parameterised model. This is because it has become 
redundant in the parameterisation process. Table 9 shows the NPT used for the node 
'clear' in the initial BN model shown in Figure 33. 
Clear 
derailment open track station twin track Through tunnel 
location tunnel station approach 
Yes 0.29 0.375 0.29 0.29 0.29 
No 0.71 0.625 0.71 0.71 0.71 
Table 9: NPT for the node 'clear' in Figure 33 
The values in this NPT are simply transcribed from the probabilities of occurrence of 
the event 'clear' in the event tree for each separate location indicated. The NPT shows 
that the probability of a derailed train maintaining its clearances is 0.29 in all locations 
except for in stopping stations, where it is 0.375. 
While undertaking the elicitation process, the risk analyst confirmed that the probability 
of 'clear' is determined by the speed at which the derailment occurs and the degree of 
track curvature. Track curvature was assumed to be high in all locations on the core 
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derailment study. However, speed differs according to location. A train in a stopping 
station would be likely to be travelling at low speed, and hence any derailment 
occurring in this location would be likely to be a low speed derailment. A low speed 
train would be more likely to maintain its clearances and this means that probability of 
'clear' at this location is higher than that in other locations. The location of the 
derailment in fact provides an indicator of the state of 'derailment speed' and 
'curvature' which are the real conditons of interest. 
In the parameterised BN model, 'derailment speed' and 'curvature' are included as 
nodes. This allows use of these nodes, rather than the 'location' node, to explicitly 
model the key relationships that determine whether or not a train maintains its 
clearances. The NPT for 'clear' that is required in order to quantify the parameterised 
model is shown as Table 10. The two values taken from the derailment study (0.29 and 
0.375) are entered into the table first, according to the assumptions that underpin them. 
The other values were elicited with the assistance of the risk analyst. 
Clear 
derailment >15 <15 
speed 
Curvature severe Mild None severe Mild None 
Yes 0.29 0.6 0.75 0.375 0.7 0.9 
No 0.71 0.4 0.25 0.625 0.3 0.1 
Table 10: NPT for the node 'clear' in Figure 34 
In this NPT, there is no need to repeat 'clear' occurrence probabilities, as was the case 
in the previous NPT shown in Table 8. In fact, in many cases the location of the 
derailment does not in itself determine the probability of occurrence of each event. 
Instead, the location indicates the state of local conditions that do directly influence the 
events. If the model is fully parameterised such that all these conditions are made 
explicit, then the 'location' node would no longer be needed. 
Note that using a standard event tree approach the calculation of the severity of 
accident outcomes is undertaken externally to an event tree. However, some 
conditions included in the model such as train speed and crashworthiness impact upon 
the severity of accident outcomes. Using the BN approach outlined here, condition 
states set in the BN model could therefore be checked for consistency with their use in 
severity calculations. 
It should also be noted that, although the core derailment event tree scope did not 
include any track for which containment rail was fitted, it was possible to include for this 
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possibility because it is known that there are some parts of the UK network where 
containment rail is fitted, and that containment rail can prevent the occurrence of a 
derailment. To build a model that is capable of analysing risk across a network area 
using this approach all of the event sequences that could arise on that section of the 
network and the full set of events that might occur need to be able to be postulated. 
7.4.3 Model validation 
To validate the final BN model, the assumptions underpinning the core derailment 
scenario (see column 1 of Table 7) were entered into the BN, and results calculated for 
each of the locations in turn. This confirmed that the model gave the same results as 
the equivalent event tree for each location. 
7.5 Use of the model 
The final parameterised BN Event Model produced allows calculation of the risk in each 
of the locations modelled in the original study. However, the additional flexibility 
provided by parameterising the model by its conditions means that it can also be used 
to estimate derailment occurrence rates with a range of other condition states set. For 
example, the effect that the variation of condition states has on the derailment 
occurrence probability on a section of the network can be quickly and easily 
investigated using the model. 
Note that evidence is only entered into condition nodes. The user cannot assert that 
events are true. This is because of the 'don't care' states mentioned in section 7.3.2. It 
is not known what these outcomes are, therefore the conditional probability 
relationships between these events and other nodes in the BN cannot be coded. Each 
condition node must also be set to a particular state. No prior probabilities are set on 
condition nodes and therefore failing to set these nodes to a particular state would 
result in the scope of the analysis being undefined. Some arcs are included between 
nodes to capture the conditional probability relationships between them. If condition 
states are set to values that are not consistent with these causal relationships then the 
BN software will flag this inconsistency, so this serves as a partial validation of 
condition sets entered. 
Probabilities were calculated using the condition sets that supported the core 
derailment study, and then recalculated when one or more of the condition states had 
been changed. The data entered and the output probabilities calculated are shown in 
Appendix 83. 
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One of the most significant effects found was the effect of track curvature on derailment 
outcome probabilities. The graph of Figure 35 shows BN event model calculation 
results for a commuter railway with severe track curvature, and one with no curvature 
at all. 
The graph shows that when track is straight derailed trains are much more likely to 
maintain their clearances. There is approximately an 80% chance that if a train derails 
on a straight section of track it will stay within its clearances. This mirrors the findings 
shown in graph of Figure 31, as the degree of track curvature was a significant 
difference between the commuter and intercity railway infrastructure. 
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Figure 35: Model output: severe track curvature, and no track curvature 
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Another effect investigated was how traffic density affects the consequences of a 
derailment. The graph of Figure 36 compares calculation results for a commuter 
railway with high traffic density, and one with low traffic density. 
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Figure 36: Model output: high traffic density and low traffic density 
At first glance, the difference in the two consequence profiles does not appear 
significant. However it should be borne in mind that risk is determined not just by the 
probabilities of each consequence but also their severity. Accident 12 'minor derailment 
to adjacent line, with secondary collision' is significantly less likely to occur when the 
traffic density is low. This is likely to result in a significant change in risk. This is 
because there is less chance that a train will be present on the adjacent line when the 
derailment occurs. In order to determine the degree of risk reduction that is achieved 
by this reduction in traffic density, further calculation must be undertaken externally to 
the model. 
7.6 Review of the model 
The parameterised BN model produced at this stage meets some of the ideal 
requirements for railway risk models highlighted in section 4.3. At this stage, a full 
modelling methodology has not been developed. However, the model is reviewed to 
assess its potential as an approach and consider any areas requiring further 
investigation and development. 
7.6.1 Review against ideal risk modelling requirements 
In this section, the model is reviewed against the ideal risk modelling requirements 
previously set out. 
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RMR1: Risk models should allow as many of the events in an accident sequence 
to be modelled as is practicable. 
The model described in this section includes some events in the accident sequence but 
not others. It uses the same event tree models as the SRM and the industry study 
previously mentioned and is therefore concerned only with the possible sequences of 
events following the occurrence of a hazard. 
RMR2: Risk models should allow as many of the significant and quantifiable 
technical, operational, organizational and performance conditions that cause 
accidents or exacerbate risk to be explicitly modelled as is practicable. 
A fundamental requirement of the desired approach is that it should allow the modelling 
of conditions and their possible states of existence as well as events. The BN model 
developed in this chapter shows how it might be possible to build such a model. The 
approach can be used to make conditions explicit as nodes in the BN. 
Standard event tree notation does not allow the underlying conditions to be modelled. 
Therefore the conditions that underpin the event trees need to be carefully documented 
as assumptions. As was found in section 4.3, even the most diligent of analysts might 
forget to record an assumption or miss the effect that varying it has on an event 
elsewhere in the model. It was observed that, when conditions are manually 
documented it is easy to make inconsistent assumptions in various parts of the same 
model. During discussion with the risk analyst who undertook the original study he 
commented that, as each event tree was produced independently, it was difficult to 
consistently manage all assumptions across the set of event trees. 
RMR3: The model should be parameterised by conditions so that the risk at 
different locations and in different situations on the railway network can be 
rapidly recalculated. 
The BN model is parameterised by the states of conditions. There are 768 different 
possible combinations of the condition states shown in Table 6. The model can be set 
to calculate accident outcome probabilities with any of these combinations. In the initial 
study, only six sets of condition states were modelled. 
Using the BN, a modular approach to modelling is followed. The event branching 
structure shown in the event tree of Figure 32 is re-used for each calculation, avoiding 
the need to build separate models. Output calculations can be undertaken under 
different conditions simply by entering condition states into the BN as evidence and 
propagating this information through the BN. 
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The core derailment study, like the SRM, uses fairly crude assumptions across large 
geographic areas, to reduce the need to build many multiple event trees. Simplifying 
assumptions in this way reduces the accuracy of the model produced, and makes it 
hard to establish a context for the model or the meaning of its output. For example, it 
was assumed that track curvature was 'severe' across the whole of the infrastructure 
area modelled. In fact this is a crude assumption. The analyst confirmed that only up to 
80% of the network is either 'severely' or 'moderately' curved, with the remaining 20% 
being straight track. The assumption that all track was severely curved meant that 
known information about the infrastructure was ignored because it was considered to 
be too difficult and time-consuming to includ~. As the investigation into the effect on 
risk of varying the assumptions of the study shows (see Figure 35), the degree of track 
curvature can have a significant effect on risk. Using the BN model, a true 
understanding of the states of conditions can be modelled rather than making such 
assumptions. The accident outcome probabilities can be calculated in each 
circumstance and then aggregated to a network total by considering exposure data -
the number of track miles relevant to each set of conditions. 
The approach has other benefits. As part of the original study, the analyst undertook a 
sensitivity analysis to determine how sensitive the model output was to the states of 
various conditions. To do this, it had been necessary for him to construct additional 
event trees. He stated that this was a time consuming process that acted as a 
discouragement against undertaking such analysis. He noted that the BN model allows 
such sensitivity analysis to be undertaken simply by altering the states of conditions. 
This would make it much easier to undertake sensitively analysis making it likely that it 
would be done more thoroughly. 
7.6.2 Areas requiring further investigation and development. 
Some of the condition states that are made explicit in the BN model influence 
derailment occurrence rates. For example, the analyst stated that 'track condition' and 
'track speed' influence the probability of a derailment (Table 3). 
In this model the events in the accident sequence that precede the initiating event of 
the event tree are not modelled. If a model was produced that did include such events 
it would be able to model correlations between these events and the events modelled 
in the event tree easily. This would resolve the potential lack of coherence associated 
with bow-tie models. 





the various events that precede the occurrence of the event tree initiating event. 
all conditions that influence events anywhere in the accident sequence 
the conditional probability relationships between all events and conditions 
modelled. 
In the next chapter a model of this type is described. 
7.7 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, I have shown how to develop BN models that are functionally 
equivalent to event trees, using clear repeatable rules. Using a train derailment case 
study, based on an existing industry analysis, I have also shown how a number of 
related event trees can be combined into a single BN model. This is achieved by 
developing an extended event tree, containing all possible events from a set of related 
event trees, and applying the translation rules developed. 
The probabilities of occurrence of events in an event tree are dependent on the state of 
a number of conditions. The BN models produced are 'parameterised' by making these 
condition states explicit in the model, and eliciting additional conditional probability 
relationships. This process was undertaken with the risk analyst responsible for the 
original report. This process produces a more general model which can be used to 
calculate the same output as the original trees but can also be used in a wider range of 
circumstances. 
The resulting model possesses some of the properties that were outlined as necessary 
for risk models in the railway industry allowing the rapid update of assumptions, and 
recalculation of model output to adapt the model to represent different locations, or 
situations and run calculations to see how the accident probabilities are affected. 
However there are a number of difficulties that remain to be overcome to use this , 
technique to build dependable risk models. In particular BN models of this type are 
based on the assumption that initiating event occurrence rates are constant regardless 
of the particular condition states that are entered into the BN. This assumption is not 
considered to be a valid one, as condition states may affect the probability of hazard 
causes as well as events. The next chapter describes an expansion of the approach to 
address this point. The method described involves the combination of the BN event 
tree model with BN equivalents of fault trees. Both models are parameterised and 
common parameters are shared between the models. 
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8 Case Study Part 2: A parameterised risk model 
In this chapter, I outline part 2 of the case study which builds on the work described in 
part 1 (Chapter 7). The approach is extended to develop a parameterised BN model 
which incorporates the events preceding the initiating event of the event tree. Like the 
event tree based model described in the previous chapter, the model is based on a 
standard causal modelling approach that models logical event sequences: fault tree 
analysis. The fault tree model is similarly parameterised by making condition states 
explicit and variable and is quantified using available data and expert judgement. 
The key features of models of this type are described, and I argue that these features 
substantially meet the ideal requirements for risk modelling RMR1-RMR3 that were 
previously set out. This argument partially supports Hypothesis 4, that models which 
meet the ideal requirements were set out are possible. 
8.1 Conceptual overview of the parameterised risk model. 
The diagram of Figure 37 shows a conceptual outline for the type of risk model that is 
proposed in this chapter. The outline shows the structure of the model, and its distinct 
parts, and provides reference to subsequent sections of this chapter which describe the 
model in more detail. 
The model consists of sets of BN nodes and arcs representing: 
• sequences of events which lead to different outcomes, given the occurrence of 
a hazard. The structure of this part of the BN encodes the logic from a set of 
related events trees. This part of the model was described in the previous 




the events which can lead to the occurrence of a hazard and the combinational 
logic by which this hazard might arise. The structure of this part of the BN 
encodes the logic from a set of related fault trees and is described further in 
section 8.3. 
the relative frequency of fault types (described further in section 8.5). 
the conditions which affect the probability of occurrence of: 
o base events in the fault tree (see section 8.4). 
o events in the event tree (see section 8.2). 
In some cases, these conditions introduce correlations between the two distinct parts of 
the model (see section 8.6). 
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Output node - calculation of probability 
of occurrence of each outcome 
BN representation of event tree logic (outlined 
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Figure 37: The structure of the complete risk model 
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The model also includes an output node, which calculates the probabilities of 
occurrence of each derailment outcome, using information from the top event of the BN 
fault tree and the outcome node of the BN event tree. This is described further in 
section 8.7. 
A prototype BN model of this type was developed to estimate the probability of 
occurrence of a range of derailment accidents that might occur across the UK railway 
network. The model was developed entirely using Hugin BN software. The full model, 
with details of model scope, and supporting documentation and information is 
described in Appendix C. 
8.2 BN representation of event tree logic, and conditions 
The event tree logic in the parameterised BN derailment model described in this 
chapter is identical to that used in the event tree model described in the previous 
chapter (see Figure 32). However, a smaller set of conditions is modelled, including 
only: 









line speed - this is considered to be closely correlated to the actual train speed 
number of tracks 
lineside object density 
lineside object type 
location of track 
As will be described in section 0, the parameterised BN was produced using Hugin BN 
modelling software and NPT probabilities needed to be elicited and manually entered 
into the model. The more conditions, and condition states, that are modelled, the larger 
the NPTs that are needed. This rationalisation of conditions was undertaken to make 
the BN quantification process more manageable, given that the model developed here 
is for the purposes of illustrating the feasibility of the approach, rather than developing 
a model suitable for practical industrial use. 
In the next chapter, I propose how the development of these types of model might 
eventually be supported by software to automate many of the modelling tasks. A 
discussion of how data collection might be scoped to enable routine and systematic 
quantification of node probabilities (section 9.2.5) is also presented. If this were 
possible then the time and effort required to develop the models would be reduced 
allowing larger models, with a more complete set of conditions, to be quantified more 
easily. 
The BN model of event tree logic used for the model described in this chapter is shown 
in full in Appendix C. 
8.3 BN representation of fault tree logic 
This part of the model models the events which can lead to the occurrence of a hazard 
and the combinational logic by which this hazard might arise. A standard fault tree 
development approach is followed. 
Section 7.4.1 described how, in order to build a BN model that was capable of 
representing a wide geographic area, an event tree that contains all of the events that 
might occur in different circumstances and locations must first be developed. Then, by 
entering condition nodes, a model is created that can be downscoped to represent a 
particular location. A similar approach is used with the fault tree part of the model. The 
fault tree part of the model was structured to include base events at a lower level of 
151 
abstraction than the SRM, because this lower level of analysis was supported by 
available data and previous modelling work. Fault types, and their failure rates were 
taken from the derailment risk model undertaken for RSSB by Risk Solutions 
(Campbell and Kennedy 2003). The resulting model is a type of Master Logic Diagram 
(see section 5.4) of the causes of derailment on the UK railway network. The fault tree 
for the prototype model is shown in Appendix C4. Although not comprehensive, the 
model captures the key causes of derailment on the UK rail network: overspeeding; 
track faults; Switch and Crossing (S&C) faults, rolling stock faults, and obstructions. It 
therefore also captures a wide range of the control measures that are used to detect, 
remove or prevent the various causes of derailment. Figure 38 shows a fragment of the 
fault tree model built, which relates to derailments caused by rolling stock faults (RSF). 
There are two key features to note about this fault tree, which are relevant to 
subsequent discussion: 
• The fault tree models various conjunctions of events that could lead to the 
occurrence of the top event 
• The fault tree base events have a logical sequence 
The fault tree model shown includes a range of separate events further back in the 
accident sequence than the derailment itself, such as the occurrence of the faults that 
cause derailment (event 17), and the detection and control activities (events 19, 20 and 
21). In this part of the model up to six separate events might need to occur to cause a 
derailment (see figures C1-C6 in Appendix C). 
There is a logical sequence of occurrence of fault tree base events. EVENT 17, 'rolling 
stock fault occurs' can be considered to be the initiating event. The probability of 
occurrence of all other base events in the fault tree are conditioned on the occurrence 
of EVENT 17. For example a rolling stock fault cannot be detected (EVENT 19) unless 
a fault has occurred in the first place. The probability of occurrence of EVENT 19 is 
therefore conditional on the probability of occurrence of EVENT 17. Similarly EVENT 
























train stays in 
service 
Figure 38: Fragment of the fault tree used to specify BN logic 
In section 6.4.4 work by Bobbio was reviewed, highlighting the simple process by which 
a fault tree could be translated into a BN. The BN of Figure 39 is developed by applying 
those translation rules to the fault tree of Figure 38. Here, the white nodes represent 
gates, grey nodes represent events. The full BN fault tree model produced is shown in 
Appendix C4. 
The NPTs for each event node have two states: true and false; and the gate nodes are 
quantified with NPTs probabilities as appropriate. The NPTs of the gates are simply the 
truth tables for the logical relationship described. The diagram shows the NPTs for 
gates 17, 18 and 19 which represent logical AND, OR, and NOT relationships 
respectively. 
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GATE 17: rolling stock fault derailment 
EVENT 18 False True 
GATE 18 False True False True 
EVENT 17 False True 
False 1 1 
True 0 0 
GATE 19: rolling stock fault not detected 
EVENT19 False True 
False 0 1 
True 0 
False True False True False 
1 1 1 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 














Figure 39: BN equivalent fault tree 






In a traditional fault tree model conditional probability relationships are bound up in the 
definition of the base events, and by implication their coincident occurrence. For 
example, in Figure 38, gate 17 'rolling stock fault derailment' represents the probability 
of occurrence of a derailment (event 18) given that a roiling stock fault has occurred 
(event 17). This is sufficient as fault trees model the probabilities given a fixed set of 
underlying conditions and base event probabilities. However in the BN model, as the 
model must remain valid given different the existence of different underlying conditions, 
the conditional probability relationships must be modelled. Figure 40 shows the first 
step in developing such a model. It shows the BN described in Figure 39, with the 
addition of the condition nodes whose states influence the probability of occurrence of 
base events. In the BN shown dotted lines represent conditions. For example, the 
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probability of occurrence of a derailment (event 18 'der 'I t ' ' , , al men occurs) IS considered 
to be affected by the line speed. 
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Figure 40: BN equivalent of the fault tree 
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In section 8.3 it was stressed that there was an order in which fault tree base events 
would occur. EVENT 17 'rolling stock fault occurs' is the initiating event (i.e. the first of 
the base events in Figure 38 to occur) and this order relates to the conditional 
probability relationships embedded in the fault tree event descriptions. In the BN model 
the intent is to model a wider range of underlying conditions, and this means modelling 
these conditions and the conditional probability relationships, In reality there are 
different types of rolling stock fault that might occur, and the type and severity of rolling 
stock fault influences the probability of occurrence of other events in the fault tree. For 
example, severe failures will generally be more likely to lead to derailment but will also 
tend to be easier to detect. The probability of occurrence of a rolling stock fault will also 
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depend on the particular type of fault that occurs (for example a wheel fault and a 
brake fault are entirely different types of fault with different probabilities of occurrence 
and different implications). The ideal model would therefore allow for the probability of 
occurrence of these various types of fault, and the impact on the probability of other 
events, to be distinctly modelled. But, if each of these different types of fault were to be 
modelled using separate fault tree base events, this would result in the duplication of 
the fault tree logic needing for each fault type. The method developed in this thesis 
seeks to avoid this type of duplication, to prevent the model size from rapidly 
expanding given additional causal modelling. Therefore an alternative approach is 
followed. 
The logical relationships shown in the fault tree model are dependent on the 
occurrence of a fault, not its type or severity. The fault tree logical structure is thus built 
according to the generic fault (a rolling stock fault in the example shown). The generic 
fault event (rolling stock fault occurs) is quantified with the aggregate failure rate for all 
failure types. Additional nodes for fault type and severity are then added. Figure 41 
shows the nodes 'rolling stock fault type' and 'rolling stock fault severity' and their 
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r.s. fault type brake failure ax. box failure wheel failure bogie failure 
high 0.08 1 0.08 0.08 
medium 0.15 0 0.15 0.15 
low 0.77 0 0.77 0.77 
... , 
Figure 41: Nodes relating to event 17: rolling stock fault occurs 
According to the fault tree logic, the top event 'rolling stock fault derailment' cannot 
occur unless event 17 is true. However, the occurrence of the top event is also 
dependent on the occurrence of other events in the model (for example events 18 and 
19). The probability of occurrence of these events depends on the fault type and 
severity. 
The model includes nodes for these factors, but these nodes are not quantified with the 
absolute rates of occurrence of each fault type as this information is already captured 
in total in the NPT for event 17. Instead, they are quantified according to the relative 
probability of occurrence of each of their states. For example, according to the model 
4.66% of rolling stock faults are brake failures, and 8% of brake failures are of high 
severity. Note that the node for event 17 is not linked to either the 'type' or the 'severity ' 
node. The link between event 17 and the fault condition nodes is in the way that they 
have been quantified - the absolute probabilities of occurrence for each set of fault 
conditions can be calculated using the aggregate total and the relative probabilities. 
Using this approach, the aggregate top event probability can be calculated given all 
possible faults without the need to create additional models for each different type and 
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severity of fault. A fault tree model built to model the same sets of conditions as the BN 
of Figure 41 would require the fault tree logical structure to be duplicated twelve times, 
once for each of the discrete combinations of fault type and fault severity shown in the 
NPT for 'rolling stock fault severity'. 
Table 11 shows the set of different fault type nodes occurring in the model and the 
possible states of each. These nodes are left as distributions and are not set to a 
particular state for a given analysis. This means that the fault tree top event gives the 
aggregate probability of occurrence of a derailment given all possible fault types and 
severities. Note that, according to the definitions in section 2.3 the fault type variables 
shown in Table 11 are events, and not conditions. This is reflected in the way that they 
are used in the model as, in common with other events, and unlike conditions these 
variables are not set to any particular state when using the model to develop accident 
outcome likelihood estimates. 
fault type fault state 
rolling stock fault type brake failures, axle/axle box failure, wheel 
faults/failure, suspension/bogie failure 
rolling stock fault severity high, medium, low 
track fault type gauge spreading, track twist, broken rail, buckled 
rail, subsidence/landslip 
track fault severity high, medium, low 
S&C fault severity high, medium, low 
type of obstruction engineering material, debris from 
lineside/overbridge, objects from trains, 
landslip/fallen trees, from vandals, large animals. 
Table 11: Fault type variables 
This approach represents a new adaptation of fault tree modelling. It allows the same 
logical assumptions and structure of a fault tree to be used in the BN model, but the BN 
approach allows a much more compact model to be built, which can calculate the 
aggregate top event probability of a range of different underlying base events 
occurrences. It also allows the specific causes which influence those base events 
occurrences to be explicitly modelled. 
8.6 Conditions affecting base events in the BN fault tree and events in 
the BN event tree 
There are a subset of conditions that are correlated with both event tree event nodes 
and fault tree base event nodes. For example the 'line speed' influences events in both 
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the fault tree and event tree including 'maintain clearances' and 'strike tunnel portal'. 
The likelihood of occurrence of both these events increases as the derailment speed 
increases. There are three condition nodes in the model that link the fault and event 
trees: 'line speed', 'track curvature' and 'location of track'. As the prototype model is 
constructed entirely as a BN it is a simple matter to include these correlations with the 
addition of BN arcs. 
8.7 Output node - calculation of probability of occurrence of each 
outcome 
The 'event tree' part of the model outputs a relative frequency of occurrence of each 
possible outcome per derailment. It therefore assumes that a derailment has occurred. 
The 'fault tree' part of the BN model which calculates the probability of occurrence of a 
derailment per track mile, per year. In order for the model to provide an estimate of the 
actual frequency of occurrence of each outcome it is necessary to conjoin the output of 
the two models. The parameterised BN model built here links the two output nodes of 
the 'fault tree' and 'event tree' parts of the model in order to calculate the probability of 
occurrence of each of the 14 possible outcomes per track mile per year - the absolute 
probability of occurrence of each derailment consequence outcome. 
The model is conceptually shown as a 'bow-tie' model (see section 2.4.4) however in 
practice this part of the BN is not created by using the fault tree top event as the event 
tree initiating event, as this conceptual model might imply. Instead, a new variable is 
created with a state for each of the 14 possible outcomes. In the new variable each of 
the outcome states is true only if that outcome is true in the event tree part of the model 
and a derailment has occurred (i.e. the top event variable of the 'fault tree' part of the 
model is true). The NPT for this new variable is therefore simply an AND truth table. 
However it is not necessary to complete this table in the Hugin BN model, as an 
equivalent logical statement can be used instead. 
The output node multiplies the probability of occurrence of a derailment with the 
probability of occurrence of each outcome calculated by the BN event tree, given that a 
derailment has occurred. 
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Models of this type combine calculations of the probability of occurrence of some event 
with a scaling factor relating to exposure data i.e. the number of times that there is an 
opportunity for this event to occur. For example, the derailment model within the SRM 
calculates the risk from derailments across the network as a whole in a given year, 
based on historical incident data. It then divides this figure by the total number of train 
miles on the network per year to give an approximation of the risk from derailment per 
train mile. This is based on the principle that, although a derailment event occurs in a 
specific place the opportunities for derailment rise as the number of train miles rises. 
The model developed here applies the same principles but in a slightly different way. It 
has been structured to calculate the probability of occurrence of a derailment on a 
given section of track in a given year. To scale the output an average train demand of 
approximately 200 trains per day (73,000 trains per year) is assumed. This assumption, 
and the normalisation of train traverse events that it enforces, is appropriate given the 
intended uses of this prototype model; the relative comparison of the risk at different 
types of track location (see section 8.12). 
For different studies, for example to explore the impact of timetable changes on 
derailment risk on a particular section of track, it would be necessary to scale the 
output for different demand rates, measured in train miles. This could be done simply 
by dividing the output probabilities of the model by 73,000 and scaling them up by the 
desired demand rate. 8 To develop the model to more readily support scaling in this way 
this could be done by dividing the probabilities of occurrence of the relevant prior 
probabilities in the model (a subset of the fault tree base events) by the assumed 
demand rate. The revised model would then output a probability of occurrence per train 
mile in the same way as the SRM. 
8.8 Data requirements and model quantification 
As discussed in section 2.1.1, the probability estimates that form the likelihood 
component of risk can be estimated using a combination of historical data and expert 
judgement. This approach was followed to quantify the derailment BN model described 
in this chapter. 
Several data sources, which provided probability estimates similar to those needed to 
quantify many of the BN NPTS, were identified and reviewed. The data sources were: 
8 The SRM does not provide any facility to vary exposure data automatically and any scaling of 
risk to take account of exposure is similarly done outside of the model. 
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• The core derailment study, which formed the basis of the event tree BN 
described in the previous chapter 
• Probability estimates developed with the author of the core derailment study, as 
part of the BN event tree modelling approach described in the previous chapter 
• Probability estimates provided in the Risk Solutions Report (Campbell and 
Kennedy 2003). 
In all cases the available data needed to be supplemented by a significant degree of 
judgement. In addition to this, in many cases in the model there was no data at all to 
inform the elicitation of conditional probability estimates. Therefore an elicitation 
process was undertaken, supported by two of the risk analysts from Sotera who 
developed the network wide risk model for Irish Rail (see section 5.2). These analysts 
supported a probability elicitation process in two separate meetings. The NPTs for the 
model were populated using the same process as is described for the event tree model 
in section 7.3.3. Where data relating to the frequency of occurrence existed, or where 
others had sought to estimate similar probabilities and the relevant conditions were 
known, this data was used to populate the NPT. Where data was absent, NPT tables 
were completed via extrapolation and judgement using available data as reference 
values. The full set of NPTs for the model, and the sources of data used are described 
in Appendix ca. 
8.9 Types of condition modelled 
In section 2.3.1.3, conditions were categorised as being of four types: technical, 
operational, organizational and performance. These categories are used to differentiate 
between the different types of condition modelled in Table 12. Note that three different 
types of condition are modelled. 
Technical Operational Performance 
containment fitted competence of track inspection intervals 
track curvature 
infrastructure maintenance rolling stock inspection 
worker interval 
number of tracks 
competence of rolling line speed 
track type stock maintainer 
lineside object density driver experience 
lineside object type 
, 
location of track 
Table 12: Types of condition included in the parameterised BN model 
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The model has been developed for use to estimate derailment outcome frequency 
rates in any location on a particular section of the UK rail network where conditions 
states are known. Therefore, in order to derive meaningful outcome frequency 
estimates every condition must be set to a particular state in the BN before the BN 
probabilities are updated. The model does not include any prior distributions across the 
states of condition nodes and so the output of the model is meaningless if any 
condition nodes are not set. It may be possible to extend the model so that it could 
calculate risk estimates across a particular section of the network, or set of locations, 
but to do so would require an understanding of the distribution of conditions across that 
set of locations and the correlations between the conditions. This approach is 
investigated further in section 10.3.2. 
The ease with which the state of conditions can be established in any particular 
circumstance is related to the type of condition, according to the previous 
categorisation of causes. 
'Technical' conditions are the fixed physical attributes of the railway infrastructure. 
There is no conceptual barrier to the identification of 'Technical' condition states. Their 
state should be able to be determined in any particular location by inspection. Even if 
these condition states were not contained in asset registers they would be able to be 
identified by an inspection. 
The state of operational conditions tends to be more difficult to ascertain than the state 
of a technical condition. In the model, the competence of individuals is stated as an 
operational condition. This could be established via audit but implies a different level of 
scrutiny for 'operational' conditions compared to 'technical' conditions. There may also 
be some subjectively in assigning 'operational' condition states, such as assigning 
'high', 'medium' or 'low' levels of competence. 
Performance conditions are set parameters of the network and can be planned and 
changed according to management decisions. These conditions might change rapidly 
from minute to minute or might suddenly change after a period of months or years. The 
states of these conditions can be estimated, using the railway's planning information 
but ultimately the states will be subject to perturbation and change. 
The set of conditions selected for the model reflects those identified by the expert 
judgement process previously described. In the UK rail industry, we are concerned with 
fundamentally the same accidents and hazards. Therefore, were these models to be 
built we would expect that the set of relevant conditions would rapidly emerge through 
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the shared experience and understanding of the industry just as the set of 125 
hazardous events modelled by the SRM has emerged. 
Note that no 'organizational' conditions were identified as part of this process. The 
issue of 'organizational' conditions will be revisited in section 10.3. 
8.10 Testing the model output 
In this section, a number of tests of the model are described. These were undertaken 
to: 
• ensure that the model was free from unintentional errors 
• establish whether the model produced estimates that were similar to those 
calculated from a trusted industry model (the SRM). 
8.10.1 Implementation of fault tree logic in the BN model 
Tests were undertaken to confirm that the fault tree logic had been correctly encoded in 
the BN. Different sets of evidence were entered into the condition states in the BN so , 
that fixed base event probabilities could be established. Fault trees were then built to 
calculate the top event probability using these fixed base event probabilities. In all 
cases identical top event probabilities were calculated by the BN and by its fault tree 
equivalent (see Appendix C.9.3). 
8.10.2 Derailment occurrence rates 
The output results were then compared with derailment rates calculated by the SRM. 
This was done in order to investigate whether the fault tree output of the BN model was 
comparable to other probability estimates in the rail industry which were known to be 
trusted. The condition states shown in Table 13 were identified as a set of conditions 
that might exist in a typical location on the UK railway network. These conditions were 
then entered into the BN model so that it calculated the derailment risk in a 'typical' 
location and the evidence propagated through the net to update the calculations. 
As discussed in section 8.5, evidence is not entered into nodes representing failure 
type and severity to undertake calculation of accident probabilities. These nodes relate 
to events not conditions. Instead, as can be seen from the NPTs for these variables, 
they are instead quantified with prior distributions. These distributions were estimated 
by averaging over the different fault types based on knowing their relative rate of 
occurrence across the UK rail network. These variables are therefore not shown in 
Table 13. 
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In the fault tree part of the model, there are five gates that input to the top event (Gate 
2 - over speed derailment occurs, Gate 3 - track fault derailment occurs, Gate 13 -
S&C (Switch and Crossing) derailment occurs, Gate 17 - rolling stock fault derailment 
and Gate 21 - obstruction derailment). Each calculates the probability of occurrence of 
a different type of derailment. These probabilities were taken from the BN model and 
compared with their equivalent values from the SRM. The two sets of probabilities are 
shown in Table 14. 
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Conditions Typical mile section of UK rail 
network 
containment fitted No 
track curvature low/none 
line speed 40-79 
number of tracks 2 
track inspection intervals 2 week 
track type switch and crossing 
lineside onject density Low 
lineside object type Anchored 
location of track outside rural 
rolling stock inspection interval 2 weeks 
competence of infrastructure 
maintainer Medium 
competence of rolling stock 
maintainer Medium 
driver experience Medium 
Table 13: Conditions for a typical location on the UK rail network 
Probability per track Probability per 
mile per year, track mile per 
calculated using BN year, calculated 
model with the by aggregating 
condition states relevant SRM 
shown in Table 13 precursor rates 
set. (see Appendix 
C9.4) 
Gate 2 - over speed 4.50e-10 8.11E-10 
derailmentoccurs 
Gate 3 - track fault 1.16e-08 1.41 E-08 
derailment occurs 
Gate 13 - S&C (Switch 4.60e-09 9.69E-09 
and Crossing) 
derailment occurs 
Gate 17 - rolling stock 1.12e-09 1.47E-09 
fault derailment 
Gate 21 - obstruction 9.1ge-08 3.17E-08 
derailment 
Table 14: Derailment probabilities calculated by the BN and by the SRM 
The probabilities of occurrence for gates 2, 3, 13, 17 and 21 are all of the same order 
of magnitude as their SRM equivalents. This finding can be explained. As discussed in 
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section 4.2, the SRM model output does not relate to any particular mile of track on the 
network. It is simply the number of hazards occurring in total, divided by the number of 
train miles in total. The SRM figure therefore represents the network average likelihood 
of occurrence of a derailment. Analysis shows that this estimate is similar to the 
estimate the prototype model produces for a typical section of the network. 
8.11 Use of the model 
In the absence of a full set of data the BN model has been developed with a limited 
data set, supported by judgement. Therefore the model cannot be considered to be a 
fully validated risk model suitable for use in real risk management problems. 
Nevertheless the model structure and probabilities have been based on the 
judgements of industry risk analysis experts, and quantified using available data. The 
test described in 8.10.2, provides additional confidence that the model output is 
credible. The model combines a large number of causal relationships and in isolation 
each relationship is plausible. The combined effect of these causal relationships on the 
probability of occurrence of derailment accidents has never previously been modelled 
in this way. Therefore despite lack of substantial data to quantify the model I believe 
the output of this model may still provide meaningful support to the previous 
hypotheses. The philosophy is similar to that of Ale et al (Ale, Bellamy et al. 2006) who 
argue that an educated guess, based on a carefully designed and constructed model is 
better than unsupported judgement alone. 
Section 3.6.3 argued that risk is highly variable from location to location, resulting in the 
occurrence of 'hotspots'. I now investigate whether the model does indeed show such 
variation. 
The model is used to see what level of risk it estimates for locations with characteristics 
similar to those where the Hatfield and Potters Bar derailments occurred. All of the 
evidence entered into the BN models is information that could be routinely obtained or 
monitored at locations across the network in advance of the occurrence of an accident. 
However not all of this information is currently gathered in a suitable form. The 
condition 'competence of infrastructure maintainer' refers to the organisational 
competence, and it is considered that a qualitative judgement of this organisational 
attribute could be ascertained by regular audit of the application of an organisation's 
competence management system. These sorts of audits are a requirement of railway 
companies' safety management systems, and are therefore undertaken regularly in the 
GB railway industry. Although there is no standard approach that is universally applied 
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across all companies each company would apply some sort of qualitative assessment 
of management processes and this could be linked to the qualitative categories 
assigned in the model (high, medium and low). 
8.11.1 Hatfield Scenario 
Table 15 shows two sets of conditions entered into the prototype BN model. The first 
set represents the conditions existing in a typical mile section of high speed track on 
the UK railway network. The other represents a set of conditions similar to those that 
existed at the location of the Hatfield derailment in 2000. 
Typical section of high 
Conditions speed track Hatfield type scenario 
containment fitted false false 
track curvature low/none high 
line speed 110-125 110-125 
number of tracks 2 4 
track inspection intervals 2 week 4 week 
track type plain line plain line 
lineside object density low high 
lineside object type anchored anchored 
location of track outside rural outside rural 
rolling stock inspection 
interval 2 weeks 2 weeks 
competence of 
infrastructure maintainence medium low 
competence of rolling stock 
maintainer medium medium 
driver experience medium medium 
Table 15: Conditions set for a typical track and a Hatfield type location 
Each set of conditions were entered into the BN model in turn and the output 
probabilities calculated. 
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Scenario Typical Hatfield scale of 
location type difference 
(prob per location 
track mile (prob per 
per year) track mile 
per year) 
1 No derailment 0 0 0 
2 Minor derailment within clearances 4.01 E-07 2.81 E-07 0.7 
3 Major derailment to cess, tunnel 0 0 0 
portal hit 
4 Minor derailment to cess 2.53E-07 9.72E-07 3.8 
5 Minor derailment to cess, striking 6.50E-08 2.50E-07 3.8 
lineside structure 
6 Minor derailment to cess, collapsing 4.33E-08 1.67E-07 3.8 
rolling stock 
7 Major derailment to cess 9.38E-07 3.61 E-06 3.8 
8 Major derailment to cess, striking 3.03E-07 1.17E-06 3.8 
lineside structure 
9 Major derailment to cess, collapsing 2.02E-07 7.78E-07 3.8 
rolling stock 
10 Major derailment to adjacent line, 0 0 0 
tunnel portal hit 
11 Minor derailment to adjacent line 3.61 E-08 8.33E-07 23 
12 Minor derailment to adjacent line, 3.25E-07 3.33E-06 10 
with secondary collision 
13 Major derailment to adjacent line 1.44E-07 3.33E-06 23 
14 Major derailment to adjacent line, 1.30E-06 1.33E-05 10 
with secondary collision 
TOTAL 4.01E-06 2.81 E-05 7 
Table 16: Tabulated model output for a typical location and Hatfield type 
Table 16 shows the derailment outcome probabilities calculated for each location. The 
column on the right hand side shows the difference between the values calculated in 
each location as a ratio. Figure 42 presents these results visually, using a logarithmic 
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Table 16 shows that the probability of occurrence of a derailment of any type is 7 times 
more likely in the Hatfield type location than in the 'typical' high speed location 
selected. The graph shows that the probabilities of occurrence of all possible accident 
scenarios in the Hatfield type location are Significantly higher than those in the 'typical' 
location with the exception of outcome 2 'minor derailment within clearances' (which is 
a low severity outcome relative to the other outcomes). 
The train in the accident at Hatfield collided with the overhead catenary and ruptured 
the restaurant coach, where all of the fatalities occurred. This scenario relates to 
Accident 9: 'Major derailment to cess, collapsing rolling stock' . The model calculates 
that this particular accident outcome is approximately 4 times more likely in a location 
with conditions similar to the Hatfield accident, than in a 'typical' high speed location. 
The model calculates a much higher probability of major train accidents to the adjacent 
line, including a much higher probability of secondary collisions (outcomes 11 to 14). 
Although this did not occur at Hatfield, it is clear that such accidents were very 
possible, and could well have occurred in different circumstances .. 
Risk is the product of accident likelihood and severity. The differential calculated and 
shown in Figure 42 is in the probability of accident outcomes only. The model does not 
calculate the severity of accidents. If this were done, then the differences in the speed 
associated with the two scenarios would be likely to result in an even larger factor of 
difference between the risk estimates in each location than that shown for the accident 
outcome probabilities. 
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8.11.2 Potters Bar scenario 
The next location investigated was one similar to the location in which the Potters Bar 
accident occurred. Table 17shows two sets of conditions entered into the BN model to 
undertake the calculations for comparative purposes. 
Conditions Typical section of track Potters Bar type 
scenario 
containment fitted false false 
track curvature low/none low/none 
line speed 80-109 80-109 
number of tracks 2 4 
track inspection intervals 2 week 2 week 
track type plain line S&C 
lineside object density low high 
lineside object type anchored fixed 
location of track outside urban outside urban 
rolling stock inspection interval 2 weeks 2 weeks 
competence of infrastructure medium low 
maintainer 
competence of rolling stock medium medium 
maintainer 
driver experience medium medium 
Table 17: Conditions set for a typical track and a Potters Bar type location 
Table 18 shows the derailment outcome probabilities calculated for each location. As 
with the previous example, the column on the right-hand side shows the difference 
between the values calculated in each location as a ratio. The results are presented in 
Figure 43 . 
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Scenario Typical Potters scale of 
location Bar type difference 
location 
1 No derailment 0 0 0 
2 Minor derailment within clearances 1.33E-07 1.B1 E-07 1.4 
3 Major derailment to cess, tunnel 0 0 0 
portal hit 
4 Minor derailment to cess 3.00E-OB 1.70E-08 0.6 
5 Minor derailment to cess, striking 2.50E-09 2.27E-09 0.9 
lineside structure 
6 Minor derailment to cess, collapsing B.33E-10 3.40E-09 4.1 
rolling stock 
7 Major derailment to cess 2.83E-OB 1.59E-OB 0.6 
B Major derailment to cess, striking 3.75E-09 2.72E-09 0.7 
lineside structure 
9 Major derailment to cess, collapsing 1.25E-09 4.0BE-09 3.3 
rolling stock 
10 Major derailment to adjacent line, 0 0 0 
tunnel portal hit 
11 Minor derailment to adjacent line 3.33E-09 1.36E-OB 4.1 
12 Minor derailment to adjacent line, 3.00E-08 5.44E-08 1.B 
with secondary collision 
13 Major derailment to adjacent line 3.33E-09 1.36E-08 4.1 
14 Major derailment to adjacent line, 3.00E-OB 5.44E-OB 1.B 
with secondary collision 
TOTAL 2.66E-07 3.62E-07 1.4 
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Figure 43: Graph of model output for a typical location and Potters Bar type 
From Table 18 it can be seen that that the total probability of occurrence of a 
derailment is only very slightly greater in the Potters Bar type location than in a 'typical' 
location. However, the difference is less pronounced than it was in the previous 
example. This might be thought to indicate that the Potters Bar derailment was in some 
way less foreseeable than the Hatfield accident. Ultimately this might be because the 
model includes more of the causal factors that were relevant to the Hatfield accident 
than were relevant to the accident at Potters Bar. The Potters Bar accident was 
fundamentally caused by a points maintenance error. The analysis does not assume 
any knowledge about this failure, and without this specific knowledge there is little 
information that does indicate this location as being particularly prone to a derailment. 
This analysis does indicate that, were a derailment to occur in a location where the set 
condition states existed, the derailment would be likely to have severe consequences. 
The train is assumed to be travelling very fast and its proximity to lineside structures 
creates the potential for severe collisions. 
8.12 Review of the prototype model and its potential benefits 
In this section, I argue that parameterised risk models of the type described in this 
chapter meets the ideal requirements for risk modelling RMR1-RMR3 that were 
proposed in section 3.8. On this basis, I partially argue hypothesis 4, that the 
development of risk models that meet the ideal characteristics set out is possible. The 
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degree to which the model meets remaining two requirements (SMS1 and SDM1) is 
considered in the next chapter. 
8.12.1 Review against RMR1 
RMR 1 states that: 'Risk models should allow for as many of the events in an accident 
sequence to be modelled as is practicable.' 
The fault tree part of the SRM modelling derailment cause includes only one event: 
'derailment occurs'. This event is then categorised by its possible causes. As was 
explained in section 8.1 the fault tree part of the model includes a much longer event 
sequence than the SRM. The deepest model of cause in the derailment model that has 
been produced relates to track faults. Up to six separate events might need to occur to 
cause a derailment. 
By definition events further back in the causal sequence will tend to occur more often 
than those later in that sequence. The BN model therefore identifies events that are 
likely to occur often enough to make monitoring of their occurrence possible and 
provides a structure with which to analyse and interpret that data. 
8.12.2 Review against RMR2 
RMR2 states that: 'Risk models should allow all significant and quantifiable technical, 
operational, organizational and performance conditions that cause accidents or 
exacerbate risk to be explicitly modelled.' 
The BN model makes significant progress in this area. The model demonstrates how a 
wide range of conceptually different conditions can be explicitly included in the model. 
The model includes conditions from three of the four categories of condition that were 
initially identified: technical, operational and performance. However, the inclusion of 
organisational conditions has not yet been demonstrated (the inclusion of such factors 
is addressed in section 10.3.1). Inclusion of such factors is needed before the 
approach could be argued to be entirely consistent with organisational accident theory. 
In the review of the industry risk assessment (appendix A and section 4.3), it was 
established that analysts do take account of technical and operational condition states 
when determining the likelihood of events in the accident sequence. Despite this, they 
do not always document this process rigorously. The approach outlined in this chapter 
is based on exactly the same sort of judgements. More of them are required which 
would create development and analysis work initially. However, the condition states 
would then be thoroughly documented. As the description of the relationships between 
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events and conditions in the model is general, the model could be used repeatedly and 
possibly shared between organisations who manage risk on the railway. This means 
that a particular model would evolve and improve over time, and there would be no 
need to continually develop risk models for different applications from first principles. 
Operational conditions like 'competence of infrastructure maintainer' are also 
commonly used to inform the estimation of event likelihoods. For example these 
conditions are typical of those that form the 'error producing conditions' in some human 
factors assessments (see section 2.3.1.2). The condition 'competence of infrastructure 
maintainer' refers to the organisational competence, and it is considered that a 
qualitative judgement of this organisational attribute could be ascertained by regular 
audit of the application of an organisation's competence management system. 
8.12.3 Review against RMR3 
RMR3 states that: 'Risk models should be parameterised by conditions so that the risk 
at different locations and in different situations on the railway network can be rapidly 
recalculated.' 
The prototype BN derailment risk model is parameterised by 13 different conditions. 
These each have between two and five possible states. In theory, the model is capable 
of calculating derailment accident probabilities for over 620,000 different sets of 
conditions. This is not to say that that many different combinations of condition states 
actually exist in locations on the UK railway network. Rather that, in practice, the model 
has sufficient resolution to differentiate between all possible combinations of those 
condition states. 
In models reviewed previously, different condition states were incorporated by 
physically duplicating parts of the fault and event trees. This approach was applied in 
both the SRM (see section 4.2) and in the model produced by Risk Solutions (see 
section 5). In the latter case the approach resulted in a model of unmanageably large 
size. A greater degree of parameterisation than that attempted in that research project 
has been achieved by applying a modular approach. The fault and event tree 
branching structure is used as the modular core of the BN. Setting condition states in 
the BN automatically restructures the fault and event tree models encoded in the BN 
for the purposes of calculation. 
The derailment model was used to test the theory that risk occurs in 'hotspots' across 
the network, where the conditions that give rise to organizational accidents exist. 
Conditions for locations similar to those known to have existed prior to the derailment 
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accidents at Hatfield and Potters Bar were entered into the model, and the output 
compared with that calculated in 'typical' locations where 'typical' condition states 
existed. The model calculated much higher probabilities of occurrence of all types of 
derailment accident in both cases. In particular much higher probabilities of occurrence 
were calculated for the accident outcomes which most closely matched those that 
actually occurred in each case. Therefore in both cases the output of the model 
supports organizational accident theory and the idea that given readily available or 
collectable data, and the right model to interpret it, risk hotspots can be identified prior 
to the occurrence of major accidents. 
8.13 Review conclusion 
The arguments put forward in sections 8.12.1 to 8.12.3 show that the models of the 
type described in this chapter meet three of the five requirements for ideal risk models 
that were proposed in section 3.8. The requirements were developed to specify a risk 
model with organisational accident theory as its conceptual basis. The approach does 
not currently demonstrate how organisational conditions could be explicitly included 
and therefore does not provide a complete realisation of a model aligned to this theory. 
However the use of BNs as the base of the model provides opportunities for further 
work to expand the model in the area of organisational conditions, which are discussed 
in section 10.3.1. The degree to which the model meets the remaining two 
requirements (SMS1 and SDM1) is considered in the next chapter. 
8.14 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, I described a risk model, developed using a BN, and based on fault and 
event tree logical structures. The model is parameterised by making condition states 
explicit and variable and is quantified using available data and expert judgement. 
The model is flexible enough to be used for rapidly analysing risk in different locations. 
By entering sets of conditions similar to those in which major accidents are known to 
occur it was demonstrated that the model would have identified these locations as , 
having much higher probabilities of major railway accidents occurring than a typical 
railway location. In the case of the Hatfield accident the model estimates the risk from 
the particular accident that occurred as being several orders of magnitude higher than 
at a typical location. 
I argued that parameterised risk models, of the type described in this chapter, meet the 
ideal requirements for risk modelling RMR1-RMR3 that were proposed in section 3.8. 
On this basis I have partially argued hypothesis 4, that the development of risk models 
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that meet the ideal characteristics set out is possible. I argue that the modelling 
approach meets remaining two requirements (SMS 1 and 80M 1) in the next chapter. 
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9 Using a parameterised risk model to support safety 
management and decision making 
In Chapter 8 a parameterised BN risk model was described and its uses investigated. It 
was argued that this model substantially met the modelling requirements (RMR1-
RMR3) that were previously outlined. 
In this chapter, the argument in support of Hypothesis 4 is completed by arguing that 
the parameterised risk model meets the remaining two ideal requirements that were 
initially set out in this thesis, namely that it: 
• Effectively supports the various stages of a safety management system 
(SMS1). 
• Is capable of being used and understood by those who manage safety on the 
network (SDM1). 
In order to argue that the model meets these requirements, I outline how such a model 
would be developed (see section 9.1) and used in practice (see sections 9.2 and 9.3). 
9.1 Methodology for the development of a BN risk model 
This section describes the process by which a BN risk model of the type described in 
Chapter 8 would be developed. Although, as has been demonstrated, it is feasible to 
build such models using off the shelf BN software packages, this is very time 
consuming. Additional tool support would be necessary to ease the development of 
these types of model for practical application. The description of the development 
methodology is supplemented with views that could be produced using software, which 
would support the process used to develop these types of model. 
The software envisaged to support the development of the model would need to 
support the following functions 
• Fault tree editing 
• Event tree editing 
• BN editing and inference calculation 
The software envisaged would have similar editing functionality to existing commercial 
editors like Fault Tree plus (lsograph 2007) for the fault and event tree modelling. BN 
editing and calculation would require similar functionality to software like Agena risk 
(Agena 2008) or Hugin (Hugin 2008). The fault tree user interface would be viewed 
using standard fault tree notation of the type described in section 2.4.2 and shown in 
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Figure 38. The event tree software user interface would display event tree notation of 
the type described in 2.4.3. The BN user interface would similarly display a BN notation 
as described in Chapter 6. 
In addition to model viewing, editing and calculation functions the software would allow 
the causal model to be viewed either as a fault and event tree or as a BN. Alternative 
views would be generated by automating the translation process described in sections 
6.4.4.1,7.3.1 and 7.4.1. 
1. Build 2. Build 3. Add 4. Check all 5. Fully 
'extended' f-+ 'extended' ~ conditions f-+ correlations f-+ quantify 
fault tree event tree identified model 
i I 
Figure 44: Methodology for the development of a parameterised BN risk model 
Figure 44 shows the five stages in the development process. Each of these stages is 
described in the following sections. 
9.1.1 Stage 1: Build 'extended' fault tree 
First, the model architect develops the 'extended' fault tree using a fault tree editor. The 
extended fault tree would be developed following standard approaches to fault tree 
modelling, by reviewing the hazard and seeking to identify the set of technical faults or 
human errors that, individually or in combination, could lead to its occurrence. Note that 
each BN model models the risk from a particular hazard. For example, the model 
described in Chapter 8 considers only a derailment hazard. In order to model all risk to 
which the railway network is exposed, the process would have to be followed for each 
separate hazard that might arise on the network. 
Ideally, the model architect should develop the fault tree model to as low a level of 
abstraction as is practicable in accordance with requirement RMR 1. Control measures 
that might be applied to reduce risk tend to align with events in the model. Therefore a 
greater depth of causal analysis means that the model can ultimately be used to 
investigate the possible impact of a wider range of control measures. Fault Tree 
models commonly model sub-system failures, and in some case go down to several 
levels of abstraction modelling component level failures. A greater depth of analysis 
leads inevitably to a larger number of base events that must be quantified. Ultimately 
the decision about the depth of causal analysis will be taken based on weighing up of 
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the benefits of inclusion of additional base events, against the costs. There are two 
main benefits of including more fault tree base events: 
1. The model will be able to be used to investigate the implications of a wider 
range of failures on risk. 
2. The model, when parameterised, will be able to be scoped to represent a 
wider range of different locations and situations, allowing more explicit 
modelling of the failure mechanisms for locations in which these additional 
failures might occur. 
These benefits must be weighted up against the cost of the time and effort needed to 
collect and analyse the additional data that would be required to quantify any additional 
fault tree base events. Also, there are some events that there is little practical 
experience or understanding of and it is not possible to judge credible event 
probabilities for such events. Figure 45 shows a simple example of what the extended 
fault tree might look like for the purposes of illustrating subsequent stages of the 
development methodology. 
Top Event 
Fault tree view 
Figure 45: Simple example of an extended fault tree 
At this stage, the extended fault tree does not include any base event probabilities, as it 
represents only the generic logical structure of events whose occurrence can lead to 
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the occurrence of the hazard under analysis. It is the railway network equivalent of the 
Major Logic Diagrams or 'top logic' used for modelling failures in nuclear industry 
systems (see section 5.4, page 100). 
The 'extended fault tree' developed for the top event 'train derailment' (Appendix C.4.1) 
gives an indication of the size and complexity of fault tree that is envisaged for this 
approach. 
9.1.2 Stage 2: Build 'extended' event tree 
Next, the model architect develops an 'extended' event tree using an event tree editor. 
The extended event tree includes all possible event sequences following the 
occurrence of the hazard. A simple illustrative example is shown in Figure 46. Note that 
no probabilities are shown on the model at this stage. The model shows the full set of 
possible events and the range of possible combinations of those events leading to 
discrete outcomes. The event branching logic defined clarifies where certain event 
combinations are either impossible or irrelevant to outcome consequences in all 
circumstances (i.e. under all possible combinations of condition states). For example, 
the diagram shows that, given that event 4 is false, the probabilities of occurrence of 
event 5 and event 6 are irrelevant to the outcome, regardless of the states of any 
conditions that might subsequently be considered. 
Event 4 Event 5 Event 6 
true Outcome 1 
true 
false Outcome 2 
true true Outcome 3 
false 
false Outcome 4 
false Outcome 5 
Event tree view 
Figure 46: indicative extended event tree 
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The model architect could develop an entirely new event tree using expert knowledge 
and available data. However, as with the modelling undertaken as part of this thesis in 
Chapter 8, sets of existing event trees might be used to help build the tree. The analyst 
must make a judgement as to how many events to include in the model. Like the fault 
tree part of the model, the event tree part models events in possible accident 
sequences. The same trade-off of the benefits of including additional events against 
the costs, as described in 9.1.1 is required. For a risk model for the UK railway industry 
it would be sensible to use, or at least refer to, the sets of event tree models produced 
as part of the SRM. These models have been developed over many years to represent 
the industry's understanding of the possible sequences of events that can occur on the 
UK railway network as a result of hazards and therefore provide an indication of the 
level of detail which should be possible. 
9.1.3 Stage 3: Add conditions 
Conditions would be added to the model in the BN view of the 'extended' fault and 
event trees. The model architect would identify the conditions whose state can affect 
the probability of occurrence of each event and add these into the BN. A checklist type 
approach could be used to derive the list of conditions. In this thesis four different types 
of condition that might be modelled have been categorised. The model described in 
Chapter 8 demonstrated how conditions of three of these types could be modelled. The 
checklist approach could be structured around these categorisations and might include 
the following prompts: 
• Technical conditions (e.g. types of train, attributes of the surrounding location) 
• Operational conditions (e.g. frequency of planned inspections, competency of 
individuals) 
• Performance conditions (e.g. speed, track inspection intervals) 
Ultimately, the relevant conditions are determined by the type of system or network 
being modelled. Both parts of the case study described in this thesis, demonstrated 
how industry risk analysts and experts could derive the relevant set of conditions for a 
particular analysis. Setting the states of technical conditions is simple. For example, 
there are known, defined, types of trains and data relating to their population across the 
railway network could be obtained. However for other types of condition definition of 
variables and associated variable states is more difficult. Some states are qualitative 
and judgement based. For example in case study 2 some competency variables (see 
for example Figure 41) were assigned the qualitative states 'high', 'medium' and 'low'. 
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Definition of these states, and assigning of them to real world conditions is subjective. 
However, the definitions could be linked to the results of audits, for example audits of 
the competence of members of the workforce, as was the case with the aviation BN 
modelling project described in section 6.4.3.1. Assigning a value of 'medium', for 
example, would be considered to be a qualitative assessment based on performance 
relative to norms of current practice or behaviour in a particular area. Although the 
assignments are subjective, it is reasonable to believe that some correlation between 
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for example, audit results and the actual competence of individuals and departments 
would exist. If the inclusion of such factors in the model were found to be useful and 
beneficial then this would imply the need to improve the consistency and repeatability 
of audits of this type, in order to improve the use of these types of variables to support 
modelling and safety management. 
For a set of accidents in a particular industry, the relevant conditions would be 
expected to emerge over a period of time as they are intrinsic to the type of system 
being operated, and the nature of possible accidents. However, as with modelling 
decisions about the number of events to model, there is a cost-benefit judgement to be 
made about how many conditions and condition states to include. The more that are 
included, the wider the range of potential uses of the model, and the more likely that 
the model's assumptions could be aligned to a particular scenario by instantiating 
evidence into the BN. However inclusion of additional conditions and their states 
greatly increases the size of the BN NPTs, and therefore greatly increases the effort 
required to quantify them. This is potentially even more problematic than quantification 
of event probabilities as, as was discussed in section 3.6.2, complete data sets relating 
to conditions states on the GB rail network are not readily available. The inclusion of 
conditions states should therefore be prioritised to those whose states are known to 
most strongly influence one or more of the events in the accident sequence. For 
existing fault and event tree type models these conditions will tend to be the things 




Bayesian Network view 
Figure 47: BN view of conditions and events 
Once conditions have been identified the model architect inputs the causal 
relationships between conditions and events by adding causal arcs between them. The 
diagram of Figure 47 shows the BN view of the extended fault and event trees with the 
addition of five condition nodes whose states are considered to influence the probability 
of occurrence of one or more events. 
The fault tree of Figure 45 has been translated into its BN equivalent by applying the 
translation process described in section 6.4.4, and the event tree section of the BN at 
this stage in the process shows only the set of events included in the extended event 
tree. This view does not show the nodes used to calculate the event outcome 
probabilities as they do not provide any additional information or understanding that is 
considered helpful. In the example shown each event is affected by one or more 
conditions and each of these conditions has two possible states. Note that condition 2 
influences event 3, which is in the fault tree, and event 4, which is in the event tree. 
This shows how the model is able to overcome the assumed independence of a fault 
and event tree in a simple bow-tie model that was discussed in section 3.4.4, in a clear, 
transparent way. The model does not require the input of prior probabilities on all 
condition nodes. This is because, when the model is used, there are a set of condition 
nodes whose state must be certain for meaningful risk estimates to be calculated by 
the model (Table 11 shows the list of the conditions for which prior probabilities were 
required in the derailment model). 
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9.1.4 Stage 4: Check all correlations identified 
Stage 4 of the model development process is a check to ensure all necessary 
correlations between variables have been included as arcs in the BN model. To do this 
the use of a correlation chart is proposed. A correlation chart is a simple matrix of 
events and conditions which indicates where causal relationships between the two 
exist, and where they do not. Completion of the chart ensures that causal relationships 
between events and conditions have been considered systematically. Table 19 shows 
an example of such a correlation chart. 
Correlation charts are a simple way of ensuring that the risk analyst consciously 
considers all potential correlations in the model, and consciously rules out any where 
correlations are not shown. Missing these correlations would have an effect on model 
output calculations and would also result in an imperfect graphical model of causal 
relationships. Full correlation charts for the model described in Chapter 7 are included 
in appendix C6. 
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line rolling competence rolling rOiling 
speed stock of rolling stock stock I I 
inspection stock fault fault 




event 17- rolling No No No Yes Yes 
stock fault i 
I 
occurs 
event 18 Yes No No Yes Yes 
derailment I I 
occurs (rolling 
stock fault) 
event 19 No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
rolling stock 
fault detected 
event 20- No No Yes No No 
rolling stock 
fault not fixed 
event 21 - train No No Yes No No 
stays in service 
Table 19: Example correlation chart 
The software should support the use of correlation charts of the type shown in Table 
19. It should generate a table of the set of events (both event tree events and fault tree 
base events) in the model and highlight where these have been correlated to 
conditions by the inclusion of directed arcs. The software should allow the editor to 
assert the existence of conditional probability relationships in the chart. The software 
would need to ensure that, when these additional correlations are added to the chart, 
the BN representation of the model is automatically updated to ensure that the 
equivalent arc is also added. 
Additional causal arcs should be automatically inserted into the BN representation 
when correlations are identified in the correlation chart view. Figure 48 shows the 
identification of an additional causal arc between condition 3 and event 5. 
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Event 4 Event 5 Event 6 
Condition 2 Yes No No 
Condition 3 Yes Yes No 
Condition 4 No Yes No 
Condition 5 No No Yes 
Correlation chart generator/editor view 
Bayesian Network view (event tree events only) 
Figure 48: Adding correlations into the chart creates additional BN arcs 
9.1.5 Stage 5: Quantify model 
Next, the model is quantified by entering the probabilities of occurrence of faults and 
events. There are several stages to the NPT quantification process. The model 
architect must undertake the following tasks: 
• Enter sets of condition states relevant to a particular location or situation 
• Enter the relevant fault and event probabilities into the fault and event tree views 
of the model. 
• Repeat for a number of cases (locations or situations) 
• Complete the NPTs by extrapolation using available data and expert judgement. 
All four stages are together described in the following text. 
First, a set of conditions that represent a particular situation or location are entered into 
the model. Once condition states have been entered, the model architect should be 
able to view the resulting fault tree or event tree. The view produced would show the 
extended trees annotated with the relevant condition states. Figure 49 shows the 
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extended event tree annotated to show condition states and example probabilities 
entered on the basis of these condition states. 
Event 4 Event 5 Event 6 
Condition .. Condition 3 = state 1 Condition 3 = state 1 Condition 5 = state 2 states Condition 2 = state 1 
shown Condition 4 = state 2 
True = 0.5 Outcome 1 
-----------
True = 0.1 
I False = 0.5 
Event ~ Outcome 2 
probabilities r--
--. True = 1 True = 0.7 entered Outcome 3 \ 
False = 0.9 
r--- False = 0.3 Outcome 4 
False = 0 
Outcome 5 
Figure 49: Event tree view annotated to show condition states 
Given this view of the event tree, the model architect can input the probabilities of 
occurrence of each event into the model with complete knowledge of the states of the 
relevant conditions. In other words, the diagram is annotated to make all key 
assumptions clear and hence much of the ambiguity associated with unclear or 
average assumptions (for example the issues discussed in section 4.3.2) are removed. 
Figure 49 shows that the model architect has entered different probabilities for event 6 
depending on whether or not event 5 is true. This indicates a conditional probability 
relationship between event 5 and event 6. This conditional dependency could be 
identified automatically and captured as an arc when the complementary BN model is 
subsequently produced (see Figure 51). 
The model architect would input a range of sets of condition states indicating different 
locations or situations. For example, in the industry study that was reviewed previously 
6 different sets of conditions were identified (section 4.3). The model architect would 
need to be confident that enough different cases had been considered to uncover the 
full set of events relating to the hazard under analysis and all conditional probability 
relationships between events. 
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Figure 50 shows a similarly annotated version of the extended fa It t A' . 
. u ree. gain, this 
view shows the condition states which influence base event probabilities. The diagram 
also shows example probabilities entered on the basis of these condition states. 
Top Event 
Condition 1 = state 2 Condition 1 = state 2 
P (True) = 0.6 Condition 2 = state 1 
P (True) = 0 
Fault tree view 
Figure 50: Fault tree view annotated to show condition states 
The final stage in the quantification of the model is to complete the full set of fault and 
event probabilities needed by the model. To do this the model architect would revert to 
a BN view of the model produced to support NPT quantification. The BN view of the 
event tree event nodes and associated conditions is shown in Figure 51. Note also that 
the BN view produced captures the conditional probability relationship between event 5 
and event 6 that is indicated by the probabilities assigned in Figure 49. 
In this view of the model, the model architect would be able to see where event 
probabilities had been entered and where they remain unquantified. The diagram 
shows that there is at least one probability of occurrence in each event NPT shown. 
The model architect therefore has a reference value to use to extrapolate the remaining 
probabilities in the NPT. In other words the analyst estimates the likely causal influence 
relationship between two variables based on an understanding of the relationship 
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q 
between the two values. The existing values in the NPT provide point estimates which 
the conditional probability relationship described in the NPT must fit. 
Cond 2 State 1 State 2 
Cond 3 State 1 State 2 State 1 State 2 
True 1 ? ? ? 

















, , , 
False 
State 1 State 2 
? 0.7 
? 0.3 
Figure 51: BN view of the event tree nodes model with partially populated NPTs 
The model architect does not need to view the event tree model to undertake this 
judgement as the BN clearly shows all influences of interest. This approach was 
applied to the quantification of the BN derailment model described in this thesis 
(section 7.3.4 and 0). 
Quantification of the fault tree model would follow a similar process. Figure 52 shows 
the BN view of the extended fault tree model and related conditions, with the NPTs 
populated according to the base event probability assignments shown in Figure 50. In 
practice, the model architect would need to populate the model with probabilities based 
on sufficient different sets of circumstances to ensure that at least one set of 
probabilities was included in each NPT. The model would be able to be used when all 






Bayesian Network view (of fault tree nodes) 
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True ? 0.6 Cond 2 State 1 State 2 State 1 State 2 
False ? 0.4 True ? ? 0 ? 
False ? ? 1 ? 
Figure 52: BN view of the fault tree nodes with partially populated NPTs 
9.2 Using the model to support safety management 
Having explained how the BN modelling approach would be developed in practice, I 
next explain how it would be used to support safety management activity. The extent to 
which the model could be used to support the various elements of a Safety 
Management System, as initially proposed in section 3.7.2 is considered. This is to 
allow subsequent consideration of the extent to which the modelling approach meets 
requirements SMS 1. 
Note that the model described in Chapter 8 does not yet calculate risk, and the 
methodology described in this chapter does not describe how this would be done in 
practice. The model described calculates the probability of occurrence of undesirable 
accident outcomes. In order to use the model to calculate risk, it would first be 
necessary to assign a severity to each accident outcome. Then it would be necessary 
to calculate and aggregate the risk associated with each branch of the event tree part 
of the model by multiplying the likelihood and severity of each branch outcome 
(implementing Equation 1). This section describes the use of the model to assess and 
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analyse risk given that this approach presents no theoretical barriers and is therefore 
possible, although it is not described how it would be done in detail. 
9.2.1 Use to gauge the impact of organizational changes on risk. 
The derailment model described in Chapter 8 only includes three of the four types of 
condition that were defined in section 2.3.2. I have not yet demonstrated how the 
approach could be used to model organizational conditions. However, in the literature 
review of section 6.4.3 several areas of research were identified where others have 
proposed a variety of approaches for the incorporation of organizational conditions into 
risk models using BNs. The work described in this thesis has demonstrated how to 
build a robust BN for the UK railway industry that builds on and extends existing safety 
engineering techniques. There is therefore an opportunity to extend the modelling 
approach such that the BN could include organizational conditions, either by adopting 
proposals made by others or developing a new approach which capitalises on the 
apparent suitability of BNs to this type of modelling problem. This is investigated as 
possible future work in section 10.3.1. Therefore the model does not meet this 
requirement but it provides the potential for future development in this area. 
9.2.2 Estimates the total network wide risk 
The model is potentially capable of calculating the aggregate risk across the entire 
network. This could be achieved by: 
• Developing a BN model for each of the hazards that are possible on the 
network. 
• Estimating the risk associated with each possible instance of the hazard across 
the network so that the total risk could be aggregated to estimate the total 
network rate. 
This would require that the condition states in a large number of locations and 
situations were separately determined and entered into the model for each estimate to 
be calculated. This process could be automated by automatically reading sets of 
condition data relating to each network location into the model, and summing the 
results. A safety manager could use such a model to estimate the locations with the 
highest probable accident rates so that safety management effort could be prioritised to 
address them. (Marsh and Bearfield 2007b) uses a train SPAD example to 
demonstrate how this could be done with the use of a 'situation node' to set the 
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combinations of condition states for each location in the correct proportions for an 
infrastructure area. 
However, the approach would only be possible if all condition information in each 
location was known and for the reasons that were outlined in section 3.6 this is not 
currently the case. However the model provides a clear specification for data that, if 
known, could be used to estimate accident occurrence rates. This issue is considered 
further in section 9.2.5. 
In summary, the model is potentially capable of being used to estimate the network 
wide accident outcome frequency rates. The modelling approach provides a 
specification for the collection of the data necessary to model the aggregate railway 
safety risk across the UK network. If this data were collected and systematically fed 
into the model it would allow network wide risk totals to be calculated. 
In section 10.3.2 an approach for estimating network wide risk totals in the absence of 
such data is discussed as a possible extension to the work described here. 
9.2.3 Estimation of risk by individual location 
Because the model is parameterised, it allows the user to closely align model 
assumptions with knowledge of the condition states that exist in particular locations and 
at particular times on the network. Using the BN model, it is a simple matter to 
recalculate accident probabilities given each different set of condition states, and by 
applying this approach it is possible to identify risk hotspots on the railway network. 
This use is equivalent to the analysis that was demonstrated in section 8.11. 
The analyst would enter all necessary condition states relating to a particular location 
on the railway network which was suspected of having a disproportionately high 
accident risk associated with it - i.e. of being a risk hotspot. A risk estimate for this 
particular location or scenario could then be calculated. To determine whether risk is 
relatively high comparison could be made with 'typical' locations, as was done in the 
analysis described in section 8.11. Separate fault and event tree models would be 
produced in each instance meaning that analysts would have a qualitative model of the 
underlying accident event sequence in addition to numerical estimates of risk. 
Using this type of risk model, it is possible to differentiate between a large number of 
different sets of conditions. The model developed in Chapter 8 is theoretically capable 
of estimating the risk in over 620,000 different sets of circumstances. The approach 
therefore removes the need to make average assumptions. In the core derailment 
study model the analyst assumed that track curvature was severe, even though he 
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knew that in some cases track curvature was moderate and in other locations track 
was straight. Therefore even if data is not available to support quantification of the 
model, the fact that the model provides greater context and clarity of key assumptions 
should make the basis of elicitation much clearer, and hence improve the ease of 
elicitation, and creates the potential for more accurate risk estimation of probabilities. 
In summary, the model clearly supports estimation of risk by individual location, as this 
underpins the requirements that it was designed to meet (in particular RMR3). 
9.2.4 Estimate changes in risk levels following interventions 
Once a high risk level has been identified, by either of the means described in 9.2.3 or 
9.2.2 a safety manager would then need to decide what to do to manage or reduce that 
risk. 
As described in section 2.1.3, the railway industry bases decisions about whether or 
not to introduce new control measures for safety reasons on a comparison of the risk 
reduction achieved by a measure and its costs. The model provides a means of 
determining the risk reduction associated with a control measure, in order to support 
this process. 
The model results in the development of standard fault and event tree views of the 
accident sequence, and it is possible to view underlying BN fragments which describe 
additional causal relationships. The analyst could use the model to postulate the 
possible effect of various interventions. The rich causal models produced, and the use 
of existing safety engineering models, would help an analyst or editor to understand the 
fundamental causal sequence, and therefore aid them in identifying where the 
imposition of control measures might be most effective. 
An accident occurs due to an undesired sequence of events. Each event in the 
accident sequence provides an opportunity for intervention and prevention and hence 
risk reduction. Control measures are therefore targeted at the prevention of certain 
events in the accident sequence or at the conditions which influence the probability of 
occurrence of those events. For example by reference to Figure 40, derailment risk 
would be decreased by putting in place a detection measure, like a rolling stock fault 
inspection. This is modelled as an event 'rolling stock fault detected'. However given 
that such a detection measure is in place derailment risk could be further reduced by 
improving the competence of the track inspector, or by increasing the regularity of 
inspections. These two causes relate to conditions - 'competence of infrastructure 
maintainer' and 'rolling stock inspection interval' respectively. Where control measures 
193 
targeted the state of conditions the risk reduction they might achieve could quickly be 
estimated by entering different condition states, associated with the before and after 
scenarios and calculating the difference in risk. 
In some cases, where a control measure fundamentally changes the nature of the 
event sequence, and causal relationships, it might be necessary to undertake bespoke 
fault and event tree analysis to estimate the risk following the imposition of this control 
measure. Even in this situation the parameterised model could provide help by 
providing a clear baseline model, in which all key assumptions are clearly documented. 
As the models are at a deeper level of cause than the other models reviewed in this 
thesis, it would provide the potential for a wide range of control measure to be 
considered using the model. 
In some cases there may only be a few locations where intervention is necessary. 
Using a highly parameterised model or the type developed by following the 
methodology described here, it should be possible to differentiate between a wide 
number of locations on the network. This means that the model can be used to help 
target control measures to the set of locations where they would be most effective. 
An analysis that was scoped to look at infrastructure areas rather than individual 
locations, like the SRM or the core derailment study, might fail to identify these 
interventions. In other cases network wide models might justify the imposition of control 
measures in general, but fail to identify the subset of locations where installation is not 
necessary. I previously described how the industry implemented TPWS at junction 
signals across the entire railway network in order to reduce SPAD accident risk. Some 
of these installations were subsequently removed as they were considered to cause 
operational problems without having any significant affect on risk. Using a model of the 
type described here it would have been possible to estimate the risk reduction 
achieved by TPWS in each different location or type of location. Control measures 
could then have been targeted at the locations where they provided the best reduction 
in risk. This would have resulted in more efficient allocation of the railway's resources. 
In conclusion, the modelling approach strongly supports the estimation of changes in 
estimated accident rates following interventions. 
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9.2.5 Monitoring risk 
The problems with the monitoring of data for the purposes of supporting risk 




Because the industry operates with high levels of safety there is little readily 
available accident data with which to ascertain the effectiveness of defences 
against accidents, at any given point in time. 
Major accidents are often the result of a complex set of causes that are 
particular to a location or situation. Data relating to the variety of causes that 
might be implicated in a major accident is not routinely monitored. 
The sheer size and variability of the railway network means that the amount of 
potentially relevant data is vast. This makes collection and interpretation of data 
very difficult. 
The model provides improvements in each of these three areas, respectively by: 
• Providing a richer causal model that goes further back in the event sequence 
and hence identifies events and incidents which occur more regularly and hence 
can be monitored 
• Explicitly models a wide range of accident causes, both events and conditions, 
making it clear what causal information should be recorded following an 
accident or incident, to support risk estimation 
• Identifying the causal data that can usefully be collected, and hence being used 
to identify data that might be collected for other reasons. The model could also 
be used to identify the data that could be collected as apriority. The model 
provides a means of interpreting the data collected and using it to calculate risk. 
This allows for risk itself to be estimated and monitored and also provides a 
justification for detailed incident cause reporting. 
The model shows the variables (both events and conditions) whose state is related to 
the probability of occurrence of an accident. Data is needed to improve the 
understanding of these relationships in order to quantify the conditional probability 
relationships that are essential to the model. Data on the occurrence of events and the 
states of conditions allows estimation of event occurrence rates and how they differ 
given the presence of certain sets of conditions. The modelling approach described in 
this thesis supports monitoring as it can be used to improve a company's awareness of 
what event and condition data should be monitored to ensure the best possible 
estimate of risk. A risk model produced following the methodology developed lists the 
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events in the event sequence and all of the conditions whose state is known to 
influence the probability of occurrence of these events. The model could therefore be 
thought of as a specification of the data that should be recorded by an organisation to 
support the estimation of risk. As the model includes a long causal sequence, with a 
wide range of conditions modelled as influencing these events, the result is a very 
detailed and thorough specification of the data that should be routinely collected in 
order to support risk modelling in the industry. 
The risk model identifies events that are further back in the causal chain. These events 
will by definition occur more often than hazards and accidents creating more 
opportunity for monitoring. The availability of this data should therefore make it more 
easy to elicit likelihood estimates and logically would give greater confidence in the 
accuracy of overall estimates. Accurate estimates of the likelihood of these events will 
improve the ability to estimate the likelihood of subsequent events, and ultimately of 
hazards and accidents. The model therefore identifies the events whose rates of 
occurrence can be monitored to improve understanding of risk. 
Bayesian Network view 
Figure 53: BN model fragment: nodes influencing whether a track fault is 
detected 
Figure 53 shows the set of conditions whose state influences the event 'track fault 
occurs'. These are 'competence of infrastructure maintainer', 'track inspection 
intervals', 'track fault type' and 'track fault severity'. The implication of this is that data 
relating to the states of these conditions should be routinely collected, and in particular 
should be recorded when a track fault occurs. 
Knowledge of the state of conditions when events have previously occurred would help 
the industry to build up a map of all condition states across the network and at different 
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time of the day or year. It would also help determine the strength of correlations 
between events and conditions. The condition states represent the circumstances in 
which an event occurs. If the likelihood of occurrence for an event in a certain set of 
circumstances can be established then this is likely to provide a good likelihood 
estimate when those same circumstances arise again. However, this data is not 
necessarily relevant where the circumstances differ. Collecting condition data is 
therefore a way of avoiding the 'loss of context' problem (section 3.6.2). If condition 
data is routinely collected when an event occurs, data becomes more useful in the 
future as its relevance to other similar situations can be established. 
The BN model developed has a significantly larger scope and higher resolution of 
causal analysis than traditional event trees or sets of event trees. This means that to 
quantify the model many more probability estimates are needed. This remains a key 
barrier to the adoption of the modelling approach. As was discussed in section 0, 
however, some types of condition data are more readily available than others. 
Technical conditions should be able to be established via asset records or via survey. 
Performance conditions may change rapidly from minute to minute or might suddenly 
change after a period of months or years however they are at least constrained to an 
extent by readily available plans such as the timetable. These conditions therefore 
provide the obvious starting point for establishing better knowledge of condition states 
and using them to drive risk models. 
Operational and organizational conditions may be more difficult to ascertain requiring 
proactive measures for their identification and qualitative judgements about their 
particular state. I have not demonstrated how organizational conditions like safety 
culture indicators could be included in the model, although this remains an aspiration 
and is discussed in the subsequent chapter. 
If the correct information is recorded, relevance of data to event probabilities given 
different conditions can be properly established when quantifying the model. The model 
supports the use of this data in the elicitation of probabilities as elicitation would 
ultimately come down to a succession of judgements about the degree of correlation 
between two variables. It also supports the sharing of data between organisations. 
Data collected by one organisation at one location on the network, might be useful to 
another organisation at another location on the network, where the same or similar 
conditions exist. A BN model shared across operators on an infrastructure area, with 
relevant conditions agreed between them, would make it possible to pool incident data 
and allow organisations to learn from others' data. The model allows the set of 
conditions to be established when using data to support probability estimation, and also 
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when using the model to estimate risk in a particular location. The flexibility and 
structure of the model allows the user to re-establish that context when using the model 
for analysis. The model therefore creates the structure for the industry to jOintly learn 
from data that is collected. 
In summary, the model provides a specification for the data that should be collected in 
order to estimate risk. The amount of potentially useful data is significant and therefore 
collecting it would be time-consuming. This is a barrier to the adoption of the 
approach. However the model supports better elicitation of probabilities and identifies 
data items that could be readily collected in the immediate future. 
9.2.6 Can be used to help learn lessons from accidents 
Application of the methodology produces fault and event tree models of the generic 
event sequences in addition to the BN causal model. This provides a detailed 
qualitative model that could be used by those investigating the occurrence of an 
accident to help understand the sequence of events that may have occurred, and the 
possible condition states that existed at the time of the accident. 
Any accident that occurs due to a particular hazard should fit within the generic risk 
model associated with that hazard. If this is not the case, then it implies that the model 
is incomplete and needs to be updated. 
9.2.7 Can be used to diagnose the causes of accidents 
BNs are commonly used to diagnose the causes of events (see section 6.4.1). 
However reasoning from effect to cause is not possible using BN models of the type 
described in this thesis. In section 10.3.3, it is explained why this is the case and 
further work that might overcome this limitation is suggested. 
9.2.8 Ability to be used to interpret audit results, and their implications for risk 
According to the definitions of conditions that were proposed in section 2.3.2 
organizational conditions could be considered to be 'failings or inefficiencies in an 
organisation'. Operational conditions could be considered to be 'factors that affect the 
performance of front line staff undertaking safety related duties'. Either of these 
conditions might be audited. The model described includes some operational 
conditions in the model and hence indicates how audit results might be used to inform 
the estimation of risk. As previously stated, the model that was presented in Chapter 8 
does not include organizational conditions and I do not claim to have demonstrated that 
it is possible to include such conditions in the model. However, the BN modelling 
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approach developed means that it may be possible to extend the approach in this area, 
and future work to investigate this is proposed (see section 10.3.1). 
9.2.9 Summary of review against SMS1 





estimation of risk by individual location (section 9.2.3) and in 
estimation of changes in risk levels following interventions (section 9.2.4) 
monitoring of the railway to support risk estimation and modelling (section 9.2.5) 
In the other areas reviewed, the model either partially supports safety management or 
provides or provides promising areas of further work where it could be developed to do 
so more fully. 
In general, the model supports the various elements of a safety management system 
more fully than the other approaches reviewed (in Chapter 4) and provides a 
foundation for further development in this area. Therefore it partially meets SMS 1, and 
provides the foundation for development to meet this requirement more fully as I will go 
on to investigate in sections 10.3.1 to 10.3.3. 
9.3 Use of the model to support safety decision making 
Having described how a model would be developed and the views that a tool would 
need to show to support this, I now consider how the BN model would be used to 
support the taking of safety related decisions. The analyst might be the safety 
manager, or other decision maker within the industry. The uses of the model produced, 
and the improvements and advances that the model and associated tools would bring 
to risk assessment and safety management in the UK railway industry, are considered. 
As argued in section 3.7.3, the process of safety analysis has benefits above and 
beyond any numerical output that it produces, as it ensures that the domain experts 
think about the relevant issues in a systematic and structured way before reaching any 
judgment about what measures to put in place. 
The benefit of a risk model is not just in its ability to undertake calculation. The model 
provides a means of understanding how accidents might occur and therefore how to 
deal with them. In the following sub-sections the qualitative benefits of using this type 
of model to support safety decision making are argued. 
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9.3.1 Analyst view of the model 
Figure 54 shows an overview of proposed views produced when condition information 
is entered into the model using the running example from section 9.1 as its basis. Note 
that the fault tree and event tree are simplified versions of the extended fault and event 
trees shown in Figure 49 and Figure 50. When a particular set of conditions has been 
entered into the model some of the branches of the extended trees may become 
redundant. Figure 49 shows that under the conditions entered in the illustrative 
example outcome five becomes impossible. Therefore, the view of the resulting event 
tree can be pruned to a more simple structure as shown in Figure 54. Similarly Figure 
50 shows the event two is not possible and under these conditions the fault tree shown 
here is simplified to a single AND gate. 
The views shown in Figure 54 are complementary. The standard fault and event tree 
views, which are familiar to industry risk analysts, are presented. However they are 
annotated to explicitly identify the condition states which comprise the underlying 
assumptions of the model. The BN model provides an alternative causal model of the 
same phenomena which shows the causal relationships between all events and 
conditions. 
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Event 4 Event 5 Event 6 
Condition 3 = state 1 Condition 3 = state 1 C ond ition 5 = state 2 
Condition 2 = state 1 Condition 4 = state 2 
True = 0.5 
True = 0.1 
False = 0.5 
True = 1 True = 0.7 
False = 0.9 
Event tree view 
Fault tree view 
Bayesian Network view 
Gate 2 
False = 0.3 
Condition 1 = state 2 






Condition 2 = state 1 
P (True) = 0.3 
Figure 54: Fault tree and event tree views: Condition information entered 
9.3.2 Improved causal model 
The BN view of the model offers a view of the causal mechanisms that are implicated 
in the occurrence of possible accidents that is complementary to the fault and event 
tree views. The BN view of the model explicitly includes conditional probability 
relationships between events. This should make it less likely that such relationships are 
missed or erroneously included. The model also explicitly shows the causal 
201 
relationships between events and conditions. This richer causal model should help the 
model architect to more easily capture the actual causal phenomena that they believe 
exist in the real world. 
9.3.3 Stable, trusted and shared models of risk 
Another key advantage of the BN model is its re-usability. The model would be re-
reviewed and refined over time. The model captures the fundamental events and logic 
that are implicated in the occurrence of accidents. Because these aspects of the model 
are translatable to any organisation involved in the management of the railway network, 
the model can potentially be shared between organisations. In this way it could be used 
to consolidate and share knowledge. 
In many railway companies, there is no internal resource dedicated to risk analysis and 
modelling. Consultants tend to be employed, as was the case with the core derailment 
study. This acts as a disincentive against the use of risk models to support decision 
making. The user of the BN model, the analyst, does not require any specific 
knowledge or experience in risk modelling other than an ability to understand and 
interpret the causal models. A model of this type could shift the focus away from 
actually doing the analysis to interpreting and understanding the results. The user does 
not have to be an expert at constructing models. The user would only need to input the 
condition states of relevance and would need to be competent in the understanding 
and interpretation of the improved causal models produced. 
9.3.4 Modelling of conditions 
Standard approaches, like those reviewed in section 4, do not compel the analyst to 
consider relevant conditions and assume that the analyst will manually document them 
as assumptions. Using the model and the methodology outlined here conditions are 
explicitly included. The author of the core derailment study commented that: 
'Even though in the derailment report many of the assumptions are documented in 
detail there are still some things which, now I look at the report after some time, are 
only implicit in the model. The BN looks as if it makes these factors explicit.' (appendix 
A2). 
The model development includes a stage ('add conditions' in the description of the 
method) where the editor must consider which conditions are relevant to each event. 
The result is a clear graphical model of the conditions which influence the probability of 
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each event. Figure 53 shows the set of conditions influencing the event 'track fault 
detected'. 
The methodology ensures that probabilities of occurrence of 'track fault detected' can 
only be entered when each of the conditions is set to a particular state. This makes the 
context in which the probability is estimated clear avoiding any ambiguity in probability 
estimates. 
The use of correlation charts prompts the editor to consider correlations between all 
events and any conditions modelled too. This type of analysis is again not prompted by 
existing methods. Conditions might introduce correlations between events in the same 
part of the model or between events in the fault and event tree parts of the model which 
are usually modelled separately and in which inconsistent assumptions might easily be 
made. Section 4.3 described how the value of speed was assumed to be different in 
the fault and event tree parts of a model produced for an industry study. Using the 
approach outlined here, it is impossible to assume different condition states in different 
parts of the model as the states are set in a single place. 
9.3.5 Accessible to, and understandable by local managers, decision makers, 
policy makers and strategic decision makers 
The approach outlined in this section uses fault trees and event trees as a specification 
from which to generate the BN model. The review described in section 6.4.3.1 found 
that others had identified that BN models are visually difficult to comprehend as little 
structure is imposed on them by the modelling approach itself. In some of the models 
presented in this chapter nodes and arcs were removed to make the diagrams easier 
to understand. The core derailment study risk analyst found it difficult to interpret the 
meaning of the BN event tree model produced (Figure 34) and commented that one of 
the reasons why event trees are widely used and trusted in safety engineering is that 
they are conceptually simple and easy to understand. For these reasons the decision 
was made to develop the BN from fault and event trees. This aids in the interpretation 
of the BN model, which could also be presented with clear links between the two 
contrasting models shown. The BN can be considered to provide an alternative view of 
possible accident causal sequences. At the core of any model built using the approach 
described is an accepted and widely understood model of accident sequence. This 
approach was chosen deliberately. There is no point in an organisation having a 
completely accurate and infinitely flexible model of risk if that information is not 
translated into effective and timely practical decisions throughout the industry. One of 
the key reasons why fault and event trees were chosen as the basis of the model is 
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that they form part of the common language of the UK railway safety engineering 
community, and this will help to make the model accessible to those who must use its 
output to inform management decisions. The approach also retains existing safety 
engineering structure and terminology. For example, the concept of a hazard, and of 
various levels of cause, is retained. 
Having seen the BN model produced, the analyst believed that the more explicit 
modelling of assumptions that is supports, and the elicitation process necessary to 
produce such models could lead to more effective and consistent handling of model 
assumptions. 
The approach was also reviewed by the manager of the Safety Management Systems 
Programme at RSSB (see Appendix D), who commented: 
I Speaking as an industry Safety Manager who has had first hand experience of 
developing high level organisational risk assessments using existing industry modelling 
techniques, I found the concepts proposed extremely thought provoking and easy to 
understand, and as such can certainly visualise their practical application.. , 
9.3.6 Review against SDM1 
The risk modelling approach here builds on existing safety management concepts, 
terminology and models. It therefore provides a model which is understandable by all of 
those who currently undertake quantified risk assessment in the industry. However it 
extends existing practice to make the assumptions that underpin that practice more 
transparent. It also provides an alternative model that helps in the understanding of the 
causal relationships that underpin current approaches. Updating of the model to 
calculate revised risk estimates would require no expertise in risk assessment as it is 
purely a question of setting conditions (like line speed and track curvature) to their 
proposed state. When compared to existing approaches the model is more accessible 
to and understandable by those who actually manage safety on the network and 
therefore substantially meets requirement SDM1. 
9.4 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, I described how parameterised BN models of the type described in 
Chapter 8 would be developed and used in practice. I then argued that the model, as 
described, partially meets SMS1, and provides the foundation for development to meet 
this requirement more fully (this will be further investigated in sections 10.4.1 to 10.4.3). 
I also argued that, when compared to existing approaches the model is clearly more 
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accessible to and understandable by those who actually manage safety on the network 
and therefore substantially meets requirement SDM1. Having previously concluded that 
the models met requirements RMR1-RMR3, I can now conclude that Hypothesis 4 is 
valid (i.e. that the development of a risk modelling approach that possesses the 
characteristics proposed in Hypothesis 2 is possible). 
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10 Conclusions, contribution and further work 
In this chapter, the argument put forward in this thesis is restated in summary form. 
The contribution of the work described here is then put forward, making reference to 
other related work. Further work and areas of research opened up by the research 
described here are then outlined. Finally I consider the concept of a parameterised risk 
model and what the future might be for this type of modelling approach. 
10.1 Conclusions: Summary of argument 
The argument presented in this thesis is reprised in this section. Each of the 
hypotheses that were initially presented in section 1.4 are considered in turn, and the 
arguments in support of them summarised. 
Hypothesis 1 'Organizational accident theory provides an explanation for the 
mechanisms by which major accidents occur within the UK railway industry' 
According to (Reason 2002), complex safety critical systems are prone to the 
occurrence of organizational accidents. Organizational accidents occur when multiple 
safety controls fail at the same time, in the same location. In Chapter 3, I reviewed the 
recent accident history of Britain's railways and found that organizational accident 
theory explains many of the phenomena seen in the industry. The theory provides an 
explanation of the causal mechanisms by which the Ladbroke Grove accident 
occurred, and how its various causes arose. It also describes the industry's response 
to major accidents more generally and provides an explanation for trends seen in 
reported accident levels in the industry. 
Hypothesis 2: Given that the industry is prone to the occurrence of 
organizational accidents a risk modelling approach with particular 
characteristics is needed in order to ideally support the effective management of 
safety. 
The safety controls that must fail in order for organizational accidents to occur are 
implemented to prevent the occurrence of events in the accident event sequence, and 
also relate to the underlying causes that influence the likelihood of occurrence of these 
events. In section 2.3.2, I categorised these underlying causes as technical, 
operational and organizational conditions. Risk on the railway industry is also closely 
related to the performance parameters of the network such as the density of traffic and 
speed of trains. These parameters were categorised as performance conditions. The 
categorisations link organizational accident concepts to related risk modelling 
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terminology and concepts and therefore provide a solid basis for the development of a 
risk modelling approach that applies the principles of organizational accident theory. 
In section 3.6.3, I argued that the nature of the UK railway network meant that it 
experienced particular problems with the management of organizational accidents. The 
UK railway network exists over a wide geographic area. Similar hazards are possible at 
many different locations across the network. However the various underlying accident 
causes - the condition states - vary greatly depending on the particular location and 
the time of day, week or year. In addition I argued that risk on the network was likely to 
be unevenly distributed with 'risk hotspots' existing where the conditions for an 
organizational accident were substantially in place. Risk estimates from the railway 
industry support the hypothesis that such hotspots exist (see section 3.5.2). This 
creates a management problem for the industry. 
This implies that in order to ensure safety and prevent the occurrence of organizational 
accidents the industry needs to be aware of all condition states across the network at 
any given time. The industry also needs models that allow them to analyse these 
conditions states and interpret their relationship to accident risk. On this basis I 
proposed ideal requirements for risk models to support the management of safety in 
the UK railway industry. These were: 
RMR1: Risk models should allow for as many of the events in an accident sequence to 
be modelled as is practicable. 
RMR2: Risk models should allow as many of the significant and quantifiable technical, 
operational, organizational and performance conditions that cause accidents or 
exacerbate risk to be explicitly modelled as is practicable. 
RMR3: Risk models should be parameterised by conditions so that the risk at different 
locations and in different situations on the railway network can be rapidly recalculated. 
I argued that risk models and information need to be presented to safety professionals 
in a form that they understand and in a way that allows them to make effective 
decisions about how to manage safety and proposed two additional requirements on 
this basis: 
SMS1: In order to ensure that they effectively support the management of safety, the 
uses of a risk model should support the various stages of a safety management 
system. 
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SDM1: In order to ensure that they effectively support the taking of safety related 
decisions, risk models should be usable and understandable by those who actually 
manage safety on the network. 
Hypothesis 3: Current risk modelling approaches in use in the UK railway 
industry do not have these characteristics. 
In Chapter 4, I argued that existing risk models (section 4.2.1) and risk modelling 
approaches (sections 4.1.1 and 4.3.2) in the UK railway industry do not have the ideal 
characteristics outlined and substantially fail to meet requirements RMR1-RMR3. In 
particular, I found that modelling approaches do not provide a full model of the accident 
event sequence. Fault and event trees are commonly used and this approach does not 
include explicit modelling of condition states instead documenting them separately as 
assumptions. I also found that models are developed with a wide scope and average or 
worst case condition states are assumed, meaning that the applicability of the models 
to particular situations is unclear. In existing models (section 4.2.1) and in research 
undertaken (section 5.3) attempts had been made to take account of a wider range of 
condition states in risk models but this results in increased fault and event tree model 
size as each unique combination of conditions requirs additional fault and event tree 
models to be produced. The industry risk model, the SRM, also suffers this problem 
with additional instances of fault and event trees required to model each separate 
unique set of condition states (section 4.2). 
Hypothesis 4: The development of a risk modelling approach that has these 
characteristics is possible. 
From a review of the state of the art in risk modelling, I found that rapidly updatable, 
parameterised risk models are used in other industries (section 5.4). I also found that 
work had already been undertaken on the Irish railway network (section 5.2) which 
partially met the requirements set out. Also, in the aviation sector some models had 
been developed or were under development which used BNs to incorporate condition 
states directly into risk models (section 6.4.3). The review led to the conclusion that 
BNs provide a technique which is flexible enough to be used to include a variety of 
condition states in a risk model. However, it would be sensible to develop a method 
which used the structure of fault and event trees to build the BN model. This would help 
safety professionals in the railway industry to be able to interpret and understand the 
BN model and hence would help the model to meet requirement SOM 1. 
Previous research had described how to translate fault trees into equivalent BNs 
(section 6.4.4). Chapter 7 showed how to translate a generic event tree structure for a 
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particular hazard into a BN. By adding condition nodes and eliciting conditional 
probability relationships a model is produced which allows the generic model to be 
made more specific by setting the states of conditions. An existing case study 
supplemented by the judgement of its original author was used to illustrate how the 
approach would work. Chapter 8 expanded on this case study by including a BN 
representation of the fault tree to develop a parameterised bow-tie model. By entering 
sets of conditions similar to those in which major accidents are known to have 
occurred, I demonstrated that the model would have identified these locations as 
having higher probabilities of major railway accidents occurring than a typical railway 
location. I argued that the model substantially met risk modelling requirements RMR1-3 
(section 8.12) with the key exception being that I have not demonstrated how 
organizational conditions could be included in the model. As will be discussed in the 
further work section of this thesis (section 10.3.1) there is potential to extend the 
technique to address this omission. 
In Chapter 9, I formalised the modelling approach describing how models of this type 
would be developed and used. I proposed that software would be needed to make the 
building of these types of model practical and proposed useful views of the BN and its 
fault and event tree equivalents to aid in the development and use of the model. The 
approach was reviewed against the risk modelling requirements. 
I assessed the extent to which the modelling approach and models of the type 
proposed would meet the detailed requirements for models to support safety 
management systems outlined for requirement SMS 1. I argued that the approach 
substantially meets the requirements which align with the organisation and planning 
elements of a SMS. The approach partially meets the requirements that align with the 
other elements of a SMS. 
Finally I argued that the model would provide better support for safety decision makers 
than existing techniques (SOM 1) as it produces a model with transparent assumptions, 
and could be used by safety professionals who are not expert risk analysts. 
10.2 Summary of contribution 
In this thesis I have developed a new type of risk model, and supporting development 
methodology, that are aligned to the particular problems facing safety management in 
the UK railway industry, these problems being: 




The inherent variability in risk across the UK railway infrastructure depending 
on the set of condition states in any location at any given time. 
The ability of risk models to be used and understood by safety professionals to 
support their various management activities. 
In order to achieve this overall contribution, a number of intermediate contributions 
have also been made. These are spelled out in the remainder of this section. 
• Formulation of a set of requirements for risk models in the UK railway industry 
From a review of safety management and safety performance in the UK railway 
industry, and a consideration of its relationship to organizational accident theory, a 
clear set of requirements for risk models has been developed. 
• Development of a classification of accident cause that is consistent with risk 
modelling techniques and methods 
In section 2.3, I outlined a classification of the causes of accidents, based on a 
distinction between events and conditions and their sub-types. This classification 
extends the causal definitions used in organizational accident theory, and is presented 
to be consistent with risk modelling concepts and terminology. This classification is 
therefore the fundamental initial step in the development of a QRA approach that is 
consistent with organizational accident theory. These definitions underpin the whole 
thesis, and the modelling approach that has been developed. 
• Development of a modular way of structuring fault and event trees which 
prevents the need to replicate logically similar fault and event tree models. 
I have developed a new way of encoding all fault and event tree logic in a single BN 
model, in a way in which the location specific logic and probabilities can easily be 
recovered and used for the purposes of assessing risk in a particular set of 
circumstances. This prevents the need to develop a separate fault and event tree for 
each possible combination of condition states that might exist on a railway network. 
Standard approaches like the SRM are based on producing separate instances of fault 
and event trees, and this puts practical limits on the degree of parameterisation that 
can reasonably be modelled. The model developed by Sotera addressed the problem 
by separating the Irish railway network into 227 different locations where similar 
conditions are assumed to exist. Using the approach described here, it is practically 
possible to build models with a much higher degree of parameterisation than this. For 
example, the model described in this thesis is capable of estimating risk given 
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approximately 620,000 different sets of conditions that might exist at any given location 
or time. 
Ale et al (Ale, Bellamy et al. 2006; Ale, Bellamy et al. 2007) apply a similar approach to 
the model development, using event sequence diagrams and fault trees as part of the 
underlying BN specification resulting in the development of a single integrated BN 
similar to the model that is described in Chapter 8. However the airport accident causal 
model they describe is primarily driven by the need to understand the variability in and 
complexity of causes of air traffic accidents at a particular airport rather than variability 
in risk across multiple locations. The focus of this work on the risk at a particular airport 
contrasts with the focus of this thesis on modelling of risk across a variety of locations 
on a national railway network. They do not describe the problem of variability across a 
range of locations and offer no specific solution for it. 
• Development of a modelling approach which has the potential to be used to 
include technical, performance, operational and organizational causes of 
accidents. 
As this logical core of the model is developed in a BN, there is the potential to extend 
any model developed using this technique to include non-deterministic causes of 
accidents, such as audit indicators, or qualitative judgements about human 
performance, as long as some statistical relationship between these causes and 
existing events and condition states in the model can be established. The model 
described in Chapter 8 includes technical, performance and operational conditions. In 
section 10.3.1 I outline ideas for further research to allow the inclusion of organizational 
conditions in the model. 
The uses of the Sotera model reflect its focus on technical and performance conditions. 
It would be difficult for Sotera to expand the model to include operational and 
organizational conditions for the reasons that were outlined in section 2.4.2, as it is 
structured around standard fault and event tree techniques 
The BN produced for Schipol Airport primarily extends their model to include variability 
in human performance, the potential source of most variability in accident likelihood 
that might be expected at any given airport. The model includes operational conditions, 
described as performance shaping factors, which are considered to have a significant 
influence on human error probability, and provides some additional confidence that 
rigorous inclusion of such causes in a BN model is possible. No parameterisation to 
capture technical conditions is described in the approach presumably because these 
conditions were assumed to be fixed, and known within Schipol airport. 
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• Development of an approach, which presents the traditional fault and event 
tree logical structure, and its underlying assumptions, in a transparent 
alternative causal model. 
By using BNs to extend fault and event tree modelling approaches, a modelling 
methodology that builds upon accepted concepts and techniques in safety engineering 
that are extensively used in the UK railway industry has been developed. The resulting 
BN provides a qualitative model of the causes of accidents that provides safety 
engineers and analysts with a conceptual model to support understanding of the causal 
mechanisms that lead to risk. This model is in addition to, and supplements, the fault 
and event tree view of this model which is retained, providing methodological benefits 
to its use, which have the potential to strengthen the link between risk assessment and 
safety management, and to improve a safety decision makers understanding of risk 
issues. 
The Sotera modelling approach described makes use solely of fault and event trees as 
parameterisation of the model is undertaken in an additional layer of software, rather 
than using a BN. Therefore, there is no alternative causal model to aid understanding 
of the causal relationships than underpin parameterisation. Nevertheless, the model 
does not reproduce the fault and event trees that result from the instantiation of 
condition states. This means that the approach does not have some of the 
methodological advantages of the approach described in this thesis, which were 
described in section 9.2. 
Ale at al do not describe the qualitative benefits of using accepted causal models to 
provide an alternative representation of the BN in their airport risk model. Neither do 
they describe the methodological approach and benefits of their approach. Instead they 
stress the need for the model to produce quantitative output for the purposes of cost 
benefits analysis, a use which the model described here also support (see section 
9.2.4). 
10.3 Further Work 
In this section, further work to develop and extend the modelling approach described in 
this thesis is suggested. Consideration is given to extending the modelling approach to 
support: 
• Inclusion of organizational conditions 
• Development of network wide risk estimates in the absence of a full set of data 
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• Diagnostic reasoning 
• The specification and collection of monitoring data 
10.3.1 Including organizational conditions in the model 
I have argued that the modelling methodology proposed in this thesis results in the 
development of risk models that substantially meet the requirements that were 
previously set out for an ideal UK railway risk model. A key attribute of the modelling 
approach is that it results in models in which condition states are both explicit and 
variable. The derailment model presented in Chapter 8 provided an example of the 
type of model proposed. However, this model explicitly includes technical, operational 
and performance conditions only and does not include organizational conditions within 
its scope. 
The inclusion of organizational conditions within the model is necessary to fully meet 
the ideal modelling requirements that were set out in section 1.4 to align models with 
the possible causes of organizational accidents. Research has argued that failure in 
the management of organisations is instrumental to the occurrence of complex 
accidents in modern industrial systems. It is widely accepted that the Challenger space 
shuttle accident was the result of organizational failings (see for example (Vaughan 
1996; Hall 2003a). The chemical disaster at Bhopal and the Nuclear disaster at 
Chernobyl are also considered to be the result of organizational failings and poor safety 
culture (Pidgeon and O'Leary 2000). A review of the Ladbroke Grove railway accident 
(section 3.3) described how organizational weaknesses were considered to be 
fundamental causes of that accident. The inquiry report included a whole chapter 
((Cullen 2001), pages 59-77) on industry failings at the organizational level. 
The Baker Report into the Texas City refinery accident (Baker, Leveson et al. 2007) 
highlighted how monitoring of the wrong organisational indictors might ultimately result 
in a lack of focus on the possibility of major accidents. The key finding of that report 
was that an accident occurred because of a focus within BP on occupational safety -
for example slips-trips-and-falls rather than 'process safety'. Linking of organisational 
indicators to models of possible major accidents, would help to ensure that the purpose 
and meaning of these different sorts of indicators were not confused. 
The risk modelling approach described in this thesis results in the development of a 
model which incorporates the logic and structure of accepted safety modelling 
techniques but is implemented in a BN. This provides some flexibility about how the 
approach might be extended as using BNs any two variables can be linked, as long as 
213 
a conditional probability relationship between them can be established. The modelling 
approach described here results in models displaying a long causal sequence which 
looks at a range of different events in the fault hierarchy as well as the events following 
the hazard. If organizational conditions can be found that are correlated to any of these 
events, then they can in theory be included in the model. As was stated in section 
2.3.2.3, organizational conditions like personal attitudes, habits and other intangibles 
are considered to lead to tangible manifestations that can be used to test and monitor 
the safety culture of an organisation. Using BNs it might also be possible to link 
organizational conditions to these tangible manifestations. This would result in a model 
in which measurements of safety culture could be linked to the underlying accident 
sequence and hence to estimates of risk. 
Further work is required to establish exactly how this might be done. An obvious way 
forward would be to consider application of existing techniques already proposed by 
other researchers for modelling organizational conditions using BNs. In the literature 
review of section 6.4.3, several areas of research were identified where others have 
proposed how to incorporate organizational conditions into risk models using BNs. 
Another approach might be to find a model of the organizational causes of accidents on 
which to base an extension of the BN part of the model in the same way that fault and 
event trees, an accepted model of the event sequence, were used as the specification 
for that part of the model. Initial consideration has been given to some possible 
approaches. Section 6.4.3 discussed how (Trucco, Cagno et al. 2007) had proposed 
the use of the structured analysis and design technique (SADT) to structure BNs. 
(Hale, Heming et al. 1997) have also proposed the use of the (SADT) for modelling 
safety management systems. The STAMP method (Leveson 2002a) is based around a 
socio-technical representation of a problem domain showing the safety constraints and 
hierarchical management structure in place for the operation and development of a 
technical control system. The model is used to try to ensure that the whole socio-
technical system is optimised to prevent the occurrence of accidents. The STAMP 
method provides a representation of an accident scenario and shows how this is 
related to the wider system. However, its focus is biased towards technical control 
systems (and therefore its application) may not be ideally suited to the railway industry 
application where we are concerned with the wider railway network rather than 
particular technical systems within it. 
Perhaps the most promising model for our purposes is that used within the accimap 
approach (Rasmussen 1997). Accimap is a qualitative modelling technique to aid 
understanding of how organizational processes and influences can affect generic 
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accident sequences. The stated aim of the accimap technique is to represent all of the 
decision makers (actors), how they interact, and what their individual goals, conflicts 
and information resources are. Rasmussen argues that, in most cases, the activities of 
these actors are functionally disconnected, and only the accidents reveal a relational 
structure. The accimap approach provides a rich model of organizational interactions 
and how these might impact upon events in the accident sequence. Using an 
adaptation of the accimap an organizational BN model might be developed made up of: 
• Actors: each actor is a role; it is described in terms of its responsibilities 
relevant to the accident. 
• Interactions: these are modelled as the information exchanged between actors. 
Measurements that provide evidence for each interaction and its effectiveness could 
perhaps be identified with the interactions represented as variables in the BN. Data 
collection and analysis could be used to establish correlations between measured 
values and the effectiveness of interactions. The statistical relationships between these 
interaction states and events in the event sequence would also have to be established. 
This approach is outlined further in (Marsh and Bearfield 2004). 
The inclusion of organizational factors in the model would allow the risk estimates to be 
made that take account of the structure of an organisation and its effectiveness. In 
theory it would allow safety professionals to identify where poor organizational 
performance is problematic and possibly a key contributory factor to a high level of risk 
at certain locations or in certain situations on the network. 
This would assist in the structuring and management of organisations to aid risk and 
safety management. A risk model which included audit findings as conditions could be 
used to interpret the results of audits, and also to identify areas where audit should be 
targeted. Audit results and other safety culture indicators could in theory be fed into the 
risk model on a routine basis to help identify risk hotspots that might emerge as 
organizational performance degrades over time. 
10.3.2 Network wide risk estimates in the absence of a full set of data 
Section 9.2.2, explained how the modelling structure and approach proposed in this 
thesis would make it possible to estimate network wide risk by aggregating the risk 
from individual locations on the network. However, this would imply that a large amount 
of data about the condition states, and occurrence of events in each and every location 
and situation on the network was available, and this is highly unlikely to occur in the 
foreseeable future. 
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In the absence of such information the BN may be able to be ad t d t . ap e 0 provide an 
estimate of the network wide risk from each hazard F'lgure 55 h tw . sows 0 nodes 
extracted from the BN risk model described in Chapter 8' 't k . rac curvature' and 
'containment fitted'. In that model, no prior distributions were set for these nodes. This 
was not necessary as the nodes were definitively set to a particular state whenever the 
model was used to calculate risk estimates. However, if it were possible to set these 
node to represent the distribution of condition states across the network then it might 
be possible to use the model to approximate risk at the network level rather than just by 
location. The NPTs shown for the nodes in Figure 55 illustrate how they could be 
quantified in the risk model in order to do this. 
track curvature containment fitted 
v.hiQh 0.025 track curvaTure V.hlgh high medium low/none 
high 0.007 false 0 0.2 1 1 
medium 0.018 true 1 0.8 0 0 
low/none 0.95 
Figure 55: Condition nodes quantified for system wide calculation 
The prior distribution for the NPT for 'track curvature' could be estimated taking into 
account the known properties of track across the network. For example the relative 
probabilities for track curvature shown have been estimated using data from the 
Network Rail business plan (NR 2007). The NPT shows that 2.5% of track on the 
network is considered to consist of 'very high' track curvature (i.e. track curvature with 
a radius of curvature of 200m or less and 95% with little or no curvature). Estimation of 
network wide distributions of condition states is a far less onerous task than the 
collection and population of data for every possible instance of a hazard on the 
network. However, some condition states are highly correlated to others. Also certain 
combinations of conditions result in particularly high levels of risk. It is therefore 
important that the model should take account of the coincidence of condition states, 
rather than just their distribution; that is, we need to ensure that key correlations 
between conditions are captured and modelled. Figure 55 shows how this might be 
done. The state of 'containment fitted' is modelled as having a strong correlation to the 
state of 'track curvature'. The NPT for 'containment fitted' shows that containment rail is 
always fitted to rail with severe track curvature, and it is never fitted to rail of medium or 
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low track curvature. This relationship can be inferred from group standards ((RSSB 
2007d) clause 3.2.9), which describe the circumstances under which containment rail is 
fitted. In the absence of data, a technical expert might be able to estimate that 
containment rail is fitted to only 20% of rail with 'high' track curvature on the basis of 
their experience. 
By entering the network population distributions into all condition nodes, and including 
correlations between nodes, the model could be adapted to calculate network wide 
accident occurrence rates. As the BN model output is in units of events per track mile 
the output calculations would need to be scaled up by the total number of route miles 
on the infrastructure9 to achieve a network total. 
The Risk Solutions risk model described in section 5.3 appears to have attempted to 
apply a similar approach. Figure 20 shows the conditional probability relationships that 
were identified between the 'environmental' conditions that were identified for that 
research project, and indicates the strength of these relationships. 
If this approach were attempted, one objective would be to determine how the modeller 
would know when sufficient conditional relationships between condition nodes had 
been modelled to provide a reasonable estimate of the network wide distribution of 
these conditions, and hence the network-wide risk estimate given the degree of 
complexity and variation inherent to the UK railway network. The model would only 
ever give an approximation of the relationships between condition states and hence of 
network risk, and therefore ultimately better data collection would remain as the ideal 
way to enable estimation of network wide risk totals. 
Expansion of the model in this way would allow it to be used in a similar way to the 
SRM (see section 4.2). It would also allow a number of other uses. The user would be 
able to look at a range of risk profiles that cannot be calculated using the SRM. For 
example if the model included the same conditions as the BN model in the previous 
chapter it could look at the network wide risk associated with high speed trains, by 
setting the line speed node to 'high speed'. By setting the location node, it could 
calculate the network total risk arising in tunnels; but by setting both, it could calculate 
the risk arising from high speed trains in tunnels. This ability to consider different types 
of network wide information would provide additional information to steer network wide 
decisions and initiatives. 
9 There are over 16,000 route miles on the UK rail network according to Network Rail's business 
plan. 
217 
10.3.3 Supporting diagnostic reasoning 
BNs are commonly used to diagnose the causes of events (see section 6.4.1). 
However, to use the model described in this thesis in this way we would need to be 
confident that the BN inference calculations correctly updated node probabilities when 
event nodes are set to a particular state. Section 7.3.2 explained that, where an event 
tree path does not branch, there is insufficient information in the model to determine 
why this might be. The lack of branching might be because, given the occurrence of 
preceding events; 
• The outcome of the subsequent event is certain, and therefore does not affect 
event tree outcome probabilities. 
• Whether or not the subsequent event occurs is considered by the modeller to 
be irrelevant to the outcome of that path 
As the states of events are not known under certain conditions, it is not possible to 
assert that events are in a particular state in a coherent way in the model. If the 
information about the state of events in non-branching paths were known, then it might 
be possible to use that information to create an event tree in which the state of events 
could be instantiated into the model. 
The event tree in Figure 56 shows a simple, two-event, event tree, the top path of 
which does not branch. The event tree shows that if event 1 is true, then it is inevitable 
that outcome 1 will occur. However, given that event 1 is true, the event tree provides 
no information about the state of event 2. If the translation process as described in 
section 7.3.1 were to be applied then no causal relationship between event 1 and event 
2 would be identified. 
Event tree b shows the circumstance where an event outcome is undefined because it 
is known and considered inevitable given the occurrence of preceding events. In this 
case a conditional probability relationship exists between events 1 and 2. The event 
tree has been annotated to show that, given that event 1 is true, it is certain that event 
2 is true. If the event tree were to be drawn fully expanded (the alternative view of 
event tree b in the diagram) it would show clearly that the probability of occurrence of 
event 2 is conditionally dependent on the outcome of event 1. Hence a causal arc is 
needed between these two nodes in the BN. 
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Figure 56: Non-branching paths: Possible reason 
The other reason why the path might not branch is that the outcome of the non-
branching event is irrelevant to the consequences of that path. This is unlikely as 
events in an event tree are selected as the events whose occurrence escalates the 
likely severity of a hazard. In theory, however, there may still be a conditional 
relationship between one of these 'don't care' events and previous events in the tree. 
Ultimately if it were possible to annotate the event tree with the full set of possible 
branches and event probabilities it would be possible to develop a model that included 
all conditional probability relationships, and therefore in which the state of events could 
be definitively asserted. 
A potential use of such models would be to guide accident investigation and the 
diagnosis of the cause of an accident. 
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10.3.4 Data specification and collection 
The most significant barrier to the adoption of parameterised risk models of the type 
described is the increased need for event and condition data that they imply. 
According to industry requirements for data collection, only the immediate cause of an 
accident must be recorded in the industry management information system (section 
3.6.1). The SRM structure maximises the use of the available data. However the model 
described here presents a longer sequence of events in an accident sequence, and in 
order to estimate the probability of occurrence of each of these events, and the 
conditional probability relationships between them, a lot of incident data would be 
required. The model also includes many conditions and this implies that the state of 
these conditions at any given time should be known in order to infer their impact on 
event occurrence probabilities. However, the practical difficulty of collecting all of the 
data needed to build a perfect model only partially undermines the approach. If the 
industry is to aspire to collect all of the data that is needed to properly understand risk a 
sensible place to start is to determine what events and conditions are actually 
correlated to accident risk. The model therefore has two key uses in this area: 
• It provides a means of filtering available data that might be collected for a 
variety of reasons, to identify what is potentially useful for risk modelling and 
estimation. 
• It provides a means of specifying the condition and event data that should 
ideally be collected (as discussed in 9.2.5). Some of this information might be 
readily available. The model might also convince a company that, even if some 
data is difficult to get, it is worth investing the effort in collecting it because it is 
useful for risk estimation. 
The model provides a means of interpreting the data collected and using it to calculate 
risk. This allows for risk itself to be estimated and monitored and also the model itself 
provides a justification for detailed incident cause reporting. 
By defining the data that would ideally be collected to analyse and assess risk we can 
start to improve the way in which data is collected in the industry, and over time align 
and prioritise data collection. The Sotera risk model is the most similar model to the 
one described here that has been developed and implemented in industry. This model 
focuses on asset data, asset condition data, and performance data - such as train 
speeds and train loadings. This information is available and can be collected by 
surveys and review of planning schedules and information, as it was by Irish Rail to 
support the Sotera model. 
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Finally, it should be borne in mind that the model is still usable in the absence of this 
data. The BN modelling approach reduces any expert judgement problem to the 
elicitation of the strength of causal relationships between two variables. As we 
described in section 10.3.2, the model could still be used in practice, even if it were not 
fully quantified. 
10.4 The future of parameterised risk models 
Parameterised risk models represent the next natural extension for risk models in the 
safety domain and in particular in the railway industry. Similar approaches have existed 
in the nuclear industry for many years, and in this thesis I have reviewed emerging 
techniques applied in both the aviation and railway industries. Over recent years, safety 
has improved in the railway industry, and in other safety critical industries. At the same 
time, the pace of technological change is increasing, placing more and more emphasis 
on predicting the impact of changed systems and procedures, and on managing the 
safety associated with their implementation and operation. In the global capital 
economy, increased efficiency is also needed, meaning that industries will have to 
ensure that they are prioritising their efforts on safety appropriately and not achieving 
safety at the expense of performance benefits, or at excessive cost. Risk models which 
include a greater set of accident causes, both events and conditions, and which can be 
used to inform management and decision making effectively should be a part of the 
solution to these problems. 
Currently the key barrier to the adoption of fully parameterised risk models as a 
technique is the availability of sufficient data to quantify the models. In the longer term, 
this is much less likely to be a problem. Technological advances and the ongoing 
revolution in the digital economy mean that more data from all sorts of sources is 
increasingly becoming available over time. In the railway industry there is already 
increasing use of on track monitoring systems, recording train movements, track cant 
and levels of adhesion between train wheels and the track. Some trains are also 
experimenting with real-time transfer of data from trains to control centres. In the years 
to come it is likely that the problem will not be one of obtaining data, but instead of 
interpreting and using the myriad of data that is available. 
I have previously talked about location specific risk modelling. However, it is only really 
the physical conditions that could be considered to be a property of a particular 
location. Other conditions vary over time, and across organisations as well as from 
location to location. A model that is parameterised to include all condition states would 
not just be able to differentiate between risk in different locations. It would also be able 
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to determine the risk relating to different times of the day, week or year. The ultimate 
vision is of parameterised risk models being used to interpret risk information in real 
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Appendix A Urban railway derailment study 
A1 Event trees developed for the core derailment study 
This section of Appendix A shows the event trees taken from the core derailment study. 
The consequences of each of the event trees have been numbered so that similar 
consequences can be grouped in the extended event tree produced as part of the 
approach described in Chapter 5. 
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Figure A-5: Event tree for derailment accidents occurring in a station 
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Figure A-6: Event tree for derailment accidents occurring on a bridge 
A2 Elicitation meetings to support event tree parameterisation 
The expert elicitation required to support the event tree parameterisation exercises 
described in Chapter 7 took place with the support of Colin Howes of Atkins Rail at 
three separate meetings on: 
• 4 February 2005 
• 10 February 2005 
• 18 March 2005 
Full records of the meetings are available from the author. 
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Appendix B BN Event tree models 
81 Simple translation from an event tree to a BN 
This section of Appendix B describes how to produce a BN version of an event tree, as 
outlined in section 5.3. 
8.1.1 Node Probability Tables 














carriaQes fall FALSE TRUE 
FALSE 0.8 0.75 








h t th c nsequence node can be The methodology described in Chapter 5 shows t a e 0 
th full set of event trees. produced by creating a single node, whose parents are e 
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However, even for this relatively simple example, the NPT produced would consist of 
1536 conditional probabilities as there are 7 separate events, each with two states, and 
12 possible consequences. 
It is therefore easier to build the consequence NPT using a hierarchy of nodes as 







Figure B-1: Bayesian Network version of Open Track event tree 
Using a software package like Hugin, it is possible to quantify this hierarchy of nodes 
using a combination of NPTs and logical statements as shown below: 
345 
collapse FALSE TRUE 
hits FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE 
3 1 0 1 0 
4 0 1 0 0 
5 0 0 0 1 
678 
collapse FALSE TRUE 
hits FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE 
6 1 0 1 0 
7 0 1 0 0 
8 0 0 0 1 
9 10 11 12 
falls FALSE TRUE 
collision FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE 
9 1 0 0 0 
10 0 1 0 0 
11 0 0 1 0 
12 0 0 0 1 
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345678 
If 'carriages fall' = TRUE then consequence is '678' else consequence is '345' 
3 - 12 
If 'direction' = 'cess' then consequence is '345678' else consequence is '9 10 11 12' 
2 -12 
If 'clear' = 'true' then consequence is '2' else consequence is '3 -12' 
1 -12 
If 'contained' = 'true' then consequence is '1' else consequence is '2 -12' 
8.1.2 Calculation results 
The screen shot below (Figure B-2) shows that the Bayesian Network created 
calculates the same consequence probabilities as the original open track event tree 
from which it was developed (Figure A-1). 
: Hugin 5.5.1 Professional- [c:\documenls and settings\george bearfield\my documenls\phd\Phd · currenl\lhesi.\lhesi5\appendices\a4\op~n I rack ... r;]~[R1 
l!) File Edt View Network Tobie Options Wi1dow ._He_Ip __ 
~I~T~ I§ I ,l(, I ~l I xl ~I i I 8I rn l ~ l l:] l .!.l 
o clear \C2) 
o coUllpse (Cl0) 
o colHsioh (collision, 
o COIII.lined (el) 
o dlr&ctkll, (e41 
o f.ll1s (e3) 
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Figure 8-2: Screen shot of BN event tree calculation 
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82 Parameterised BN Event Tree model 
This section of Appendix B shows how a parameterised BN Event Tree model of the 
type described in section 5.3.3 can be produced. 
8.2.1 The 8N model 
The BN model, expanded to include additional condition nodes is shown below. 
3-12 
Figure B-3: 'Open track' BN event tree parameterised with factors that determine 
event probabilities. 
8.2.2 Node Probability Tables 
The node probability tables used to quantify the parameterised BN event tree BN 
model are shown below. 
Event nodes 
Contained 
derailment speed >15 <15 
containment fitted Iyes no Iyes no 
FALSE 0.9 1 0.5 1 
TRUE 0.1 0 0.5 0 
Clear 
derailment speed >15 <15 
curvature severe mild none severe mild none 
FALSE 0.71 0.4 0.25 0.625 0.3 01 
TRUE 0.29 0.6 0.75 0.375 0.7 09 
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Direction 
tracks 2 4 
cess 0.5 0.125 
adj. line 0.5 0.875 
Falls 
rolling stock high speed train emu 
derailment speed >15 <15 >15 <15 
FALSE 0.975 0.9875 0.95 0.975 
TRUE 0.025 0.0125 0.05 0.025 
Hits 
derailment speed >15 >15 
lineside density high low hi h low 
carriaQes fall FALSE TRUE FAL SE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE 
FALSE 0.8 0.75 0.95 0.9 0.85 0.8 0.98 0.95 
TRUE 0.2 0.25 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.02 0.05 
Collapse 
lineside type fixed 
crashworthiness high low hi h low 
derailment speed >15 <15 >15 <15 >15 <15 >15 <15 
FALSE 0.85 0.95 0.8 0.9 0.98 0.99 0.95 0.98 
TRUE 0.15 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.02 
Collision 
density of traffic high low 
direction cess adj line cess ad' line 
FALSE 1 0.9 1 0.99 
TRUE 0 0.1 o 0.01 
Consequence nodes 
The model developed uses the same NPT structure for modelling consequences as the 
previous model described in 8.1.1. 
8.2.3 Model output 
The two sets of conditions shown in the Table 12 were input into the resulting BN 
model. One set represents the conditions that might exist on an urban commuter 
railway; the other represents the conditions that might exist on a high-speed, inter-city 
type railway. 
The accident outcome probabilities calculated are shown in the table below. 
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Probabilitv of occurrence per year Probability of occurrene per derailment 
Consequence BN model BN model Commu.ter ~ilway Intercity railway (as 
characterised as a characterised as (as outlined In outlined in column 2 
commuter railway Intercity railway column 1 of Table of table 12) 
(column 1 of Table (column 2 of table 12) 
112\ 112\ 
1 0 0 0 0 
2 0.0012267 0.0031725 0.29 0.75 
3 0.000285314 0.000489754 0.06745 0.11 5781 
4 6.77621 E-05 2.19101E-05 0.0160194 0.00517969 
5 3.56219E-06 3. 86649E-06 0.000842125 0.000914063 
6 1.4078E-05 1.18969E-05 0.00332813 0.0028125 
7 4.45804E-06 1.12359E-06 0.00105391 0.000265625 
8 2.34633E-07 1.98281 E-07 5.55E-05 4.69E-05 
9 0.002246845 0.000510375 0.531169 0.120656 
10 0.00024965 5.15531 E-06 0.0590188 0.00121875 
11 0.000118255 1.30866E-05 0.0279563 0.00309375 
12 1.31394E-05 1.32188E-07 0.00310625 3.13E-05 
Table 8-1: Probability of occurrence of derailment on a commuter railway and on 
an intercity railway (per derailment and per year). 
The event tree calculates the probability of occurrence of an accident per derailment. 
The initial core derailment study calculated that the probability of a derailment per track 
mile was 4.23E-03 per year. Therefore, the per year consequence probability has 
been calculated by multiplying the consequence per derailment figure by this number. 
B3 Parameterised BN event tree model for multiple locations 
This section of Appendix 8 describes the parameterised BN Event Tree model can be 
produced that is more general than the models previously described and is capable of 
calculating the risk is a wide range of different locations as shown in section 5.4 of this 
thesis. 
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B.3.1 Extended Event Tree 
The extended event tree shown in Figure B-4 was used as the specification for the 
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Figure 8-4: Extended Event Tree 
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B.3.2 The BN Model 
The BN model produced from the extended event tree of Figure B-4 is shown as Figure 
B-5. The BN model also shows condition nodes added to pal"ameterise t e--""-f'I",",= II-
1-14 
3-14 
Figure B-5: General BN event tree parameterised with factors that determine 
event probabilities 
8.3.3 Node Probability Tables 
The node probability tables used to quantify the parameterised BN event tree BN 
model are shown below. 
Event nodes 
Contained 
derailment seed >15 <15 
containment fitted es no es no 
FALSE 0.9 1 0.5 1 
TRUE 0.1 0 0.5 0 
Clear 
derailment seed >15 <15 
curvature severe mild none severe mild none 
FALSE 0.71 0.4 0.25 0.625 0.3 
TRUE 0.29 0.6 0.75 0.375 0.7 0.9 
Direction 
4 
n track in station It tunnel th. station twine! a 
tracks 2 
location o n track in station tt tunnel tho station tunnel a 
0.125 05 0.5 05 05 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
0.875 05 0.5 0.5 05 • Hoe 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
--~rtlun nec~----------------------------------------------------------~ 
248 
derailment speed >15 
derails to cessladj cess 
adi location iopentrack in station tt tunnel tho station tunnel app qQen track in station tt tunnel Ith. station FALSE 1 1 1 1 0.5 IlnleI aDD. 1 1 1 1 0Jl TRUE 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0' 
derailment speed >15 
derails to cess/adj cess adj 
location open track in station tt tunnel tho station tunnel app QPen track in station tt tunnel FALSE 1 1 1 1 0.7 
tho station tunnel aDD 
1 1 1 < 095 TRUE 0 0 0 0 0.3 0 0 0 0 005 
Falls 
rotting stock high speed train 
derailment speed >15 
derails to cessladj cess adj 
location open track in station tt tunnel tho station tunnel app open track in station tt tunnel tho station tunnel aop. FALSE 0.975 1 0.995 1 0.975 0.975 0.95 0.975 0.975 0975 TRUE 0.025 0 0.005 0 0.025 0.025 0.05 0.025 0.025 0 025 
rolling stock high speed train 
derailment speed <15 
derails to cessladj cess adi 
location open track in station tt tunnel tho station tunnel app open track in station tt tunnel tho station tunnel app. 
FALSE 0.9875 1 0.9975 1 0.9875 0.9875 0.9975 0.9975 0.9875 09875 
TRUE 0.0125 0 0.0025 0 0.0125 0.0125 0.0025 0.0025 0.0125 0.0125 
rolling stock EMU 
derailment speed >15 
derails to cessladi cess adj 
location open track in station tt tunnel tho station tunnel app open track in station tt tunnel tho station tunnel app. 
FALSE 0.95 1 0.99 1 0.95 0.95 0.99 0.95 095 095 
TRUE 0.05 0 0.01 0 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.05 005 
rolling stock EMU 
derailment speed <15 
derails to cessladj cess adj 
location open track in station tt tunnel tho station tunnel app open track in station tt tunnel tho statIon tunnel app. 
FALSE 0.975 1 0.995 1 0.975 0.975 0.995 0.995 0.975 0.975 
TRUE 0.025 0 0.005 0 0.025 0.025 0.005 0.005 0.025 0.025 
Hits 
derailment speed >15 
lineside density low 
location open track in station twin track tunnel through station tunnel approac:h 
carriages fall FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE 
FALSE 0.8 0.75 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.8 0 75 
TRUE 0.2 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 02 025 
derailment speed >15 
lineside density low 
location open track in station twin track tunnel through station tunnel approach 
carriages fall FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE 
FALSE 0.95 0.9 1 1 1 1 1 1 095 0.9 
TRUE 0.05 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.1 
derailment speed <15 
lineside density high 
tunnel approach_ 
location open track in station twin track tunnel through station FALSE TRUE 
carriages fall FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE 
1 1 1 1 1 085 
08 
FALSE 0.85 0.8 1 0 15 02 
TRUE 0.15 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
derailment speed <15 
Iineside density low tunnel approach 
location open track in station twin track tunnel through station TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE carriages fall FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE 1 098 095 1 1 1 1 FALSE 0.98 0.95 1 005 
0 0 0 0 
002 
TRUE 0.02 0.05 0 0 
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Collapse 
lines ide type fIXed 
crashworthiness hiah low hiQh low 
derailment speed >15 <15 >15 <15 >15 <15 >15 <15 FALSE 0.85 0.95 0.8 0.9 0.98 0.99 0.95 0.98 TRUE 0.15 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.02 
Collision 
density of traffic high low 
direction cess adj line cess adj line 
FALSE 1 0.9 1 0.99 
TRUE 0 0.1 0 0.01 
Consequence nodes 
This section shows the NPTs, and equations used to quantify the hierarchy of nodes 
used to calculate consequence probabilities shown in Figure 8-5. 
456 
collapse FALSE TRUE 
hits FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE 
3 1 0 1 0 
4 0 1 0 0 
5 0 0 0 1 
789 
collapse FALSE TRUE 
hits FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE 
6 1 0 1 0 
7 0 1 0 0 
8 0 0 0 1 
11121314 
falls FALSE TRUE 
collision FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE 
9 1 0 0 0 
10 0 1 0 0 
11 0 0 1 0 
12 0 0 0 1 
456789 
If 'falls' = TRUE then consequence is '789' else consequence is '456' 
3456789 
If 'hit tunnel' = TRUE then consequence is '3' else consequence is '456789' 
1011121314 
If 'hit tunnel' = TRUE then consequence is '10' else consequence is '11 12 13 14' 
250 
3 - 14 
If 'direction' = 'cess' then consequence is '3456789' else consequence is '9 10 11 12 13 
14' 
2 - 14 
If 'clear' = 'true' then consequence is '2' else consequence is '3 -14' 
1 -12 
If 'contained' = 'true' then consequence is '1' else consequence is '2 -14' 
B.3.4 Model output 
In this section we present the model output calculations used to investigate how 
changing the state of conditions/parameters in the model affected the derailment 
accident probabilities calculated by the model. 
First we present the output calculations for the model calculated with a range of 
different conditions sets: 
- - -
Commuter Commuter Commuter Commuter 
railway (as railway with railway with no railway with low 
outlined in containment curved track traffic density 
column 1 of Table fitted 
4) 
1 0 0.207595 0 0 
2 0.312864 0.241229 0.790348 0.312864 
3 0.002433 0.0021901 0.000857 0.002433 
4 0.29204 0.229213 0.086682 0.29204 
5 0.003041 0.0027369 0.001071 0.003041 
6 0.00016 0.000144 0.000056 0.00016 
7 0.00244 0.002196 0.000859 0.00244 
8 0.0002 0.0001801 0.00007 0.0002 
9 0.000011 0.0000095 0.000004 0.000011 
10 0.000487 0.000438 0.000171 0.000487 
11 0.333711 0.27023 0.103043 0.367083 
12 0.037079 0.0300356 0.011449 0.003708 
13 0.01398 0.0124309 0.00485 0.015378 
14 0.001553 0.0013812 0.000539 0.000155 
Table B-2: estimated derailment consequences per derailment for a commuter 
railway (with a range of different condition sets) 
These results are then scaled by the annual probability of occurrence of derailment, 
calculated in the original study (2.59E-02) on the network to estimate the accident 
outcome probabilities per year: 
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Commuter Commuter Commuter Commuter 
railway (as railway with railway with no railway with low 
outlined in containment curved track traffic density 
column 1 of Table fitted 
4) 
1 0 0.005376711 0 0 
2 0.008103178 0.006247831 0.020470013 0.008103178 
3 6.30147E-05 5.67236E-05 2.21963E-05 6.30147E-05 
4 0.007563836 0.005936617 0.002245064 0.007563836 
5 7.87619E-05 7.08857E-05 2.77389E-05 7.87619E-05 
6 0.000004144 3.7296E-06 1.4504E-06 0.000004144 
7 0.000063196 5.68764E-05 2.22481 E-05 0.000063196 
8 0.00000518 4.66459E-06 0.000001813 0.00000518 
9 2.849E-07 2.4605E-07 1.036E-07 2.849E-07 
10 1 .26133E-05 1.13442E-05 4.4289E-06 1.26133E-05 
11 0.008643115 0.006998957 0.002668814 0.00950745 
12 0.000960346 0.000777922 0.000296529 9.60372E-05 
13 0.000362082 0.00032196 0.000125615 0.00039829 
14 4.02227E-05 3.57731 E-05 1.39601 E-05 4.0145E-06 
Table B-3: estimated derailment consequences per annum for a commuter 
railway (with a range of different condition sets) 
The graphs that follow show how the probability of occurrence of derailment accidents 
per year estimated, varies when condition states are revised: 
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Figure B-6: Graph to compare the probabilities of occurrence of various train 
derailment consequences for a commuter railway with a containment rail fitted, 
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Figure B-7: Graph to compare the probabilities of occurrence of various train 
derailment consequences for a commuter railway with curved track, and a 
commuter railway without curved track. 
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Figure B-8: Graph to compare the probabilities of occurrence of various train 
derailment consequences for a commuter railway with curved track, and a 
commuter railway without curved track. 
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Appendix C Parameterised risk model development 
C1 Background and purpose 
The purpose of this report is to describe in detail the specification for a parameterised 
risk model developed using Bayesian Networks. 
C2 Train derailment accidents 
Description of the phenomena of train derailments and what we are trying to model 
C3 Scope of model 
The fault tree part of the model represents the causal mechanisms that lead to the 
occurrence of a derailment. First, we summarise these mechanisms so that the fault 
tree logic can be understood. In our model, five key types of cause are distinguished: 
• Track fault derailments 
• Switch and crossing derailments 
• Derailments due to rolling stock faults 
• Derailments due to obstructions 
• Overspeed derailments. 
The model calculates probabilities of occurrence per track mile per year. The model 
assumes a level of demand of 100-299 trains per day. Therefore, where the model is 
used to estimate risk where demand is different to this the output results would need to 
be adjusted accordingly. 
Track faults 
A large number of derailments on GB rail infrastructure occur as a result of track faults 
of different types. Railway Group Standards ((GC/RT5021) list a large number of faults 
that should be monitored. We limit our concerns to four types of fault: gauge spreading, 
track twist, buckled rail and subsidence/landslip. 
Gauge spreading is a failure to maintain the correct gauge separation between two 
rails. When the gauge has spread the passing of a train can force rails back into 
position, but if this is not possible then derailment will inevitably result. If gauge spread 
is detected the track must be realigned. Temporary mechanical braces are sometimes 
used as an intermediate measure, in which case a temporary speed restriction might 
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be applied. Track twist occurs when the rail becomes twisted such that it is no longer at 
a 90 degree angle to the track bed. This can lead to a derailment as again rail gauge 
and wheel separation will be mismatched and the wheels can 'climb' over the rail. A 
broken rail is a rail that has either a complete fracture through its full cross section or a 
piece detached entirely from the rail. If such a situation arises, there will be a high risk 
of derailment for any train passing over that section of track. Subsidence of the ground 
supporting the track can lead to derailment by altering the gauge spread and height in 
a variety of ways. Detection of track faults is undertaken by both visual inspection, and 
the use of dedicated detection equipment. If track faults are detected various control 
measures might be put in place, from speed restrictions and temporary mechanical 
fixes to compete closure of the line. 
Switch and crossing derailments 
A Switch and Crossing (commonly referred to as a set of points) is a track layout that 
allows rails to be switched to guide a train onto a diverging route or to merge with 
another route. Derailment is possible when rails are not correctly locked into position, 
making it possible for wheels to come off of the rail. Derailment risk is particularly high 
where there are facing points, which lead to diverging routes, as was the case at the 
location of the Potters Bar derailment. S&C errors can be caused by poor maintenance, 
such as misaligned rails, or failure to properly tighten screws or locking nuts following 
maintenance. Because of the high risk associated with S&C errors any identified faults 
would tend to be addressed as a matter of urgency. 
Derailments due to rolling stock faults 
The model includes four types of rolling stock fault that could lead to derailment: 
• Brake failure 
• Axle box failure 
• Wheel flats 
• Suspension/bogie failure 
Brake failure can lead to trains over speeding and hence derailments occurring due to 
large forces between the wheel and rail, particularly at tight corners. The key axle box 
failure is a 'hot axle box' where the axle bearing overheats because of poor lubrication. 
This can result in the axle fracturing. Hot axle box detectors, fixed at lineside, are used 
to detect them. A wheel flat is a flat spot on the rolling surface of the wheel caused by 
the wheel sliding on the rail. This can result in large dynamic forces between the wheel 
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and rail which can result in the wheel fracturing or riding over the rail. Suspension 
failures have the potential to lead to the wheel jumping from the rail where vertical 
movement of the train is not sufficiently damped. 
Derailments due to obstructions 
Collision with significant objects which obstruct the path of the train can obviously result 
in train derailment. Even smaller objects, if placed in certain locations, can greatly 
increase the risk of derailment. In our model we include obstruction by engineering 
material, debris from lineside overbridge, objects from trains, landslip/fallen trees, 
objects placed by vandals, and the presence of large animals. 
Overs peed derailments 
Overspeed derailments occur when a train driver fails to obey a speed limit and the 
train derails because the wheel-rail forces exceed their design limits. We classify over 
speed derailments as derailments of this type where the driver causes the train to 
overspeed, rather than overspeed due to any mechanical fault to the train, such as 
brake failure (which is described in 1.3.3). 
General 
The resulting model calculates the relative probabilities of occurrence of a range of 
possible outcomes following derailment due to these causes. The consequences of a 
derailment accident and the condition states that impact upon those consequences are 
not explicitly modelled. The events and condition states that are modelled are 
described in sections 3, 2 and 3. 
This document should be read in conjunction with files: 
• Derailment model - NPTs v1.0.doc 
• Parameterised derailment model v1.0.hkb/.net 
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C4 Fault tree structure and events 
In this section of the Appendix C, the structure and meaning of the fault tree part of the 
model is shown and described. 
C.4.1 Logical fault tree structure 
The fault tree modelling all possible derailment causes is shown below.in the following 
diagrams: 
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Figure C-6: Obstruction derailment fault tree fragment 
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C.4.2 Fault Tree probabilities 
Base Event Description States Comment 
Event 1 train over A train on a given mile section of Boolean - TRUE! Event occurrence 
speed limit track passes at above the speed FALSE per track mile per 
limit. year 
(frequency) 
Event 2 derailment A train derailment occurs due to Boolean - TRUE! Probability given 
occurs (overspeed) the train passing a mile section of FALSE event 1 is true. 
track at above the speed limit (unavailability) 
Event 3 - track fault The occurrence of any track fault. Boolean - TRUE! Event occurrence 
occurs This is an absolute probability of FALSE per track mile per 
occurrence per track mile. year 
(The occurrence of different sorts (frequency) 
of track fault is modelled with a 
separate node). 
Event 4 derailment A train derailment occurs due to Boolean - TRUE! Probability given 
occurs (track fault) the presence of a track fault. FALSE event 3 and gate 
5 are true. 
(unavailability) 
Event 5 - track fault The track fault is detected by Boolean - TRUE/ Probability given 
detected routine inspections. FALSE event 3 is true. 
(unavailability) 
Event 6 - track fix Following the detection of a track Boolean - TRUE! Probability given 
and TSR required fault, a track fix (gauge restraint or FALSE event 3 is true. 
rail clamping) and TSR are (unavailability) 
required to mitigate risk. 
Event 7 - TSR works, The TSR is correctly applied and Boolean - TRUE/ Probability given 
track fix fails, the track fix is not correctly FALSE event 3 and event 
applied, given that a track fault 5 are true. 
has occurred and both controls 
are the required response. 
(unavailability) 
Event 8 - TSR fails, The Track fix is correctly applied Boolean - TRUE/ Probability given 
track fix works, and the TSR is not correctly FALSE event 3 and event 
applied, given that a track fault 5 are true. 
has occurred and both controls (unavailability) 
are the required response. 
Event 9 - TSR only Following the detection of a track Boolean - TRUE/ Probability given 
required fault, a TSR is required to mitigate FALSE event 3 and event 
risk. 5 are true. 
(unavailability) 
Event 10 - TSR not A TSR is not imposed or is not Boolean - TRUE! Probability given 
applied effective when a track fault has FALSE event 3 and event 
occurred which requires only a 5 are true. 
TSR as a control. (unavailability) 
Event 11 - line block Following the detection of a track Boolean TRUE! Probability given 
only required. fault, a line block is required to FALSE 
event 3 and event 
mitigate risk. 5 are true. 
(unavailability) 
Event 12- line block A line block is not imposed when Boolean TRUE! 
Probability given 
not applied a track fault has occurred which FALSE 
event 3 and event 
requires a line block as a control. 5 are true. 
(unavailability) 
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Base Event Description States Comment I 
I 
Event 13 S&C fault A fault occurs on a switch and Boolean - TRUE! Event occurrence occurs crossing system. FALSE per track mile per 
year 
(frequency) 
Event 14 A train derailment occurs due to Boolean - TRUE! Probability given 
derailment occurs the presence of a switch and FALSE event 13 and gate 
(switch and crossing crossing fault. 14 are true. 
fault) 
(unavailability) 
Event 15 S&C fault The S&C fault is detected by Boolean - TRUE! Probability given 
detected routine inspections. FALSE event 13 is true. 
(unavailability) 
Event 16 S&C fault An S&C fault which has been Boolean - TRUE! Probability given 
not controlled detected is not controlled. FALSE event 13 and 
event 15 are true. 
(unavailability) 
Event 17- rolling A rolling stock fault occurs as a Boolean - TRUE! Event occurrence 
stock fault occurs train travels over a particular mile FALSE per track mile per 
of track. year 
(frequency) 
Event 18- A derailment occurs due to a Boolean - TRUE! Probability given 
derailment occurs rolling stock fault. FALSE event 17 and gate 
(rolling stock fault) 18 are true. 
(unavailability) 
Event 19 - rolling A rolling stock fault is detected. Boolean - TRUE/ Probability given 
stock fault detected FALSE event 17 is true. 
(unavailability) 
Event 20 - rolling Rolling stock fault not fixed. Boolean - TRUE/ Probability given 
stock fault not fixed FALSE event 17 and 
event 19 are true. 
(unavailability). 
Event 21 - train stays A train which should be removed Boolean - TRUE! Probability given 
in service from service, following the FALSE event 17, event 
detection of a rolling stock fault, 19 and event 20 
stays in service. are true. 
(unavailability) 
(assumes that the 
RSF was 
detected) 
Event 22- The track is blocked by an Boolean - TRUE/ Event occurrence 
obstruction occurs obstruction of some type. FALSE per track mile per 
year 
(frequency) 
Event 23- The obstruction is not detected or Boolean - TRUE/ Probability given 
obstruction not noticed prior to the arrival of a FALSE event 22 is true. 
detected train. (unavailability) 
Event 24 - driver fails The driver, having seen the Boolean TRUE! Probability given 
to slow train obstruction, fails to slow the track FALSE events 22 and 23 
down sufficiently to ensure that a are true 
derailment does not occur. (unavailability) 
Event 25- A train derailment occurs due to Boolean TRUE! Probability given 
derailment occurs the presence of an obstruction. FALSE events 22,23 and 
( obstruction) 24 are true. 
(unavailability) 
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C.4.3 Bayesian Network equivalent of the extended fault tree 
cclxiii 
C5 Event tree events 
C.S.1 Logical Event Tree structure 
The extended event tree used as the basis of the model is the same one used as the 
basis of the BN event tree model shown in B.3.1. 
C.S.2 Events 
Consequence Description States Comment 
Events 
Event 26- An extra raised 'containment' rail Boolean - TRUE/FALSE Probability of 
derailment limits movement sideways and occurrence per 
containment prevents the occurrence of a derailment. 
derailment. 
Event 27 -maintain The train remains within the Boolean - TRUE/FALSE Probability of 
clearances lateral limits and does not occurrence given 
overlap adjacent lines or obtrude previous event 
beyond the edge of the track outcomes. 
area. 
Event 28 - derails to The train can derail to either cess Probability of 
cess/adjacent line side of the track: derailing to the adjacent line occurrence given 
'cess', or outside, may lead to a previous event 
collision with a structure beside outcomes. 
the line, while derailing to the 
'adjacent' side brings a risk of 
colliding with another train. 
Event 29 -strike The train collides with the Boolean - TRUE/FALSE Probability of 
tunnel portal entrance to a tunnel. occurrence given 
previous event 
outcomes. 
Event 30 -carriages One or more carriages fall on Boolean - TRUE/FALSE Probability of 
fall their side. The carriages may occurrence given 
remain upright or fall over. previous event 
outcomes. 
Event 31 -hit The train hits a structure beside Boolean - TRUE/FALSE Probability of 
lineside structure the line. occurrence given 
previous event 
outcomes. 
Event 32 -structure Collision with a line-side Boolean - TRUE/FALSE Probability of 
collapse structure causes the train occurrence given 
structure to collapse. previous event 
outcomes. 
Event 33- The derailed train collides with a Boolean - TRUE/FALSE Probability of 






Attribute Description States Comment 
I 
I 
Containment fitted Whether or not a containment Boolean - TRUE/FALSE 
rail is fitted to decrease the 
probability of a derailment 
occurring. 
Track curvature The degree of curvature on the Very high (200m radius) i 
track. 
High (700m radius) 
Medium (1200m radius) 
Low/none (>1500m 
radius) 
Train speed The speed that the train is 110-125 
travelling at (miles per hour). 80-109 
40-79 
~39 
Number of tracks The number of adjacent tracks 1 
in the area where the derailment 2 
occurs. 
4 
Track inspection The interval of time between 1wk 
intervals scheduled inspections. 2 wks 
4wks 
I 
Track type The type of track. Plain Line 
, 
S&C I 
Rolling stock The time interval between 1wk i 





Attribute Description States Comment I 
I 
Lineside object The number of lineside objects high 
density adjacent to the track in the area low 
where the derailment occurs. 
Lineside object type The type of lineside object fixed 
adjacent to the track in the area anchored 
where the derailment occurs. 
The objects are characterised 
by considering how much of an 
obstacle they will present to the 
movement of a train. Anchored 
equipment is something that 
could be knocked from the 
ground, like a signal post. 
Fixed equipment is something 
like a concrete structure that 
would significantly deform the 
derailed train. I 
i 
Location of track The location in which any given in tunnel 





Attribute Description States Comment 
Competence of A qualitative judgement of High Assumed values - would 
infrastructure the overall competence of Medium need to be determined 
maintainer 1M maintenance on any 
Low 
by a programme of 
given mile of the monitoring 
infrastructure. 
Competence of rolling A qualitative judgement of High Assumed values - would 
stock maintainer the overall competence of Medium need to be determined 
rolling stock maintenance 
Low 
by a programme of 
on any given mile of the monitoring 
infrastructure. 
Driver experience A qualitative judgement of High Assumed values - would 
the experience of drivers Medium need to be determined 
on any given mile of the 
Low 




Rolling stock faults 
Attribute Description States Comment I 
" I 
1 
Rolling stock fault Ea?h possible fault type on the 
type 
brake failures 




wheel faults/failure I 
suspension/bogie failure 
Rolling stock fault Each possible severity of rolling high 
severity stock fault. medium 
low 
Track faults 
Attribute Description States Comment 
Track fault type Each possible track fault type on gauge spreading -




Track fault severity The severity of track faultls high -
occurring on the network. medium 
low 
S&C fault severity The severity of S&C faultls high -
occurring on the network. medium 
low 
Type of obstruction Each possible obstruction on the engineering material -
track. debris from 
lineside/overbridge 




C6 Correlation charts 
In all tables that follow, mid-grey shaded boxes indicate that the variable in the row is a 
'child' of the variable indicated in the relevant column. A light-grey shaded box 
indicates that the variable in the row is a 'parent' of the variable indicated in the 
relevant column. In the conditions-conditions correlation chart only, the child 
relationships are shown (as no further information would be provided by highlighting 
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C7 Translation into a BN 
The Bayesian Network showing all fault and event tree events is shown in C.4.3. 
C8 Quantification of the model 
The NPTs in the Bayesian Network are quantified using a combination of available data 
and expert judgement. 






The RSSB Annual Safety Performance Report, 2006 
Network Rail Performance Plan, 2006 
The RSSB report, Derailment Risk Model (Track Faults) Phase 1 report, 
04145/003/01 
Railway Group Standard GC/RT5021 
Thameslink 2000 derailment report TUMPDITL2/SAF/026 
Elicitation of probabilities was undertaken with the support of David Harris, and Peter 
Dray, of Sotera Risk Solutions at a meeting held on 12 June 2007 
A complete set of NPTs used to quantify the BN model was developed in an excel file. 
Sections C.B.1 to C.B.3 provide three examples of NPTs and supporting information 
taken from this file. In the NPT tables shown, entries are shown in bold where they 
have been derived from some specific evidence, assertion by a railway professional or 
technical report. Appropriate references to source information are given. The tables are 
then completed by using expert judgement to extrapolate this known data according to 
the perceived relationship between the occurrence of events and the states of the 
relevant conditions (indicated in each event NPT). 
The data is not intended to be rigorous and complete, and the resulting model is not 
intended for use to support real risk assessment and risk based judgement. Instead 
the data is intended to be indicative, and to allow the author to fully investigate the 
possible uses of a Bayesian Network model of this type. 
C.8.1 Event 1: train overspeed 
driver performance hiah 
train speed 110-125 80-109 40-79 <=39 
false 1 1 1 1 
true 0 0 0 0 
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driver performance medium 
train speed 110-125 80-109 40-79 <-39 
false 1 0.999999 0.999998 0.999996 
true 0 0.000001 0.000002 0.000004 
driver performance low 
train speed 110-125 80-109 40-79 <-39 
false 1 0.999996 0.999992 0.999984 
true 0 0.000004 0.000008 0.000016 
Supporting evidence 
The numbers inserted in this NPT are logically self-evident and are derived from the 
relationship between the track speed limit at any given location and the train speed. 
Probability estimates are based on estimated event occurrence rates per track mile per 
year, and are based on a density of service in the area where the derailment has 
occurred of 100-299 trains per day. 
C.B.2 Event 2: derailment occurs due to a train overs peed 
train speed 110-125 
track curvature v high7200m-) high (700m) medium 1200m low/none (>1500m 
false 0.9928 0.9964 0.9982 0.9991 
true 0.0072 0.0036 0.0018 0.0009 
train speed 80-109 
track curvature v high (200m) high (700m) medium 1200m low/none (>1500m 
false 0.9964 0.9982 0.9991 1.000 
true 0.0036 0.0018 0.0009 0.00045 
train speed 40-79 
track curvature v high (200m) high (700m) medium 1200m low/none (>1500m 
false 0.9982 0.9991 0.99955 0.999775 
true 0.0018 0.0009 0.00045 0.000225 
train speed <-39 
track curvature v high (200m) high (700m) medium 1200m low/none (>1500m 
false 0.9991 0.99955 0.999775 0.9998875 
true 0.0009 0.00045 0.000225 0.0001125 
Supporting evidence 
Meeting with Dave Harris and Peter Dray, 12th June 2007: 
Irish Rail risk model: The probability of a derailment occurring following an overspeed 
through a speed restriction is 9E-04. This figure is for a passenger train. 
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It was assumed that the figure represents that probability for a train travelling at 80-
109mph on with medium track curvature. It is assumed that a derailment on track with 
low curvature is half as likely as a derailment on track with medium curvature. 
It was assumed that a derailment on track with medium curvature is half as likely as a 
derailment on track with high curvature. 
It was assumed that a derailment on track with high curvature is half as likely as a 
derailment on track with very high curvature. 
It was assumed that a derailment due to over speed when travelling at 40-79mph is 
twice as likely as when travelling at <=39mph 
It was assumed that a derailment due to over speed when travelling at 80-109mph is 
twice as likely as when travelling at 40-79mph 
It was assumed that a derailment occurring due to over speed when travelling 
legitimately at 110-125mph is five times as likely as when travelling at 80-109mph 
It was assumed that derailment due purely to overspeed is not possible when travelling 
at less than 39mph on straight track. 




Track fault annual totals derived from the 2006 Annual Safety Performance Report 
(ASPR), page 123. 
Broken rails 226 per annum 
Buckled rails 85 per annum 
Landslips/subsidence 12 per annum 
Network Rail Performance Plan 2006: 
Route miles 16,115 
Types of fault Per mile average 
Broken rails 0.01402 
Buckled rails 0.00527 
Subsidence incidents 0.00074 
Level 2 exceedences due to gauge spreading (ASPR page 237): 0.01 
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Level 2 exceedences due to track twist (ASPR, page 237): 0.4 
Total 0.43003 
The probability total is an absolute probability of occurrence per track mile. Probability 
estimates are based on a density of service in the area where the derailment has 
occurred of between 100-299 trains per day. 
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C9 Validation of the model 
C.9.1 Typical location conditions 
In order to validate the model, output calculation results calculated with a given set of 
condition states were compared against output results for the fault and event tree 
equivalents. Table C-1 (below) shows the set of conditions used for a fairly typical 
location on the GB rail network. 
Conditions Typical mile section of UK rail network 
containment fitted no 
track curvature low/none 
train speed 40-79 
number of tracks 2 
track inspection intervals 2 week 
track type switch and crossing 
lineside object density low 
lineside object type anchored 
location of track outside rural 
rolling stock inspection interval 2 weeks 
driver experience medium 
competence of rolling stock 
maintainer medium 
competence of infrastructure 
maintainer medium 
track fault type distribution - no evidence entered 
track fault severity distribution 
S&C fault severity distribution 
type of obstruction distribution 
rolling stock fault type distribution 
rolling stock fault severity distribution 
Table C-1: Conditions relating to a typical location on the GB rail network. 
C.9.2 Validation of event tree logic 
The diagram below shows the event tree representing the event sequence when the 
set of conditions shown in Table C-1 exist. 
The frequencies of occurrence of each of the 14 possible outcomes given the 
occurrence of a derailment were calculated in a spread sheet and are shown in Figure 
C-7. 
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event 26- event 27- event 28- event 29- event 30-
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Figure C-7: event tree representing the probability of a range of derailment 
outcomes in a location where the conditions in Table C-1 are valid. 
The conditions shown in Table C-1 were then entered into the Bayesian Network 
model. In addition to this the event derailment occurs l was set to 'true I to ensure that a 
direct comparison could be made of the results of each model. 
The BN probabilities were then updated and, as can be seen by comparing the results 
shown in Figure C-7 with those in Figure C-8, the same output probabilities were 
calculated. 
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Figure C-8: Screen shot showing the derailment outcome probabilities calculated 
using the BN model, with the condition states of Table C-1 entered 
A selection of different condition sets were checked against the model is a similar way, 
in order to provide confidence that the event tree logic had been correctly and 
completely captured in the BN model. 
C.9.3 Validation of fault tree logic 
The BN logic can represent a wide range of different fault trees. In order to compare 
the output of the BN fault tree with the output of an actual fault tree it is necessary to 
enter evidence into the BN so that it represents a particular scenario, which can also be 
built as a fault tree. The fault condition nodes, whose possible states are modelled as 
distributions for general use (see Error! Reference source not found.) must also be 
set to a particular state. 
This process was followed for a range of different scenarios (and hence fault trees) in 
order to provide confidence that the fault tree logic had been correctly and completely 
captured in the BN model. 3 scenarios were considered, and these were selected to 




Condition node Condition state 
Containment fitted no 
Track curvature low/none 
--
Train speed 40-79 
Number of tracks 2 
Track inspection intervals 2 weeks 
Track type switch and crossing 
Lineside object density low 
Lineside object type anchored 
Location of track outside rural 
Rolling stock inspection interval 2 weeks I 
Driver experience medium 
Competence of rolling stock maintainer medium 
Competence of infrastructure maintainer medium 
Track fault type gauge spreading 
Track fault severity medium 
S&C fault severity medium 
Type of obstruction from vandals 
Rolling stock fault type axle/axle box failure 
Rolling stock fault severity high 
Table C-2: Conditions relating to a typical location on the GB rail network, for 
use in the validation of the output of the fault tree section of the BN 
The fault tree base event probabilities calculated by the BN when entering the evidence 
in Table C-2 were: 
Event 1: 2.0 e-06 Event 10: 0.0007 Event 19: 0.999988 
Event 2: 2.41301 e-06 Event 11: 0 Event 20: 1.0 e-
06 
Event 3: 0.43003 Event 12: 1.0 e-0
6 Event 21: 0.5 
Event 4: 5.0 e-06 Event 13: 0.0006 Event 22: 0.1739 
Event 5: 0.9996 Event 14: 0.037 
Event 23: 0.0001 
Event 6: 1 Event 15: 0.998 
Event 24: 0.1 
Event 7: 0.000999 Event 16: 1.0 e-0
6 Event 25: 0.00785 
Event 8: 0.000699 Event 17: 0.07179 
Event 9: 0 Event 18: 0.001014 
Both the BN (bn fault tree validation 1.hkb) and the fault tree (bn fault tree validation 
1.psa) calculated a top event probability, for gate 1, of 2.413e-08. 
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Scenario 2 
Condition node Condition state 
Containment fitted no 
-
Track curvature low/none 
-----
Train speed 80-109 
-
Number of tracks 4 
- -
Track inspection intervals 1 weeks 
Track type plain line 
-~ 
lineside object density high 
Lineside object type fixed I 
Location of track outside rural 
Rolling stock inspection interval 2 weeks 
Driver experience low 
Competence of rolling stock maintainer low 
Competence of infrastructure maintainer low 
Track fault type track twist 
Track fault severity medium 
S&C fault severity -
Type of obstruction landslip/fallen trees 
Rolling stock fault type axle/axle box failure 
Rolling stock fault severity high 
Table C-3: Conditions relating to a typical location on the GB rail network, for 
use in the validation of the output of the fault tree section of the BN 
The fault tree base event probabilities calculated by the BN when entering the evidence 
in Table C-3 were: 
Event 1: 4.0 e-06 Event 10: 0.00035 Event 19: 0.999975 
Event 2: 4.5 e-os Event 11: 0 Event 20: 2.0 e-
06 
Event 3: 0.43003 Event 12: 2.0 e-0
6 Event 21: 1 
Event 4: 0.000294 Event 13: 0 Event 22: 0.1739 
Event 5: 0.9996 Event 14: 0.115625 Event 23: 0.00015 
Event 6: 0 Event 15: 0.999641 Event 24: 0.64 
Event 7: 0.0001997 Event 16: 2.0 e-0
6 Event 25: 0.00294 
Event 8: 0.001397 Event 17: 0.07179 
Event 9: 1 Event 18: 0.005071 
Both the BN (bn fault tree validation 2.hkb) and the fault tree (bn fault tree validation 
2.psa) calculated a top event probability, for gate 1, of 5.956e-07. 
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Scenario 3 
Condition node Condition state 
containment fitted false 
track curvature medium 
train speed <-39 
number of tracks 1 
track inspection intervals 4 weeks 
track type switch and crossing 
lineside object density low 
lineside object type anchored 
location of track In tunnel 
I 
rolling stock inspection interval 1 week I I 
driver experience high I I 
competence of rolling stock I 
maintainer high 
I 
competence of infrastructure 
maintainer high 
track fault type gauge spreading 
track fault severity high 
S&C fault severity high 
type of obstruction large animals 
rolling stock fault type brake failure 
rolling stock fault severity medium 
Table C-4: Conditions relating to a typical location on the GB rail network, for 
use in the validation of the output of the fault tree section of the BN 
The fault tree base event probabilities calculated by the BN when entering the evidence 
in Table C-4 were: 
Event 1: 0 Event 10: 0.0014 Event 19: 0.9999 
Event 2: 0.000225 Event 11: 1 Event 20: 0 
Event 3: 0.43003 Event 12: 5.0 e-0
7 Event 21: 0.25 
Event 4: 5.0 e-05 Event 13: 0.00062 Event 22: 0.1739 
Event 5: 0.9998 Event 14: 0.074 Event 23: 0.002 
Event 6: 0 Event 15: 0.9999 
Event 24: 0.025 
Event 7: 0.000499 Event 16: 5.0 e-0
7 Event 25: 0.0147 
Event 8: 0.000349 Event 17: 0.07179 
Event 9: 0 Event 18: 0.000507 
Both the BN (bn fault tree validation 3.hkb) and the fault tree (bn fault tree validation 
3.psa) calculated a top event probability, for gate 1, of 1.404e-07. 
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C.9.4 Comparison of model output with output of SRM version 4 
The SRM model includes occurrence rates for precursors - causes of accidents. 
Precursor probabilities are not representative of their probability of occurrence in any 
particular identifiable location - they are network average occurrence rates per track 
mile. Therefore, it is not possible to structure the BN model, or add evidence into it, so 
that the assumptions that underpin it are consistent with those that underpin the 
precursor rates. However, in order to gauge whether the output of the BN model is 
plausible its output, given certain assumptions, can be compared against the network 
average figure. To allow such a comparison to be made, we need to map the 
precursors to events in the BN model. 
The table below shows which combinations of hazardous events could be considered 
to relate to event/gate occurrence rates in the BN. 
281 
BN gate 




Gate 3 - track 
fault derailment 
occurs 











Equivalent hazardous events (taken from SRM version 4.0) 
Running into large animals leading to train derailment, 
Overspeeding leading to PT derailment, Severe braking/snatch 
leading to PT derailment, 
Total rate of occurrence = 8.11 E-1 0 per track mile per year 
Buckled rail leading to PT derailment, Broken rail leading to PT 
derailment, Broken fish plate leading to PT derailment, Broken rail 
in tunnel leading to PT derailment, Track twist leading to PT 
derailment, Track maintenance staff errors leading to PT 
derailment, Incorrect scotch and clip of points leading to PT 
derailment. 
Total rate of occurrence = 1.41E-08 per track mile per year 
Other driver/train crew error at S&C leading to PT derailment, 
Shunter errors leading to PT derailment, SPAD at S&C leading to 
PT derailment, Wrongside signal failure at S&C leading to PT 
derailment, Defective S&C leading to PT derailment, Points in the 
wrong position and not detected leading to PT derailment, 
Movement of points under train (equipment faults) leading to PT 
derailment. 
Total rate of occurrence = 9.S9E-09 per track mile per year 
Seized axle box bearing leading to PT derailment, axle failure 
leading to PT derailment, Suspension system/bogie failures 
leading to PT derailment, Wheel flats or wheel/tyre wear beyond 
limits leading to PT derailment, Wheel failure leading to PT 
derailment. 
Total rate of occurrence = 1.47E-09 per track mile per year 
Running into items that have fallen onto the line leading to train 
derailment, Running into trees leading to train derailment, Running 
into items placed on the track by vandals leading to train 
derailment, Cat D SPAD or runaway leading to PT derailment, 
Running into Engineers materials left foul leading to train 
derailment, Running into to debris from overbridges leading to 
train derailment, Running into debris from lineside 
structures/buildings leading to train derailment, Running into 
landslip leading to train derailment, Subsidence/ landslip under 
track leading to PT derailment, Running into debris in the tunn~1 
leading to train derailment, Running into objects fallen from trains 
leading to PT derailment, Running into vehi~les :allen fr~m 
overbridge leading to train derailment, Runnl~g Into vehlc~es . 
through boundary fence leading to train derailment, Running Into 
snow/ice leading to train derailment. 
Total rate of occurrence = 3.17E-08 per track mile per year 
Table C-S: Mapping of precursor occurrence rates to BN gate occurrence 
probabilities 
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The condition states shown in Table C-1 were entered into the BN, and the evidence 
propagated through the net. The probabilities calculated for the five gates inputting to 
the top event, derailment occurs, were compared with their equivalents from the SRM. 
The two sets of probabilities are shown in Table C-6. 
BN gates Probability per track mile Probability per track 
per year, calculated using mile per year, 
BN model with the condition calculated by 
states shown in Table C-1 aggregating relevant 
set. precursor rates (see 
Table C-5). 
Gate 2 over speed 4.50e-10 B.11E-10 
derailment occurs 
Gate 3 track fault 1.16e-OB 1.41 E-OB 
derailment occurs 
Gate 13 S&C (Switch and 4.60e-09 9.69E-09 
Crossing) derailment occurs 
Gate 17 rolling stock fault 1.12e-9 1.47E-09 
derailment 
Gate 21 obstruction 9.1ge-OB 3.17E-OB 
derailment 
Table C-6: Comparison of derailment probabilities calculated by the BN, with 
equivalent probabilities calculated with the SRM 
We can see that the probabilities of occurrence for gates 2, 3, 17 and 21 are all lower 
than their SRM equivalents. This is a sensible finding, as the SRM figure does not 
represent the likelihood of a derailment at an average location, it represents the 
average likelihood of a derailment. 
(This thesis argues that there are 'hotspots' on the network. These 'hotspots' would be 
expected to inflate the network average. We would therefore expect that the likelihood 
of a derailment at an average location would in fact be lower than the network average) 
The probability of a derailment due to a switch and crossing fault is higher than the 
network average figure. This too is understandable. The SRM figure is an average per 
track mile. If we take into account the fact that there might only be S&C in place, on 
average for 1 track mile in every 40 miles of track then the estimate calculated by the 
BN would need to be divided by 40 in order to make a more meaningful comparison. 
This would give a figure of 1.1ge-09, again a figure below the network average. 
It should be remembered that, in the absence of a full set of data the BN model has 
been developed with a limited data set, supported by judgement - essentially 
guesswork. Therefore, the model cannot be considered to be a fully validated risk 
model suitable for use in real risk management problems. Nevertheless these 
2B3 
validation exercises show that the logic captured in the fault and event tree models has 
been effectively implemented in the BN, and that the output from the model is 
plausible. 
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Appendix 0 Industry feedback on use of the approach 
A copy of the letter received from: 
Stuart Parsons, CMIOSH, MIIRSM, Programme Manager - Safety Management 
Systems, Rail Safety & Standards Board; 
providing his feedback on the thesis and the new risk modelling approach it proposes is 
available from the author on request. 
-----
( 
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